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Abstract
Forensic fraud occurs when forensic examiners provide sworn testimony, opinions, or 
documents (e.g., reports and professional resumes) bound for court that contain deceptive 
or misleading findings, opinions, or conclusions, deliberately offered in order to secure an 
unfair or unlawful gain. Such misconduct has an undeniably devastating impact: it 
destroys the reputations of the forensic examiners involved, if not their careers; it erodes 
public confidence in the institutions where they are employed; it can result in overturned 
convictions, individual and institutional liability, and costly civil judgments; and it is 
corrosive to the collective faith in the justice system as a whole. However, owing to a 
lack of research into the phenomenon of forensic fraud that is exacerbated by the 
constraints on would-be whistleblowers, in tandem with the denials of forensic science 
stakeholders, there is a general perception that forensic fraud is primarily the result of a 
few “bad apples” rather than being cultural or systemic in origin. This dissertation 
examines the problem of forensic fraud both theoretically and empirically, to assess the 
relationships between examiner, workplace, evidentiary, and impact variables.
The present research shows that the majority of forensic examiners work for law 
enforcement or government agencies, and almost exclusively for the police and 
prosecution. Law enforcement culture is often defined by traits that afford the 
motivations and rationalizations for a deviant internal subculture, actively cultivating 
fraud within its ranks. It also furnishes otherwise lawful members with the skills, 
incentives, motivations and rationalizations for ignoring, protecting, and even publicly 
defending their unlawful co-workers. Research suggests that employment circumstances 
and cultural features, in conformity with Differential Association Theory, Social Learning 
Theory, and Role Strain, increase the likelihood that those aligned with law enforcement 
will commit, tolerate, conceal, or defend acts of overt fraud. 
iii
The present research also shows that scientific integrity requires honesty, use of the 
scientific method, skepticism, objectivity, transparency, and a host of other well 
established scientific norms. It prohibits fabrication (aka forging or dry-labbing); 
falsification (aka cooking); suppression of unfavorable results (aka cherry-picking); 
plagiarism; ghost authorship (aka honorary or gift authorship); falsification of scientific 
credentials; and the reckless disregard for practice standards that ensure scientific 
integrity. In this context, scientific misconduct (aka fraud) is primarily understood to be 
the result of institutional failures to uphold scientific values and nurture scientific culture; 
these are an institution’s responsibility to detect, investigate, and correct. More 
specifically, corrupt individuals cannot be hired, or retained, by any employer without 
some level of institutional negligence, apathy, tolerance, or even encouragement. It is 
therefore misleading to blame forensic fraud solely on the actions of isolated examiners. 
Moreover, as made clearer through the lenses of Differential Association Theory, Social 
Learning Theory, and Role Strain, the mandates of scientific integrity are incompatible 
with law enforcement values and cultural pressures. Consequently, the employment or 
alignment of forensic examiners with law enforcement is inappropriate and fraught with 
unnecessary peril. 
In order to establish and evaluate the contextual variables that influence forensic fraud, 
this dissertation sought to examine and correlate the traits of fraudulent forensic 
examiners (n=100); the nature of their fraud; their places of employment; and the impact 
of their misconduct. It was limited in scope to those cases involving fraud related to the 
examination of physical evidence, and revealed in the United States from 2000 to 2010. 
Final data were initially assessed with a series of correlation matrices, and then examined 
more closely using multiple hierarchical regression analysis. Findings support the 
assertion that forensic fraud tends to be the result of cultural, pathological and systemic 
causes rather than the narrow motives of single individuals. Additionally, they support the 
assertion that those working on behalf of the state (the police and the prosecution) are 
responsible for a substantial amount, if not the majority, of publicly known cases of 
iv
forensic fraud. Based on statistically significant findings, specific potentially causal 
factors are identified and discussed. Subsequently, fraud management strategies 
suggested by these findings are proposed.
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Chapter 1  
Introduction
“Where a proffered expert knows himself or herself to be a quack or otherwise to 
be offering false testimony, the situation is like that of any other witness who is 
perpetrating a fraud on the court. Such acts are illegal as well as unethical.”
Michael J. Saks (2001)
Professor of Law & Psychology
Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law
This dissertation examines and correlates the traits of fraudulent forensic examiners; their 
fraud related activity; and their places of employment. To ensure timeliness and provide 
for comparability, it is limited in scope to those cases revealed in the United States from 
2000 to 2010. It is a study that seeks to inform and add to our theoretical understanding 
of a specific yet potent strain of employee fraud in the criminal justice system. Based on 
the findings of this study, potential causal factors are identified and discussed. 
Subsequently, relevant fraud management strategies are proposed.
Background
The events that have accumulated over the course of this researcher’s career to confirm 
the need for this study, and provide sufficient motivation for its completion, are numerous 
and ongoing. The earliest took place immediately after to the completion of this 
researcher’s graduate studies in forensic science in 1995: a research paper that had been 
provided on-line was taken in its entirety and presented elsewhere under the name of 
another. Upon discovery and further investigation, it was learned that the person 
responsible, a forensic psychologist, was no stranger to fraud. Then the Chair of the 
Forensic Science program at National University in San Diego, California, it was learned 
that the plagiarist had purloined the research of others in at least one Canadian journal. 
He had also been accused of misrepresenting the nature of his relationship with the 
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Orange County Coroner’s Office by means of printing up misleading business cards. 
Further still, his professional resume was full of incomplete and misleading information 
and affiliations. Ultimately, and subsequent to a complaint filed by this researcher, this 
individual was forced to resign his membership with the American Academy of Forensic 
Sciences, and contemporaneously ceased to be the Chair of the Forensic Science program 
at National University. That someone would do these things so openly, let alone a 
professional of apparent high standing in the forensic science community, and that 
nobody had complained about it in writing save a recently graduated student of forensic 
science, left an impression.
Over the past 17 years of forensic practice, this researcher has observed or learned of 
countless instances of unrepentant forensic fraud by practitioners from all over the United 
States, and around the world. A severe outcome, with proven fraudsters stripped of their 
employment, penalized by their respective professional organizations, and criminally 
charged is not at all typical. Often fraud is minimized, ignored, or in extreme cases 
simply denied by those in the forensic science community. For example, Budowle (2007), 
speaking for the FBI crime laboratory, insists that “most people do good jobs”, that 
forensic fraud is not a significant issue, and that any problems are “most often human 
error”; Collins and Jarvis (2007), speaking for an organization formed by those associated 
with the American Society of Crime Lab Directors Laboratory Accreditation Board 
(ASCLD-LAB), similarly assert that “Forensic scientists are human beings. As such they 
will sometimes make mistakes and, in some very rare instances, push the boundaries of 
ethical behavior.”; and, in response to multiple and ongoing scandals involving examiner 
fraud since 2005 at the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL), the 
Army's Criminal Investigation Command, which oversees the lab, has conceded only that 
"As with all crime labs across the county, human error does occur from time to 
time" (Taylor and Doyle, 2011) – in essence ignoring the issue of fraud altogether1. Many 
leaders in the forensic science community, it seems, are content to explain fraudulent 
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1 For further discussion, see Chapters 6 & 7 with respect to Bad Apple Theory.  
examiners away, or deny their existence, despite continuous and sometimes 
overwhelming evidence of the problem. This sets the tone for the attitudes and arguments 
that must necessarily follow from their subordinates, as will be discussed in later 
chapters.
Different from that of many forensic science stakeholders, this researcher’s perspective 
has been enhanced by at least the following major events in the forensic science 
community over the past ten years:
1. The ongoing and in some cases repeated instances of major crime lab scandal, to 
include multiple instances of fraud and error, over the past 15 years (see general 
discussions in Cooley, 2004, 2007a, and 2007b; DiFonzo, 2005; DiFonzo and 
Stern, 2007; Giannelli, 2010; and Thompson, 2008)2.
2. The publication of the National Academy of Science Report on forensic science 
(aka The NAS report; Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009). The NAS Report was a 
congressionally funded system-wide investigation and review of the forensic 
science disciplines and related forensic laboratory practice. It was initiated by the 
United States Congress due to the publication of an ongoing series of critical legal 
reviews regarding the evident bias and lack of science in forensic practice; the 
ongoing occurrence of highly publicized forensic frauds, blunders, and forensic 
laboratory scandals across the United States; and the ever-increasing number of 
DNA exonerations sourced back to flawed or misleading forensic evidence 
documented by groups such as the Innocence Project (see http://
www.innocenceproject.org; see also Garrett, 2008 and Garrett and Neufeld, 2009). 
The NAS Report confirmed the lack of scientific foundation for the majority of 
forensic science methods, and an inappropriate alignment between forensic 
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2 Numerous specific crime lab scandals are adduced throughout this dissertation as necessary. 
scientists and their law enforcement employers. It also recognized the lack of 
empirical research into the nature and causes of forensic fraud and error.
3. The publication of Preventable Error: A Report on Prosecutorial Misconduct in 
California 1997-2009 by the Northern California Innocence Project (Ridolphi and 
Possley, 2010). This landmark study of the largest criminal justice system in the 
United States (California) found prosecutorial misconduct more common than 
previously thought, including that related to suppressing or misrepresenting 
physical evidence. It also found that when harmful misconduct does occur (p.3) 
“those empowered to address the problem—California state and federal courts, 
prosecutors and the California State Bar—repeatedly fail to take meaningful 
action. Courts fail to report prosecutorial misconduct (despite having a statutory 
obligation to do so), prosecutors deny that it occurred, and the California State 
Bar almost never disciplines it.” This is clearly related to, and not surprisingly 
similar to, the problems faced in the forensic science community regarding 
forensic fraud.
These experiences and events, expanded by myriad professional encounters with 
fraudulent examiners as part of regular casework, have provided a durable source of 
motivation for the current research effort.
Definitions of Key Terms
To contextualize this dissertation, and facilitate continuity between this and any future or 
related projects, it is necessary to operationalize at least the following key terms in 
advance: scientific misconduct, forensic examiner/ forensic practitioner, forensic fraud, 
and perjury. Other pertinent terms will be defined as needed.
Scientific Misconduct
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According to the guidelines adopted by the United States Office of Research Integrity, 
scientific misconduct is defined by acts that include the fabrication of data, the 
falsification of results, and plagiarism. However, it has also been argued to include ghost 
authorship and the falsification of credentials (Krimsky, 2007). While the wrongfulness 
of falsifying scientific credentials and fabricating data are fairly straightforward, the long-
standing practice of ghost authorship in the scientific community requires some 
explanation. As explained in Krimsky (2007; pp.450): “Ghost authorship occurs when the 
person whose name appears on the publication was not involved either in doing the 
research, framing the ideas behind the article, or in writing the article. Alternatively, it 
can occur when an individual who has made substantial contributions to the manuscript is 
not named as an author or whose contributions are not cited in the acknowledgments.” 
This practice is also referred to by some as “gift authorship” (Jones, 2003; p.245). 
Essentially, it involves hiding who did the work by giving credit that has not actually 
been earned.
Forensic Examiners
The terms forensic examiner and forensic practitioner will generally refer to any 
professional who examines and interprets facts, evidence, or data with the expectation of 
courtroom testimony. As explained in Turvey (2011; p.xxii):
Criminal investigators are tasked with serving the criminal justice system by establishing the 
objective facts and evidence of a given case. Forensic examiners are tasked with analyzing the 
evidence and interpreting the facts objectively.
Forensic examiners are defined by the fact that they anticipate courtroom testimony. As 
explained in Thornton and Peterson (2007; p3):
The single feature that distinguishes forensic scientists from any other scientist is the certain 
expectation that they will appear in court and testify to their findings and offer an opinion as to the 
significance of those findings. The forensic scientist will testify not only to what things are, but to 
what things mean.
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This provides that a forensic scientist does not just test or examine evidence and then 
record the results; they are meant to explore, understand, and explain its significance to a 
an attorney, judge or jury. The defining quality of a forensic examiner is the possibility 
that they will be called upon to present their findings, under penalty of perjury, in a court 
of law. Subsequently, they will be asked to explain to the court what those findings mean 
and how they came to them. This can be as straightforward as recording information 
about drug identifications, weights, and cash amounts; or it can be as complex as 
reconstructing a crime scene and determining cause and manner of death. 
Forensic examiners are therefore found across a broad spectrum of professions. This 
would include criminalists and other forensic scientists such as forensic pathologists, 
forensic toxicologists, firearm and tool mark examiners, forensic odontologists, crime 
reconstructionists, criminal profilers, forensic criminologists, forensic psychologists and 
even forensic victimologists. It would also include an array of law enforcement officers 
processing evidence or testifying as experts in a variety of specialty areas, such as gang 
culture, sexual assault, drug dealer profiles, drug lab profiles, and case linkage analysis. 
The scope of the present research is limited, however, to forensic examiners that work 
directly with physical evidence.
Forensic Fraud
Forensic fraud occurs when forensic examiners provide sworn testimony, opinions, or 
documents (e.g., reports and professional resumes) bound for court that contain deceptive 
or misleading findings, opinions, or conclusions, deliberately offered in order to secure an 
unfair or unlawful gain. As defined in the present research, forensic fraud is necessarily 
that which is committed by a forensic examiner. It is distinct from deceptive or 
misleading acts that may be committed by others, such as fact witnesses, patrol officers, 
attorneys, and judges. 
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Forensic fraud, while certainly a form of scientific misconduct, does not necessarily 
involve perjury. Perjury is criminal charge. It is the act of lying or making verifiably false 
statements on a material matter under oath or affirmation in a court of law or in any 
sworn statements in writing (Black, 1990). A violation of specific criminal statutes, it is 
not sufficient for a statement to be false to meet the threshold of perjury; it must be an 
intentionally false statement regarding a material fact—a fact relevant to the case at hand. 
As further explained in Turvey (2008; p. 734): 
The act of lying or making verifiably false statements on a material matter under oath or 
affirmation in a court of law or in any sworn statements in writing. A criminal act, it is not 
sufficient that the statement be false to be considered perjury; it must be regarding a material fact
—a fact that is relevant to the situation. Consequently, not all lies under oath are considered 
perjury.
For example, in Title 18 of the U.S. Code of Laws, §1621 “General Perjury” provides that 
perjury involves a person “having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or 
person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be 
administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written 
testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and 
contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe 
to be true.”
As it stands, not all intentionally false statements made under oath by a forensic examiner 
are considered perjury – nor are all forensic examiners who give false testimony under 
oath charged with a crime. The decision to bring such charges is made at the discretion of 
the District Attorney’s Office in the jurisdiction where the false testimony occurred.
Joseph Serowik, Criminalist
Cleveland Police Department Crime Laboratory
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In 1988, Michael Green was convicted of rape, however he was later exonerated by 
DNA evidence and released in 2001. As reported in Gillispie (2004; p.A1):
Edward Blake, a pioneer in the use of DNA for criminal investigations who was hired by Green's 
attorneys, concluded that Serowik "intentionally fabricated false evidence against Green, testified 
at Mr. Green's trial with a reckless disregard for the truth, and committed scientific fraud." 
Blake wrote that Serowik turned a washcloth into incriminating evidence against Green by making 
assumptions that had no scientific basis. Serowik told jurors that the man who used the washcloth 
to wipe himself after raping a cancer patient in May 1988 at the Cleveland Clinic Hotel had the 
same blood type as Green's. Serowik also testified that the semen on the washcloth could have 
been left by only 16 percent of the male population. Without his faulty assumptions, Blake wrote, 
Serowik should have concluded that no man could have been excluded as a possible source of the 
semen on the washcloth, rendering it meaningless in the Green prosecution.
Serowik also testified that a hair found on the washcloth shared similarities with hair taken from 
Green's head, and went on to say that the likelihood they came from two different people was 
about 1 in 40,000. But another expert hired by Green's attorneys said Serowik should not have 
made that assertion because hair analyses aren't precise enough to calculate probabilities.
In addition, Serowik admitted that he had no idea what part of the body the hair came from, 
making any comparisons scientifically improper. Determining the part of the body a hair comes 
from is not only essential, it's easy to do, wrote Max M. Houck, director of the Forensic Science 
Initiative and a professor at West Virginia University. With proper training, he wrote, it's about as 
difficult as distinguishing a Volkswagen from a Cadillac. The fact that Serowik apparently couldn't 
do it, together with his misuse and misstatement of statistics, led Houck to conclude that "Joseph 
Serowik demonstrates a fundamental lack of knowledge about conducting forensic hair 
examinations.” 
“Mr. Serowik was allowed to conduct hair examinations without proper education, training, 
supervision, or protocols," Houck wrote. "He conducted these examinations in numerous cases, 
repeatedly made the same mistakes, and did not seek any training by qualified experts in forensic 
hair examinations."
Houck and Blake pointed out that Serowik was supervised by someone who knew even less about 
the scientific disciplines involved than he did. And yet it was [Victor] Kovacic, the lab supervisor, 
who oversaw and signed off on the hair analysis in the Green case. A retired police officer who has 
headed the Cleveland crime lab since 1985, Kovacic acknowledged in February that he had no 
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expertise in either hair analysis or serology (the study of bodily fluids) and that his technicians 
could have made up their findings and he wouldn't have known the difference. It was a "gross 
deviation from accepted practice" to have an inexperienced serologist supervised by someone with 
no experience or training in the field, Blake wrote in his report.
Ultimately, Mr. Green sued the City of Cleveland and won a settlement that included 
1.6 million dollars and a mandatory forensic audit of the casework of both Mr. 
Serowik and the Cleveland Police Crime Laboratory (a random sample); this resulted 
in the review of approximately 100 cases (Green v. City of Cleveland, et al, 2004). 
During his sworn deposition for that action, Mr. Serowik agreed that his assumptions 
about the evidence in the Green case, and his subsequent expert testimony, were 
“inappropriate”  (Gillispie, 2004). Despite acknowledging his false testimony, Mr. 
Serowik was not charged with perjury. 
Initially, the Cleveland Police Crime Laboratory retained Mr. Serowik as an 
employee, but removed him from forensic casework. However, later in 2004, he was 
placed on leave and then ultimately terminated (Milicia, 2007). Mr. Serowik was not 
charged with any crimes related to his false testimony.
As a result of the mandatory audit of Mr. Serowik’s casework and testimony, two 
other convictions were questioned by the Innocence Project, which reported that 
(Salzberg, 2007):
New DNA tests show that two men's convictions for a 1997 murder were based on fraudulent 
testimony from a City of Cleveland forensic analyst - whose false testimony also wrongfully 
convicted another man who was exonerated in 2001 and led to an audit of cases covering a 16-year 
period that revealed serious problems in at least a half-dozen convictions - the Innocence Project 
said today. In legal papers filed today, the Innocence Project and the Ohio Innocence Project asked 
state courts to vacate the convictions of Thomas Siller and Walter Zimmer.
In 2009, because of Mr. Serowik’s testimony, Mr. Siller’s conviction was vacated 
and he was ordered to receive a new trial (Puente, 2009).
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This case involved fraud by a law enforcement employed forensic examiner related 
to both physical evidence and expert credentials. According to the record, Mr. 
Serowik gave intentionally false and misleading testimony about his findings, what 
they meant, the current state of the forensic science literature, and his expertise. As 
such, his acts of fraud having been uncovered during the parameters set for this study  
(2000-2010), data from Mr. Serowik was included in the final data set. See Chapter 
8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results for details regarding specific inclusion 
criteria and data collected.
Rationale 
Forensic fraud exists as a sore and often forbidden subject in the forensic science 
community. The frequency and conditions of its occurrence have not been studied to any 
significant degree, and incidents are regularly hidden from public scrutiny to maintain the 
reputations of those police agencies and crime laboratories that have suffered its stain. As 
will be discussed, this is at least in part a reflection of the reality that those who have 
direct knowledge of forensic fraud have a vested interest in keeping these instances from 
becoming public knowledge. It preserves the image of their agency or lab, and by 
extension their own, out of concern for present testimonial credibility and future 
employment prospects. 
Additionally, forensic practitioners are by definition involved in sensitive casework. As a 
function of their employment contracts, they may operate under confidentiality 
agreements or non-disclosure clauses that they believe preclude communication of any 
kind about active casework – especially that which reflects negatively on their employer. 
The fear of losing employment related income, and any future employment prospects, is 
generally sufficient enough for many to avoid causing a breach, even in the public 
interest. 
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The majority of forensic scientists are employed directly by police agencies or by crime 
labs associated with law enforcement and the prosecution (Peterson and Hickman, 2005). 
Consequently, open discussion and study of forensic fraud has long been considered a 
“third rail” in the forensic community (Cooley and Turvey, 2011). A brief explanation is 
necessary: the third rail is the method of providing electrical power to a railway, such as a 
mass transit system, by means of an exposed conductor. Anyone that touches the third rail 
is killed instantly by a surge of electricity. So it is with the issue of fraud. Such a 
discussion necessarily involves critical review of the actions and motives of law 
enforcement, prosecutors, and their scientific agents. These are not professional 
communities that are generally receptive of criticism or review, and they are frequently 
hostile to external or independent efforts involving either (Capers, 2008; Chin and Wells, 
1998; Cooper, 2009; Dorfman, 1999; Mollen, 1994; and Shockley-Eckles, 2011). 
Consequently, any forensic practitioner who raises these or related issues risks touching 
the third rail—being the object of hostility and derision within the law enforcement and 
government lab community. This means risking not only employment, but also one’s 
friends, colleagues, and professional identity 3.
This shared cultural silence regarding the existence and persistence of forensic fraud has 
resulted in an absence of clear or emergent data to enable ongoing scientific study of the 
phenomenon. The problem faced within the forensic science community, and understood 
by many in the criminal justice system, is described in Castelle (1999):
Experienced criminal defense lawyers long ago realized that police perjury haunts courthouses 
throughout the country. In a similar manner, lawyers with significant experience with forensic 
science are beginning to realize that fraudulent forensic science may be equally endemic and, with 
tragic results, may permeate the criminal justice system in every state.
...with depressing regularity, respected forensic scientists will concede their own knowledge of 
instances of "dry-labbing" -- faking of data by former colleagues and employees that they have 
11
3 The will be discussed further in Chapter 7 – Forensic Fraud: A literature Review.
encountered in their own careers. Because it is safe to assume that most of the forensic science 
fraud that occurs goes undetected, the amount of fraud that has been revealed bears disturbing 
implications for any estimate of the amount of fraud that passes without notice.
Forensic fraud, in the current setting, has remained an unexplored, undeveloped, and 
unresolved empirical mystery.
Anecdotal evidence is widely available, however. Individual fraudsters, such as 
criminalists Fred Zain of West Virginia and Joyce Gilchrist of Oklahoma, have even 
achieved a level of infamy. However, a larger picture of forensic fraud is lacking, as 
explained in Cooley (2006), where he discussed the current crime lab crisis (p.513):
The current state of U.S. crime labs, and their regular lack of qualified personnel, has forced Barry 
Scheck (2004, p. 4), defense attorney, DNA expert, and cofounder of The Innocence Project, to 
conclude, “Everyone should know our crime laboratories are in a crisis, reeling from an epidemic 
of scandals reflecting decades of shoddy work, usually from bad actors producing incompetent or 
fraudulent results, but sometimes from methodologies that have been exposed as unreliable.”
Although some may argue that Scheck’s comments must be viewed through a cautious lens, given 
his allegiance to the criminal defense bar, it must be conceded that his position is actually 
reinforced by numerous high-ranking forensic practitioners and administrators. For instance, 
Milton E. Nix, director of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation’s crime lab, admitted to Congress, 
“You may find this an unusual statement, but I am in total agreement with the National 
Association of Defense Attorneys when it comes to quality and accuracy of crime lab 
examinations and analysis” (“Crime Lab Modernization,” 2001). Similarly, Barry Fisher, director 
of the Los Angeles County crime lab, made the following comment regarding the lack of crime lab 
oversight (as quoted in Graham, 2001, p. 10): “I don’t think anyone can tell you what’s really 
going on [in the nation’s crime laboratories]. . . . The truth is, we don’t know.” 
The criminal justice system needs a working sense of what is going on with respect to the 
range and frequency of forensic fraud in courtrooms, police agencies, and government 
funded crime labs. Until this has been achieved, it is not possible to effectively anticipate 
and correct the circumstances that allow fraud to occur, let alone address fraud directly 
when it is revealed. That is purpose of this dissertation: to define forensic fraud; to 
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identify its occurrence in the justice system; to help render a sense of its nature and 
origins; and ultimately to help inform related legislation and agency policy. In the 
process, it is hoped that it will also contribute to the development polices and procedures 
necessary to maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system.
It is important to note that, in the current forensic science environment, empirical 
research on the subject of forensic fraud is necessary if only due to its utter absence 
(Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009). However, it is also clear that the vast majority of forensic 
scientists, being employed by or aligned with the prosecution, do not feel free to carry it 
out themselves (Inman and Rudin, 2006). It must fall to those that are generally 
unaffiliated, such as the present researcher, to avoid political consequences or 
institutional sanction. It is with a keen awareness of such realities that this research has 
been undertaken.
Scope and Originality
A number of law review articles and textbooks have been published which touch 
anecdotally, or ideographically, on the issue of fraud committed by forensic examiners 
(see generally Castelle, 1999; Cooley, 2004; Cooley, 2007; Cooley and Oberfield, 2006; 
Connors et al, 1996; Giannelli, 1997; Giannelli, 2001; Giannelli, 2002; Imwinkelried, 
2003; Kelly and Wearne, 1998; Koehler, 1993; Midkiff, 2004; Pyrek, 2007; Raeder, 2007; 
Saks, 2003, Saks et al, 2007; Samuel, 1994; Scheck et al, 2000; Starrs, 1993 and 2004; 
Turvey, 2003 and 2011; and Wilson, 1992). All of these works reference the problem of 
forensic fraud while only skimming its surface, to show that it can and does happen 
without any sense of frequency, consequences, or community response. Additionally, 
these works originate almost entirely from the legal community, save Pyrek (2007), a 
journalist; and Starrs (2003 and 2004), Midkiff (2004), Turvey (2011) and Wilson (1992) 
- all forensic practitioners. Moreover, none of these works represent formal research on 
forensic fraud per se; rather they exist as technical notes, collected interviews, or 
discussions regarding selected case studies.
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There has been only one prior study specific to cases involving forensic fraud. This was a 
descriptive review of limited data from 42 cases with a proposed motivational typology 
by the present researcher (Turvey, 2003). In this study, the scope was highly inclusive, the 
data was limited, the discussion was cursory, and the findings were very much 
preliminary in nature.
The current dissertation is therefore not only original, but it has been conducted from a 
unique perspective – that of a currently practicing and testifying forensic scientist. It will, 
and for the first time, provide significant examination of the nature and breadth of 
forensic fraud. This is accomplished by examining the existing cases in the public domain 
at such a depth, and in such a manner, as never before .
As already mentioned, the nature and scope of forensic fraud have essentially been 
unexamined by the forensic science community, and therefore it is unknown in a formal 
empirical sense. This research attempts to fill that existing gap in the literature. Without 
it, this the development and implementation of strategies to prevent such fraud, and effect 
forensic reform, will be under-informed and may even be misguided.
The value of this research should be self evident: to define the nature of the problem of 
forensic fraud in the forensic community; to help understand the social contexts and 
personal motives that facilitate forensic fraud; to help develop informed strategies for 
mitigating forensic fraud; and to keep the criminal justice system honest regarding the 
types of reforms required to identify and prevent forensic fraud. It will also contribute to, 
and be based upon, criminological theories associated with employee fraud and general 
criminality.
Thesis Statements
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Currently, the prevailing wisdom within the forensic science community with respect 
to forensic fraud is that it is only a minor problem, rarely occurring – akin to a few 
bad apples spoiling the barrel. As explained in Thompson (2009; p.1028): “Public 
discourse on this issue has construed forensic science foul-ups as the product of 
individual intellectual and moral failure. According to the standard account, the problem 
is limited to ‘a few bad apples’, and the solution follows from that analysis—the bad 
apples need to be identified and either re-trained or replaced.” Similar views are 
expressed in Edwards and Gotsonis (2009) and Pyrek (2007), where outright fraud by 
forensic practitioners is presented as a “rare” event, generally contained to a single 
individual that has lost their professional compass. In contrast, this researcher’s core 
hypotheses are as follows:
1. Forensic fraud tends to be the result of cultural, pathological and systemic causes 
rather than the narrow motives of single individuals, as the circumstances 
surrounding it are allowed to develop and persist by those in the immediate 
forensic environment.
2. Though private (e.g. defense) forensic practitioners are routinely characterized as 
biased or mercenary, those working on behalf of the state (the police and the 
prosecution) are responsible for a substantial amount, if not the majority, 
of known cases of forensic fraud. 
The current research and subsequent dissertation will seek to support, expand or refute 
these statements, as well as exploring the origins of forensic fraud. 
Approach Overview
This dissertation will systemically outline the major forms of employee related fraud 
found in law enforcement and scientific cultures. As part of these initial chapters, cases 
excluded from the current data under examination will be discussed, and general 
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employee fraud theories will be considered. Later chapters will deal specifically with 
types of fraud that exist in the forensic sciences, to include a literature review specific to 
this phenomenon. Theoretical causes and origins of forensic fraud will also be 
considered, through the related criminological lenses of Routine Activities Theory, 
Differential Association Theory, and Role Strain. Once the theoretical framework has 
been set in place, the data collection methods and results for the present study will be 
explained, and then research findings and conclusions will considered. This dissertation 
will conclude with discussions regarding proposed strategies for enabling forensic fraud 
prevention and management, as suggested by a statistical analysis of the present data.
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Chapter 2
Occupational Fraud 
"False face must hide what the false heart doth know"
Macbeth: Act 1, Scene 7, Shakespeare
In the first chapter, we outlined an approach to forensic fraud as sub-type of employee 
(aka occupational) fraud. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a basic discussion and 
literature review regarding the phenomenon of occupational fraud, and supply an 
understanding of how criminologists and the legal community have approached the 
subject in general. This is distinct from the treatment of fraud by the scientific or law 
enforcement communities, which will be examined in subsequent chapters. 
As explained in Black’s Law Dictionary (Black, 1990) fraud is an intentional distortion of 
facts and truth for the purposes of inducing another to give up something of value that 
they possess, or to relinquish a legal right that they might otherwise retain. It is 
additionally defined as (p.660): “A false presentation of a matter of fact, whether by 
words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which 
should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another…” 
Further still, it is described as “Anything calculated to deceive, whether by a single act or 
combination, or by suppression of truth, or suggestion of what is false, whether it be by 
direct falsehood or innuendo, by speech or silence, word of mouth, or look or gesture.” 
This exhaustive set of definitions, generally consistent with the criminological literature 
reviewed by this researcher (e.g., Albrecht and Albrecht, 2003; Albrecht, Albrecht, 
Albrecht, and Zimbelman, 2011; Bolton and Hand, 2002; Brytting, Minogue, and 
Morino, 2011; and Kranacher, Riley, and Wells, 2010), leaves little daylight for the 
willful prevaricator. Fraud is, ultimately, any act or omission of act purposed at gain 
through a misrepresentation, distortion, or concealment of the facts. 
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This chapter will discuss the criminological literature associated with occupational fraud 
and begin the process of relating it to the current research effort. First, fraud will be 
considered as a statutory violation. Second, acts of fraud will be differentiated from acts 
of negligence. Third, occupational fraud will be defined and discussed. Fourth, the fraud 
triangle will be introduced and evaluated. Finally, the relevant traits of the occupational 
fraudster will be discussed, based on the most current empirical research available. Each 
section provides an understanding for the next, dictating the order of presentation. 
Demonstrative case examples associated with the justice system will be adduced as 
necessary, involving those both included and excluded from the current study. 
Fraud as a Statutory Violation
By itself, fraud is general term rather than a specific one, with different implications 
depending on context (Albrecht and Albrecht, 2003; Ostas, 2007). Therefore, the use of 
the term “fraud” to describe a person or an action can imply that criminal and even civil 
statutes have been violated. However, this is not always going to be the case. 
Historically, legal statutes have been inconsistent, failing to provide universal coverage 
for the many types of fraud that can occur (Branham and Kutash, 1949; Newsome, 1995). 
Furthermore, not every statutory violation that occurs will result in enough evidence to 
meet the specific legal burdens of the jurisdiction where it occurred (Albrecht and 
Albrecht, 2003). Each legal jurisdiction in the United States, and around the world, has 
it’s own peculiar interpretations relating to fraud as a legal concept with multiple 
corresponding statutes on the books (Albrecht, Albrecht, Albrecht, and Zimbelman, 
2011). Within these jurisdictions, the general concept of fraud is the same but with 
varying coverage, as explained in Brown and Hepler (2005; pp.264-265):
The elements of fraud [require] an intentional misrepresentation of material facts; reliance by the 
recipient; causation, and damages. Many of these elements are omitted from consumer fraud 
statutes. While most statutes require some aspect of willfulness, some do not. 
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Brown and Hepler (2005) provide an example of this legal disparity in the United States, 
citing the selective use of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices and the Uniform 
Consumer Sales Practices Acts by different states when developing consumer fraud 
protection statutes (pp.266-267):
Approximately thirty states have adopted legislation based at least in part on the Uniform 
Deceptive Trade Practices or Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Acts. These acts are characterized 
by a listing of prohibited practices. Colorado, for example, lists forty-three categories of prohibited 
activities… Mississippi, in contrast, lists only eleven categories of prohibited activities.
In other words, one can commit the same fraudulent act in two different legal 
jurisdictions (e.g. states or countries), but that fraudulent act might violate criminal and/or 
civil statutes in only one of them. Given the vast number of criminal and civil statutes 
pertaining to fraud that are in effect, and the inconsistent coverage provided by these 
statutes across legal jurisdictions, no single legal definition of fraud can exist that covers 
all possibilities (Kapardis and Krambia-Kapardis, 2004). Consequently, fraud is best 
viewed as a criminological construct with potential legal repercussions that vary 
depending on where and how it is committed.
Despite the lack of homogeny in criminal fraud statutes across the United States, fraud 
related offenses are a required part of crime data reporting by U.S. law enforcement 
agencies to the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) program run by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI, 2004). The FBI provides a brief discussion that both defines criminal 
fraud and provides examples for submitting agencies (p.140-141):
The intentional perversion of the truth for the purpose of inducing another person or other entity in 
reliance upon it to part with something of value or to surrender a legal right. Fraudulent conversion 
and obtaining of money or property by false pretenses. 
Fraud involves either the offender receiving a benefit or the victim incurring a detriment. The 
benefit or detriment could be either “tangible” or “intangible.” Intangibles are anything which 
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cannot be perceived by the sense of touch. They can be benefits, e.g., a right or privilege, a 
promotion, enhanced reputation; or a detriment, e.g., loss of reputation, injured feelings.
Examples of common fraud cases are where something of value, such as a DVD player or an 
automobile, is rented for a period of time but is not returned. This offense, conversion of goods 
lawfully possessed by bailees, is classified as fraud and not larceny. In such cases, the offenders 
originally had lawful possession of the property (the property was either rented, loaned, or the 
person was in some way entrusted with its possession) and through deceit (they promised to return 
it) kept the property. 
Agencies must include in this classification: 
Bad checks, except forgeries and counterfeiting
False pretenses/swindle/confidence games
Leaving a full-service gas station without paying attendant 
Credit card/Automatic Teller Machine Fraud 
Impersonation 
Welfare Fraud 
Wire Fraud 
Attempts to commit any of the above
This narrow definition excludes many additional forms of criminal fraud, such as tax 
fraud, mortgage fraud, Medicaid/ Medicare fraud, and embezzlement4. 
The FBI’s UCR program divides law enforcement crime data collection efforts into Part 1 
and Part 2 offense schedules. “Part 1” offenses are the more serious violent crimes, and 
include criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-
theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson (FBI, 2004). The UCR Program requires collecting 
“data on all Part I offenses that become known to law enforcement whether or not they 
involve arrests” (FBI, 2004; p. 139). Fraud is considered a “Part 2” offense by the UCR, 
meaning that law enforcement agencies need only collect and submit arrest information 
(FBI, 2004; p.139). This necessarily excludes cases that involve complaints without 
subsequent arrest from reporting. Consequently, the fraud data collected by the FBI is 
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4 Embezzlement has it’s own separate UCR listing.
limited to criminal complaints where an arrest has occurred; it does not encompass all 
reported instances of fraud.
According to the most recent law enforcement data published by the FBI’s UCR program, 
the total number of estimated arrests for fraud in the United States has diminished 
steadily every year since 2005, from 321,521 to 187,887 in 2010 (FBI, 2006; FBI, 2007; 
FBI, 2008; FBI, 2009a; FBI, 2010; and FBI, 2011). However, the UCR data suffers from 
some important built in limitations. First, and as already mentioned, the data does not 
include all reported instances of fraud, only those crimes within the narrow scope defined 
that resulted in an arrest. Also, the number of law enforcement agencies reporting crime 
data to the UCR program changes from year to year, as reporting to the UCR is not 
mandatory. This, in combination with the inconsistent fraud laws across differing legal 
jurisdictions, makes any subsequent UCR crime statistics a rough estimate only. In other 
words, what is reported to the UCR is an unknown percentage of actual cases. This 
renders cross-comparisons of the data collected by the UCR inappropriate from an 
empirical standpoint, whether city to city or year to year (FBI, 2009b), as change is 
expected based on the number of agencies reporting; differing interpretations and 
enactments of local statutes; and any alterations made to staff and budgets that might 
affect the ability to focus on particular kinds of crime. 
Despite the steady decline in total estimated arrests for criminal fraud by the FBI’s UCR, 
and bearing in mind the program’s limitations, most researchers agree that fraud related 
crime is actually on the rise (Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004; Albrecht, Albrecht, Albrecht, 
and Zimbelman 2011). These same researchers also agree that it is not possible to know 
how much criminal fraud is actually occurring (as with any crime). This is owing to the 
fact that there are many different kinds of fraud, most of which is either not uncovered or 
not reported to the authorities when it is (Kapardis and Krambia-Kapardis, 2004; Lord, 
2010).  As explained in Albrecht, Albrecht, Albrecht, and Zimbelman (2011; p.5):
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Although most people and even most researchers believe that fraud is increasing both in size and 
frequency, it is difficult to know for sure. First, it is impossible to know what percentage of fraud 
perpetrators are caught. Are there perfect frauds that are never detected, or are all frauds eventually 
discovered? In addition, many frauds that are detected are quietly handled by the victims and 
never made public. In many cases of employee fraud, for example, companies merely hide the 
frauds and quietly terminate or transfer perpetrators rather than make the frauds public. Companies 
and individuals who have been defrauded are often more concerned about the embarrassment of 
making frauds public, and the costs of investigating fraud, than they are about seeking justice and 
punishing fraud perpetrators.
Owing to its many forms, the high frequency of known cases, and high related costs 
(discussed shortly), it is generally agreed that criminal fraud should be a primary concern 
for researchers, investigators, and employers across the board – no matter the true 
percentage of fraudsters made public (Kapardis and Krambia-Kapardis, 2004; Karcz and 
Papadakos, 2011; Lord, 2010; Quail, 2010; and RTTN, 2010). 
Differentiating Fraud and Negligence
Fraud is distinguished from negligence, ignorance, and error by virtue of the fact that it is 
intentional, involving some level of calculation (Albrecht and Albrecht, 2003). 
Negligence is: “the failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person 
would use under similar circumstances” (Black, 1990; pp.1032). In a professional 
context, it is: “conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the 
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm… it is characterized chiefly by 
inadvertence, thoughtlessness, inattention, and the like” (Black, 1990; pp.1032). In 
contrast, fraud is not accidental in nature, nor is it unplanned (Albrecht, Albrecht, 
Albrecht, and Zimbelman, 2011; Black, 1990; and Lord, 2010). Those who commit fraud 
know what they are doing and are deliberate in their efforts. They are also aware that it is 
unethical, illegal, or otherwise improper. While this may seem an insurmountable 
threshold, it is relatively straightforward to investigate and establish if one knows what to 
look for.
22
In the most general terms, fraudulent intent is established by examining the 
documentation of decisions and behaviors associated with those under suspicion. As 
explained in Coenen (2008; p.8): “Manipulation of documents and evidence is often 
indicative of such intent. Innocent parties don’t normally alter documents and conceal or 
destroy evidence.” Other indicators can include obstructing a fraud investigation by lying 
or concealing pertinent information, a known history of fraudulent behavior, 
circumventing safeguards, and being the direct recipient of benefits from suspected 
fraudulent acts (Coenen, 2008).
Evan Thompson, Forensic Scientist
Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory
This case was uncovered during the course of data gathering efforts described in 
Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results. It involves a forensic scientist 
employed by the Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory, a division of the 
Washington State Patrol (WSP; a statewide law enforcement agency). The head of 
this crime lab, which employs non-sworn scientific personnel, reports directly to the 
Chief of the WSP. 
The facts of this case, published widely in the media at the time, are documented in 
the official report prepared by the Washington State Forensic Investigations Council 
(FIC; McEachran, 2008). The FIC was only one of the entities to investigate this 
matter and make recommendations (p.2):
During the ordinary course of peer and supervisory review of the work of Forensic Scientist Evan 
Thompson, deficiencies were discovered. Due to concerns he was placed on a work improvement 
program in April of 2006. During this review process an error was discovered on Mr. Thomson’s 
work relating to bullet trajectory analysis. Due to concern raised about this type of work by Mr. 
Thompson, he was removed from bullet trajectory casework on October 2, 2006. As the review by
Crime Laboratory supervisors took place, technical errors and violations of laboratory operating 
procedures were discovered, and Mr. Thompson was removed from all casework responsibilities 
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on November 13, 2006. Mr. Thompson’s case files were reviewed and irregularities were 
discovered, and then a focused casework review was undertaken of Mr. Thompson’s work. During 
this process Mr. Thompson resigned from the State Crime Laboratory effective April 6, 2007.
In order to fully examine Mr. Thompson’s work, Dr. Barry Logan contracted with two independent 
firearms examiners, Matthew Noedel, and Dwight Van Horn. They were initially directed to 
examine 13 cases that Mr. Thompson had completed. Other casework was also examined by the 
two examiners. Mr. Nodell reported that he discovered work that was poorly organized and poorly 
documented…
To be clear, the errors that were identified in Mr. Thompson’s work were not 
demonstrably intended to hide or misrepresent the evidence. Rather, the errors 
reflected a longstanding lack of interest in following proper lab procedures and an 
overall carelessness with respect to documenting findings. Specific instances 
included releasing information to prosecutors about firearms analysis before 
supervisors could review the case and sign off on it, and separately the failure to 
identify the diameter of a bullet in a forensic report as per lab protocols (Sullivan, 
2007). While evidencing ineptitude and an incapacity to learn despite repeated 
sanctions from supervisors, there was no manifest evidence that this conduct was 
intended to deceive anyone for any particular gain. Apparently, Mr. Thompson 
simply refused to follow the required steps when conducting his work, was 
unmotivated to change by being placed on a “work improvement program”, and was 
eventually taken off casework. 
It bears noting that this attitude towards casework did not distinguish Mr. Thompson, 
as the WSP crime lab was known for sloppiness, deficiency and even overt fraud 
during the years leading up to his forced resignation (Curtis and Bowman, 2007; 
Johnson, 2008; McEachran, 2008; Seitz, 2008; Steiner, 2008; and Teichroeb, 2004). 
However, his errors were among those discovered, investigated, and made public. He 
consequently chose to resign rather than face further administrative or courtroom 
related consequences (e.g., suspension, loss of courtroom credibility). As of this 
writing, the State of Arizona’s Department of Public Safety currently employs Mr. 
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Thompson as a forensic scientist at their Northern Regional Crime Laboratory in 
Flagstaff.
 
This case involves a forensic scientist performing evidence examination and related 
duties within the timeframe parameters set for the present research. However, given 
the absence of demonstrable fraud, Mr. Thompson and the errors discovered in 
association with 13 of his cases were necessarily excluded from the present study. 
This case is provided, however, to show how negligence may be distinguished from 
fraud in a forensic context. Specific criteria for inclusion in the present study are 
discussed in Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results.
Occupational Fraud
Occupational fraud is a sub-type of fraud associated with the workplace, referring to a 
range of misconduct that includes both criminal and non-criminal infractions (Coenen, 
2008). It may also be referred to as internal fraud, employee fraud, embezzlement, and 
workplace fraud, depending on the organization or researcher (Albrecht and Albrecht, 
2003; Coenen, 2008). For the purposes of this research, the descriptors occupational 
fraud and employee fraud will be used interchangeably.
Since 1996, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) has published an 
annual Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, which provides a 
breakdown of the costs, the methods and perpetrators of fraud within the United States as 
compared to other major nations around the world  (RTTN, 2010). The ACFE defines 
occupational fraud as (p.6): “The use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment 
through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization’s 
resources or assets.” This definition is intentionally broad, meant to cover the whole 
range of misconduct committed by employees at any level within an organization. It 
includes everything from stealing items out of the workplace supply cabinet for personal 
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use, to falsifying work orders or time-sheets, to complex forms of overcharging, debt 
concealment, and embezzlement (RTTN, 2010). In its ongoing effort to study this profit-
motivated phenomenon, the ACFE has broken occupational fraud down into three general 
types: (1) asset misappropriations; (2) corruption; and (3) fraudulent statements (RTTN, 
2010). Each has many sub-types to account for the variety of fraud that is commonly 
encountered in association with the workplace (see Figure 2-1: ACFE Occupational Fraud 
and Abuse Classification System). 
The following definitions apply, taken from Kranacher, Riley, and Wells (2010; p.4).  
Asset misappropriations are “the theft or misuse of an organization’s assets”, including 
things like skimming profits, stealing company property, and payroll fraud. Corruption is 
“the unlawful or wrongful misuse of influence in a business transaction to procure 
personal benefit, contrary to an individual’s duty to his or her employer or the rights of 
another,” including things like taking bribes, accepting kickbacks, and participating in 
business relationships with inherent conflicts of interest. Fraudulent statements are “the 
intentional misrepresentation of financial or non-financial information to mislead others 
who are relying on it to make economic decisions,” including overstating profits, 
understating debts and expenses, or making false promises regarding the safety and 
potential of an investment.
The estimated cost of occupational fraud to U.S. businesses, in terms of loss of income to 
employers or clients, is approximately 5-7% on average (Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher 
and Riley, 2010; Lord, 2010). Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the term used to is the 
value of all goods and services produced a given country. The United States has a GDP of 
14.66 trillion U.S. Dollars (CIA, 2011), which translates somewhere around 
$733,000,000,000.00 and $1,002,620,000,000.00 of estimated loss to fraud per year.
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Figure 2-1: ACFE Occupational Fraud and Abuse Classification 
System (RTTN, 2010; p.7)
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24 Police Officers
Hamilton Police Department, Hamilton, Massachusetts
This case was uncovered during the course of data gathering efforts described in 
Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results. It involves the unraveling of a 
“tradition” of fraud among multiple police officers employed by the City of 
Hamilton Police Department in Massachusetts. In this particular department, all 
police officers are required to maintain state certification as emergency medical 
technicians (EMTs) as stipulated in their employment contracts. It bears noting that 
this is not an unusual requirement for any police department. As reported in Quail 
(2010; p.6):
In 2008, a complaint was made by a police officer to the OEMS [Massachusetts Office of 
Emergency Medical Services] regarding the police department’s (his employer) ambulance 
service. The complainant officer alleged that in 2006 and 2007, the police department sponsored 
EMT [Emergency Medical Technician] refresher and continuing education programs, but that the 
required number of hours to complete these programs was never met. He also reported that the 
primary instructor and other police officers would sign EMT attendance rosters, and then leave 
without attending training programs. These officers then submitted documents to the OEMS which 
knowingly contained false and inaccurate information in order to renew their EMT licenses (MA. 
DPH OEMS, 2008, August, Complaint Investigation Report # 08-0705).
During the investigative process, the OEMS investigators acquired sufficient evidence and 
testimony to conclude that there was a “culture” of falsifying records and programs, which not 
only involved the two years cited in the complaint, but began approximately in 2000 (MA. DPH 
OEMS, 2008, August, Complaint Investigation Report # 08-0705).
The OEMS conducted a trip record audit for years 2006 and 2007, to ensure patients received 
appropriate treatment by the police officers. The audit revealed that of the ambulance calls, 93 
percent and 89 percent respectively, lacked either appropriate patient care or appropriate 
documentation to support the care provided to the patient. The investigation revealed that the 
police officers had based their treatment decisions on outdated treatment protocols. In addition, the 
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two ambulances licensed by the town carried expired medications and did not have a drug control 
license to carry such medications (MA. DPH OEMS, 2008, August, Complaint Investigation 
Report # 08-0705; MA DPH OEMS-Trip Record Audit #08- 0705).
The OEMS investigation concluded that 24 police officers engaged in falsifying training 
attendance records and were not eligible for EMT license renewal for multiple years. These police 
officers used the title of EMT and provided patient care as unlicensed providers, which posed a 
threat to the health and safety of the public. In addition, the police officers knowingly submitted 
false documents and fees to the state agency, stating their training records were a true and accurate 
reflection of their training. Furthermore, the police department ambulance service staff billed 
patients’ insurance companies and received payment for services by unlicensed providers (MA. 
DPH OEMS, 2008, August, Complaint Investigation Report # 08-0705).
The OEMS began legal action against the ambulance service by immediately revoking its 
ambulance license, and against the individual police officers, by scheduling multiple DALA 
[Division of Administrative Law Appeals] hearings. The OEMS referred their investigative 
findings to the OAG and OIG insurance fraud divisions for criminal action (MA. DPH OEMS, 
2008, August, Complaint Investigation Report # 08-0705).
Discussion Case #3. The police department and staff knowingly committed multiple acts of fraud, 
larceny, and health care fraud by allowing patients to be treated by unlicensed providers and 
submitting insurance claims for reimbursement. In addition, police officers received supplemental 
money and overtime pay in order to attend training classes to be licensed as EMTs. The amount of 
money each officer received was approximately $4,470 each year (Landwehr, 2008, 2009; 
Manganis, 2008).
Originally, the whistleblower in this case was asked to keep quiet about the 
allegations and allow city officials to handle matters internally (Landwehr, 2008).
This case involved a network of fraud by those working within the criminal justice 
system on several levels, as mentioned in the discussion section provided from Quail 
(2010). To be more specific, it involved asset misappropriation and false statements 
at the very least. Asset misappropriation accurately describes the scheme devised to 
falsify training and credentials for profit. False statements are evident if one simply 
removes the unnecessary financial component of the ACFE’s definition; fraud is 
demonstrated by the intentional misrepresentation of information to mislead others 
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who are relying on it to make decisions. This accurately describes the use of 
unearned or phony credentials, giving the supervisors and the public the false 
impression that they are being served by properly trained and credentialed EMTs.
However, given that these cases of fraud did not involve those designated 
specifically as forensic examiners in the performance of evidence related duties, but 
rather non-forensic law enforcement personnel, related data was necessarily 
excluded from the present study. Specific criteria for inclusion in the present study 
are discussed in Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results. 
Mitchell T. Griffin and Cathy L. Decker, Laboratory Managers
HealthTec Labs, Merced, California
These cases were uncovered during the course of data gathering efforts described in 
Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results. It involves a private toxicology 
lab formerly operating out of Merced, California called HealthTec Labs. The 
laboratory was owned and operated by a brother and sister team: Mitchell T. Griffin 
and Cathy L. Decker.
HealthTec Labs was one of many private labs in California contracted by state 
agencies and private companies to conduct employment related or court ordered drug 
testing on employees and criminal defendants (Conway, 2003a). For instance, Child 
Protective Services (CPS) and the courts would refer parents with drug related 
convictions to HealthTec Labs for testing in order to either regain or maintain 
custody of their children. The certified results of drug tests provided by HealthTec 
Labs would be used as administrative evidence to suspend and terminate an 
employee, or in a forensic (aka courtroom) context to help a judge decide custody 
issues. It is reported that CPS, the state agency charged with investigating cases of 
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child abuse and neglect, accounted for approximately 20 percent of HealthTec Lab's 
business (Conway, 2003a).
According to Commander Larry Slate with the Merced/Mariposa Narcotics Task 
Force, complaints had been coming in for at least three years regarding HealthTec 
Labs; specifically, they were suspected of selling clean tests to parents seeking 
custody of their children subsequent to CPS taking them away for drug-related 
offenses (De La Cruz, 2003).  In December of 2002, the Narcotics Task Force 
laboratory tested a female suspect with positive results for drugs. Approximately two 
weeks later, HealthTec performed a drug test on the same female suspect with 
negative results, suggesting that she had been clean of any drugs for at least 90 days 
(Conway, 2003a). Knowing this to be false, the Narcotics Task Force began an 
official investigation that resulted in Grand Jury Testimony from Mr. Mitchell in late 
August of 2003. Subsequently, both suspects were arrested for falsifying records. Mr. 
Mitchell was given additional charges of perjury for lying to the Grand Jury, for 
possession of methamphetamine, and for being under the influence of 
methamphetamine (Conway, 2003b; De La Cruz, 2003). 
The scheme of fraud perpetrated by Mr. Mitchell and Ms. Decker is reported in 
Conway (2003a):
In CPS cases, [Commander Larry] Slate said, Griffin would ask parents for $200 for clean-test 
results. He allegedly asked at least one person for drugs in exchange for clean-test results…
In a sting operation, the task force sent in several people who agents knew had drugs in their 
systems, based on separate testing. Griffin sold test results that showed the people were not using 
drugs, Slate said.
A negative test for drugs does not guarantee that a parent will regain custody of his or her children, 
but a positive test is sufficient to postpone custody.
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HealthTec did not perform laboratory work, Slate said. Instead, Griffin and Decker sent samples to 
Omega Lab, a legitimate company in Ohio.
Omega performs two kinds of drug tests: pre-employment screenings for $36 and forensic tests, 
admissible in court, for $260.
The county, for CPS cases, ordered forensic tests and paid HealthTec $100 for each one.
Authorities said HealthTec would substitute samples to guarantee clean tests.
At the same time, it would order $36 pre-employment screenings, Slate said -- and collect $100 
from the county.
The results for each pre-employment screening came back with a notation: "This form should not 
be used for forensic (courtroom) purposes." That notation would be covered with correction fluid 
and a photocopy of the form would be sent to CPS, Slate said.
Additionally, the Merced/Mariposa Narcotics Task Force uncovered at least one 
instance in which Mr. Griffin “reportedly offered to return a client’s $200 back in 
exchange for some methamphetamine” (De La Cruz, 2003).
Of interest is the report from the Narcotics Task Force that they had warned CPS 
about HealthTec’s suspect business practices more than once in the years leading up 
to the investigation (Conway, 2003b). Then Chief of CPS Kathy Hassett denied 
being given actionable information about HealthTec, which the Merced/Mariposa 
Narcotics Task Force stated was incorrect on her part (Conway, 2003a). However, 
Social Services Director Ana Pagan admitted that several months prior to the arrests 
“Superior Court Judge Frank Dougherty told a CPS court representative that the 
judge would no longer accept drug test results from HealthTec,” which should have 
alerted them to the scandal (Conway, 2003a). 
In any case, once it was confirmed that CPS continued to refer cases to HealthTec for 
drug testing despite these warnings, CPS Chief Kathy Hassett was temporarily 
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reassigned and an investigation into CPS was initiated into the matter by the State 
(Conway, 2003b). The results of the State investigation into CPS’s handling of this 
matter were not made public. However, as of 2011, Kathy Hassett remained the 
Director of the re-named Child Support Services for Merced County, under the 
supervision of Ana Pagan (Merced County, 2011).
The fraud in these cases can be described as including asset misappropriation, 
corruption and false statements. This owing to the fact that it involved over-billing to 
the state for tests that were not performed as described; it involved accepting bribes 
for clean drug tests; and it involved false and misleading documentation relating to 
drug tests that were provided to the court.
Ultimately, HealthTec was shut down, the owners were convicted of criminal 
charges, and each of the 755 drug tests that they had authenticated for CPS over the 
previous three years had to be re-examined (Conway, 2003a). The known financial 
cost of this fraud would be, at the low end, an estimate of $75,500.00, given the 
$100.00 fee charged for each suspect drug test conducted on behalf of Merced 
County. This does not include the cost in man-hours for staff members assigned to 
review these cases, or for those involved in reviewing the custody issues that this 
scandal revealed. The additional cost and consequences with respect to harm caused 
by leaving children in the custody of drug-addicted caregivers has not been publicly 
investigated or addressed by Merced County.
This example involves multiple instances of fraud by those working on behalf of the 
justice system. Additionally, the two individuals involved lacked any formal 
education, were working in a forensic capacity directly with physical evidence, and 
were certifying the authenticity of subsequent drug tests for forensic (aka courtroom) 
purposes. As such, these self proclaimed forensic laboratory technicians, having 
committed their offenses during the parameters set in this study (2000-2010), were 
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both included in the final data set. Impact data was not replicated for both 
individuals, to prevent duplication in the data. See Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and 
Frequency Results for details regarding inclusion criteria and data collected.
The Fraud Triangle
Donald R. Cressey, PhD (1919 –1987) was an American criminologist well known for his 
study of both theoretical and applied issues across a number of related areas. In their 
biography of Dr. Cressey, Akers and Matsueda (1989) explain that (p.426): 
…his presence in the field was felt most clearly in (1) criminological theory; (2) prisons, 
punishment, and corrections; (3) sociology of criminal law and justice; (4) organized crime; and 
(5) white-collar crime. Perhaps the most lasting influence will come from his understanding and 
use of criminological theory, especially his espousal, analysis, and application of differential 
association theory, because it pervaded virtually all that he did.
An author of multiple seminal texts and research (including Principles of Criminology, 
co-edited to the 11th edition [Cressey, Sutherland, and Luckenbill, 1992], an industry 
standard until just after his death), Dr. Cressey is perhaps most remembered in the current 
literature for his development of Fraud 
Triangle Theory. 
Fraud Triangle Theory states that in order for 
an act of occupational fraud to occur, there 
must be a convergence of three elements: 
offender motivation (aka, pressure or need), 
opportunity and rationalization (Cressey, 
1953/1973; see Figure 2-2: Cressey’s Fraud 
Triangle)5. 
Figure 2-2: Cressey’s Fraud Triangle
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5 Fraud Triangle Theory is referenced throughout the literature on occupational fraud, and is essentially the 
same as the more broadly applied and empirically validated construct of Routine Activities Theory (see 
Chapter 6). 
Motivation to commit fraud can be experienced in many forms, but often comes from a 
financial need to pay existing debts and maintain professional standing; a desire for 
increased standing, wealth or profits; or cultural pressure to conform to pre-existing 
expectations within a group already engaged in fraudulent activity (Coenen, 2008; 
Donegan and Danon, 2008). According to Ostas (2007; p.574): “Traditional economic 
analysis assumes that people, including corporate executives, are motivated by pecuniary, 
or material, self-interest.” However, the motivation to commit fraud can also come from 
addiction, where fraudsters are compelled to steal money, property, or other assets in 
order to satisfy various forms of chronic dependence such as gambling or drug use 
(RTTN, 2010). 
Opportunity is experienced in the form of knowledge and access to “assets, people, 
information, and computer systems that enables the person not only to commit the fraud 
but to conceal it,” (Coenen, 2008; p.12). As explained in Brytting, Minogue and Morino 
(2011; p.50):
…fraud also demands a possibility to cheat, combined with a low possibility of getting caught, 
that is, a proper ‘opportunity’, created for instance by weak internal control systems, power to 
override systems, inside information, privileged access to resources, and so on. A potential 
fraudster will perceive an opportunity when he believes he can commit a fraud with either an 
acceptably small risk of getting caught, or an acceptably low risk of punishment if caught.
Donegan and Danon (2008) argue that opportunity to commit fraud is also created, or 
inhibited, by the cultural support that exists in a given workplace (p.10):
…the nature of available social support determines whether crimes actually occur. Social support 
typically ameliorates the effects of strain, but can also encourage crime when provided by a 
deviant subgroup. Access to a deviant subgroup provides an opportunity to learn the skills needed 
for criminal behavior and may provide social support to the nascent criminal.
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Fraud Triangle Theory suggests that when the necessary knowledge, skills, and social 
support are absent, the potential for committing fraud is decreased.
Rationalization involves either self-delusion regarding the acceptability of fraud related 
behavior under “special circumstances”, or a disregard for the law as unjust or somehow 
inapplicable. Coenen (2008) explains that rationalization (p.12): 
…is the process by which an employee determines that the fraudulent behavior is ‘‘okay’’ in her or 
his mind. For those with deficient moral codes, the process of rationalization is easy. For those 
with higher moral standards, it may not be quite so easy; they may have to convince themselves 
that a fraud is okay by creating ‘‘excuses’’ in their minds.
This is further developed in Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher and Riley (2010; p.19):
Cressey indicated that a morally acceptable rationalization is necessary before the crime takes 
place. Because a fraudster does not view himself as a criminal, he must justify his misdeeds to 
himself before he ever commits them. For example, the perpetrator may rationalize his actions by 
thinking, “This is just a loan and I’ll pay it back after my next paycheck.” The rationalization 
allows the perpetrator to view illegal behavior as acceptable, thus preserving his self-image as a 
trustworthy person.
Brytting, Minogue and Morino (2011) offer the following list of common rationalizations 
developed and held by the fraudster to allow for their misconduct (p.57): “everyone is 
doing it; it’s only fair; I’ve (they’ve) no choice; it’s just a loan; no one is hurt; I’ve 
(they’ve) earned it; they deserve it; it’s not a crime; they don’t mind; it’s for a good 
cause.” As a corollary, Kidder (2005) reports that (p.390): “perceived unfairness in the 
workplace is a major determinant of performing "bad" behaviors.” The perception of 
inequity, or not getting what one perceives rightful entitlement to, is therefore a rich 
nesting ground for the development of these related rationalizations.
It is important to note that fraud rationalizations might also be peculiar to a deviant sub-
group that tolerates or is directly involved in ongoing fraud or other criminal enterprise. 
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Brytting, Minogue and Morino (2011) maintain (p.50): “If an individual’s identity is tied 
to such a sub-group of relevant others, fraud may be committed even though they have 
excellent knowledge about cultural norms and values on a more general level.” For the 
purposes of the current research, this concept is particularly relevant to deviant subgroups 
operating within law enforcement, and in relation to Social Learning Theory, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 4: Fraud in Law Enforcement Culture.
Though Fraud Triangle Theory has been debated, adapted, expanded and refined over the 
past 60 years, it’s core remains foundational to modern occupational fraud investigation 
and examination methods (Albrecht and Albrecht, 2003; Albrecht, Albrecht, Albrecht and 
Zimbelman, 2011; Brytting, Minogue and Morino, 2011; Coenen, 2008; and Wells, 
2010). In addition, it is regularly featured as an essential starting point for new research 
on fraud in different contexts (Aguilera, and Vadera, 2008; Dorminey, Fleming, 
Kranacher and Riley, 2010; Lord, 2010; Kapardis and Krambia-Kapardis, 2004; Malgwi 
and Rakovski, 2009; Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004). 
Fraud Triangle Theory is not without criticism, however (Donegan and Danon, 2008; 
Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher and Riley, 2010). For example, Donegan and Danon 
(2008) offer an overview of the major problems with Fraud Triangle Theory that can be 
found in the literature. This includes the fact that Dr. Cressey’s theory is a generalization 
about all financial fraud from a sample of embezzlers involved in primarily financial 
statement fraud as opposed to other forms (p.3):
The white-collar crime literature has generally stratified offenders into higher and lower status 
categories, with securities law violators in the former group and embezzlers in the latter (Weisburd 
et al. 1991; Langton and Piquero 2007). These studies have found significant differences between 
high and low status offenders; thus even if Cressey’s findings for embezzlers were valid, there is 
little evidence to support the fraud triangle as a general theory of financial crime.
Another issue, often ignored by researchers, is that the three elements of the Fraud 
Triangle can be present without fraud actually occurring. This has lead some to argue that 
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the Fraud Triangle does not sufficiently acknowledge an offender’s pre-existing character, 
or criminal predisposition, with sufficient explication. This has lead to the development 
of the Fraud Diamond, originally presented in Wolfe and Hermanson (2004). 
The Fraud Diamond adds a fourth element to the Fraud Triangle: Individual Capability. 
It includes (Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher and Riley, 2010; p.20): “personal traits and 
abilities that play a major role in whether fraud will actually occur given the presence of 
pressure, opportunity, and rationalization.”  This is not conceptually dissimilar to the 
fraud model proposed in Krambia-Kapardis (2001), referred to as ROP (Rationalizations, 
Opportunity, and crime-prone Person). The occurrence of fraud is not simply a matter of 
creating the right circumstances; there must also be a person situated properly with the 
disposition to commit it. The circumstances are a door, and the propensity allows some 
notion of who will walk through it. Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) identify six traits of the 
fraudster, considered adjunct to their Individual Capability requirement, presented in 
Rudewicz (2011; p.2):
1. Positioning: The person’s position or function within the organization may provide the ability 
to create or exploit an opportunity for fraud. A person in a position of authority has more influence 
over particular situations or the environment. 
2. Intelligence and creativity: The fraudster is smart enough to understand and exploit internal 
control weaknesses and to use position, function, or authorized access to the greatest advantage.
 
3. Ego: The individual must have a strong ego and great confidence he will not be detected. The 
common personality types include someone who is driven to succeed at all costs, self-absorbed, 
self-confident, and often narcissistic…
4. Coercion: A fraudster can coerce others to commit or conceal fraud. An individual with a 
persuasive personality can more successfully convince others to go along with the fraud or look 
the other way. 
5. Deceit: Successful fraud requires effective and consistent lies. In order to avoid detection, the 
individual must be able to lie convincingly, and must keep track of the overall story. 
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6. Stress: The individual must be able to control their stress, as committing the fraudulent act and 
keeping it concealed can be extremely stressful.
Not all of these traits must be present to meet the threshold of individual capability 
suggested by Wolfe and Hermanson (2004). For example, not all fraudsters coerce others 
to commit or conceal fraud. Nor must they have a position of authority, operate at a 
supervisory level, have a big ego, or be successful and accomplished liars. The level of 
individual capability required is dictated by the existing level of anti-fraud safeguards in 
the workplace; the fewer the safeguards, the less individual capability needed by the 
fraudster to successfully cross the threshold.
These models, however, are steeped in Rational Choice Theory, which assumes that all 
people, including criminals, make rational choices based on a logical cost-benefit analysis 
of their behavior and anticipated outcomes (Scott, 2000). This is not always the case, as 
explained in Ostas (2007; p.575-577): 
A growing body of behavioral literature suggests that ... rational calculations … offer only a crude 
approximation of reality. This literature emphasizes the limitations on the human capacity to cope 
with the complexities and uncertainties of life. Drawing on the field of cognitive psychology, 
recent research provides evidence that people routinely resort to certain heuristics and biases that 
prevent them from reasoning as one might presume rational people would. For example, facing a 
complex and uncertain computation, an executive may be overconfident in his or her ability to 
make accurate judgments, and if it appears that a particular act may be very lucrative, a self-
serving bias may take hold and negative information may be subconsciously suppressed. Hence, 
behavioral insights suggest that in some situations an executive may engage in criminal activity 
even when a purely rational calculation would dictate restraint. Miscalculations can occur in the 
other direction as well. For instance, behavioral research shows that people tend to display a 
conformation bias, in that they seek out and process information in ways that tend to confirm 
preexisting beliefs. Pursuant to this bias, an executive who is generally inclined to obey financial 
regulations and who is predisposed to believe that insider trading is highly risky may not properly 
calculate the pecuniary gain available from a particular illegal trade. Here, cognitive limitations 
may inhibit, rather than foster, illegal behavior. 
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This provides that rational motives are not always relevant or applicable to criminal acts 
(see also Turvey, 2011). As explained in Sunstein (2005), people (and by extension 
criminals) are not always that logical, that deliberate, or that bright, often lacking in what 
may be referred to as common sense. Cognitive bias and metacognitive deficiency are 
only part of the problem, however (Krueger and Dunning, 1999). 
In direct conflict with the assumptions of Rational Choice Theory6, certain forms of 
mental illness, personality disorders, criminal history and a history of addiction can also 
increase individual capability to commit crime, including fraud. However, ongoing drug 
abuse and unchecked mental defect would necessarily reduce the fraudster’s ability to 
successfully deceive and handle stress over time. With chronic drug use, fraud may be 
committed in a manner that is sloppier with respect to successful methods (aka 
intelligence and creativity), and the fraudster might also exhibit noticeable physical and 
behavioral indications of intoxication and addiction. In these kinds of cases, a capable or 
suitable guardian is required (Krambia-Kapardis, 2004) – such as alert fellow employees 
who are also willing to make an official complaint. Consider the following case example:
David B. Peterson, Assistant Director 
Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) Crime Lab, St. Paul, Minnesota
This case was uncovered during the course of data gathering efforts described in See 
Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results. It involves a forensic scientist 
with the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA), working as an 
Assistant Director at the St. Paul Crime Lab. During the same time period, he was 
also serving as President for the American Society of Crime Lab Directors 
(ASCLD). Ironically, ASCLD promotes itself as a (ASCLD, 2011): “professional 
society of crime laboratory directors and forensic science managers dedicated to 
promoting excellence in forensic science through leadership and innovation.” It is 
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6 Rational Choice Theory is associated with Routine Activities Theory, which will be discussed in Chapter 
6: Contrasting Scientific Integrity with Law Enforcement Culture.
also associated with the American Society of Crime Lab Directors - Laboratory 
Accreditation Board (ASCLD-LAB), which provides voluntary certification for 
public and private forensic science laboratories all over the world (ASCLD-LAB, 
2011).
According to the criminal complaint, David B. Peterson was arrested and charged 
with “wrongfully and unlawfully possess[ing] one or more mixtures of a total weight 
of 25 grams or more containing cocaine, a schedule II controlled 
substance,” (McConkey, 2005). Mr. Peterson, a recovering alcoholic, came under 
suspicion of being under the influence of narcotics after co-workers noticed him 
making repeated visits to an evidence storage locker. Subsequently, they discovered 
unsecured drugs in the storage locker. Based on this and his erratic behavior, his co-
workers filed an internal report that led to a criminal investigation.
Mr. Petersen, an alcoholic, admitted to police that in 2004 he had begun drinking 
again after years of maintaining his sobriety. Subsequent to his renewed drinking 
pattern, he began illegally accessing the BCA's walk-in evidence vault and stealing 
from a brick of cocaine, used by narcotics officers in covert drug operations, for 
personal use. As reported in Prather (2005):
During an interview with police, Petersen told investigators he had been sober for some time but 
had begun drinking again. In April 2004, he took half a pen cap full of cocaine — about 1/8 ounce 
— from a supply of cocaine kept at the lab. Petersen said he then began coring out small amounts 
of cocaine out of a brick in storage and taking the drug home, according to the criminal complaint.  
Petersen estimated that he took two golf ball-sized amounts between December 2004 and March 
2005.
During that time, the BCA moved its lab to a new St. Paul location. In January 2005, Petersen 
received a call from the new owners of the former BCA offices reporting that they had discovered 
a package that appeared to be criminal evidence. Petersen went to investigate and found a kilo-
sized brick of cocaine that had been inadvertently left during the move.
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Petersen told police this unexpected discovery was a "gift from God" and he planned to use it to 
replace the cocaine he had taken.
Police conducting a search of Petersen's home at 1441 N. Hamline Ave. discovered trace amounts 
of cocaine in a basement room hidden behind a book shelf.
On April 28 of 2005, Mr. Peterson pled guilty to one count of possessing 25 grams of 
cocaine. He was later sentenced to six months in prison, terminated from his position 
at the crime lab, and removed as President of ASCLD. As part of his rapid removal 
from ASCLD, his “President’s Message” for Winter 2004 was taken down from the 
ASCLD website leaving no reference or trace. In addition, he was stricken from the 
roll of past presidents (See ASCLD Presidential Page; http://www.ascld.org/content/
ascld-presidential-page), replaced by Earl Wells for the years 2004 and 2005.
This case involved an admitted 11 months of ongoing fraudulent behavior by a 
supervising forensic scientist at an ASCLD-LAB certified law enforcement forensic 
laboratory. Not only did Mr. Peterson engage in repeated thefts from the evidence 
room that he was charged with maintaining, he engaged in fraud by failing to 
document the alteration of that evidence. This type of repeated alteration of the 
evidence (aka skimming amounts for personal use) has an impact on any future 
related chain of custody logs and analytical assessments (e.g., weighing and testing). 
Mr. Peterson was clearly aware of this impact, as he admitted to making plans to 
replace the brick of cocaine he had been altering with another that had been found 
during inventory (this second brick was found without a chain of custody). This 
would have required yet more fraud, as the second brick of cocaine would have been 
deleted or withheld from future evidence inventory logs created by Mr. Peterson.
When considered in light of Fraud Triangle Theory, and Fraud Diamond Theory, it 
becomes clear that all four elements are present in some form: Motivation, or 
pressure, existed in the form of an addiction to cocaine. Opportunity existed in the 
form of a supervisory position that provided knowledge, access, trust, and authority 
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over the evidence in the vault. Personal Capability existed in the form of a pre-
existing addiction to alcohol, position, intelligence, and deceitfulness. However, this 
fraudster appears to have been undone by his inability to manage the fraud over time, 
as his skill deteriorated and his outward behavior became more suspect with 
prolonged drug use and increased stress from fear of discovery. 
Traits of Occupational Fraud Perpetrators
Anyone can commit fraud, and those that do cannot be reliably distinguished from 
anyone else, making likely perpetrators difficult to predict (Albrecht and Albrecht, 2003; 
Kranacher, Riley, and Wells, 2010). Consequently, behavioral scientists have not been 
able to identify any specific set of cardinal traits to serve as a “valid and reliable marker” 
for the propensity of an individual to commit fraud (Rudewicz, 2011; p.1). However, the 
existing empirical research does suggest some interesting descriptive information 
regarding known offenders convicted of fraud (Kapardis and Krambia-Kapardis, 2004; p.
197):
…the majority of serious fraud offenders are male, aged 35–45 years, married, of high educational 
status, either have a serious financial problem or are greedy for money, do not have a prior criminal 
record, occupy positions of financial trust, rationalize their behaviour, specialize in defrauding, act 
alone, use false documents to perpetrate fraud, victimize two or more people they know, and are 
convicted of multiple charges.
Specific research findings include the following traits of occupational fraudsters:
1. Male (80% in Krambia-Kapardis, 2001; 92% Smith, 2003; 67% in RTTN, 2010);
2. No college education (25% with undergraduate degree and 3% with a 
postgraduate degree in Smith, 2003; 38% with undergraduate degree and 14% 
with a postgraduate degree in RTTN, 2010);
3. No prior criminal record (56% in Smith, 2001, 70% in Krambia-Kapardis, 2001; 
87% in RTTN, 2010); 
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4. No prior fraud (83% in Smith, 2003; 93% in RTTN, 2010).
5. No addiction problems (88% in RTTN, 2010).
6. Acted alone (70% in Krambia-Kapardis, 2001; 84% in Smith, 2003);
7. Supervisory capacity of fraudsters varies. In Smith (2003), most were found to be 
non-management (71%); in RTTN (2010), most were found to be owners or 
managers (58%).
Again, it must be noted that this is not a list of red flags, and no research efforts have 
been made to compare the traits of known fraudsters to non-criminal populations 
(Kranacher, Riley, and Wells, 2010). Therefore this information is descriptive only, and 
not predictive.
Conclusion
Fraud is a criminological descriptor that can have civil and criminal implications 
depending on context. There are many definitions of criminal fraud, resulting in 
inconsistent laws and subsequent data availability for empirical research. However, fraud 
is distinct from error and negligence by virtue of intent. 
Occupational fraud has been studied consistently since 1996, and is believed to result in a 
loss of income to U.S. businesses at a rate of approximately 5-7% on average. It can 
usefully be viewed through the lens of Fraud Triangle Theory, and in more advanced 
circumstances Fraud Diamond Theory. However, these models assume an inherent 
rationality in perpetrator planning, foresight, and deliberation that are not necessarily 
warranted.   
Occupational fraud can be committed by anyone.  Therefore, likely perpetrators are 
difficult to predict. There are consequently no cardinal traits that serve as a “valid and 
reliable marker” for the propensity of an individual to commit fraud. 
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Chapter 3 
Forensic Science: A Primer
“Forensic science is science exercised on behalf of the law in the 
just resolution of conflict. It is therefore expected to be the  handmaiden 
of the law, but at the same time this expectation may  very well 
be the marina from which is launched the tension that 
exists between the two disciplines.”
Thornton and Peterson (2007; p.4)
In the previous chapter, we explored the literature related to the investigation and 
examination of general occupational fraud. This body of research focuses almost entirely 
on the study of financially motivated schemes. It also concerns itself chiefly with the 
private sector and not acts of fraud committed by those working for government agencies. 
However, many of the underlying concepts and theories were applicable to the cases 
associated with the current research effort, suggesting some relevance.
Before we can apply these concepts to fraud committed by forensic examiners, we must 
first establish an understanding of the forensic science community and its cultural 
context. This chapter briefly explores the literature regarding nature, role, and values of 
forensic science. First, forensic science is defined. Then, the role of forensic science in 
the judicial system is discussed. This leads into a presentation of the cardinal traits of the 
forensic scientist. Finally, this chapter closes with a discussion regarding the occupational 
environment of forensic science – as born of two cultures. 
This chapter serves at least two vital ends: it relieves the reader of any false presumptions 
regarding the forensic sciences taken from film, television, or works of fiction, and; it 
contextualizes the forensic sciences, serving as a reference point for the current study. 
Forensic Science – Defined
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Forensic science is the application of scientific methodology, knowledge and principles 
to the resolution of legal questions, whether criminal or civil (Chisum and Turvey, 2011; 
Houck and Seigal, 2010; James and Nordby, 2003; Saferstein, 2010; and Thornton and 
Peterson, 2007). This definition, generally consistent across the forensic science 
literature, is intentionally broad. There are, in fact, many different forensic sub-
disciplines, including (but certainly not limited to) criminalistics, crime reconstruction, 
forensic pathology, forensic anthropology, forensic toxicology, forensic odontology, 
forensic entomology, forensic mental health (psychology and psychiatry); and forensic 
criminology (Chisum and Turvey, 2011; Houck and Seigal, 2010; James and Nordby, 
2003; Turvey and Petherick, 2010; Saferstein, 2010; and Seigel, Saukko, and Knupfer, 
2000).
Criminalistics: Some Relevant Background 
The most common and recognizable type of forensic scientist is the criminalist. 
Criminalistics is the division of forensic science dedicated to the recognition, 
examination, and interpretation of physical evidence using the natural sciences, logic, and 
critical thinking (CAC, 2011; Inman and Rudin, 1999; Kirk, 1974; and O’Hara and 
Osterburg, 1972). Criminalists are generally associated with the examination of physical 
evidence conducted in police or government funded forensic laboratories. They also 
comprise a majority (53%) of the cases found in the present study.
The first crime laboratory scientists were actually referred to by job title and general 
description as “criminologists”. This is reflected in the pages of one of the first forensic 
science textbooks published in the United States, Crime’s Nemesis (May, 1936). The 
author, Luke May offered forensic crime lab services to law enforcement and other 
government agencies in a time when they had yet to develop their own. In his work, May 
refers to the practice of crime detection and evidence examination as the field of 
“scientific criminology” (p. ix) and to those working in it as “scientific 
criminologists” (p. 2). He further refers to himself, in bold letters on the cover page, as 
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“LUKE S. MAY, CRIMINOLOGIST, Director, The Scientific Detective Laboratories; 
President, The Institute of Scientific Criminology.” 
As explained by the late criminalist Lowell Bradford (1918–2007), in his paper regarding 
the origins of the California Association of Criminalists founded in 1954 (Bradford, 2007; 
p. 5):
I first entered into the field of criminalistics in 1947 in the California State Crime Laboratory in 
Sacramento.… In those days, the terms criminalistics and criminalist were not in use. Those of us 
in the state crime laboratory had civil service position titles of criminologist. It remained for James 
P. Osterburg to publish “An Introduction to Criminalistics” in 1949, which marked the beginning 
of the usage of the terms in this country. “Crime Investigation” by Paul L. Kirk in 1953 closely 
followed and gave full meaning to “criminalistics.”
Duayne Dillon, then Chief of the Criminalistics Laboratory for the Office of the
Sheriff-Coroner in Contra Costa County, California, wrote the foreword to the second 
printing of Osterburg’s text (mentioned above in Bradford, 2007). There he shed light on 
the issue of precisely how a criminalist is defined, while crediting the authors of An 
Introduction to Criminalistics with helping engender community acceptance for the term 
(Dillon, 1972):
The authors were not only responsible for introducing many of the principles and practices of 
Criminalistics in an organized manner, but were a prime factor in the subsequent acceptance of the 
term “criminalistics” to describe the profession engaged in the examination, evaluation, and 
interpretation of physical evidence.
Many forensic science authors have actually credited the formulation of modern 
criminalistics as a discipline to the Austrian Jurist and Professor of Criminology Dr. Hans 
Gross. This because he coined the term Kriminalistik, from which our use of the terms 
criminalistics and criminalist were derived (Chisum and Turvey, 2011; DeForest, 
Gaennslen, and Lee, 1983; Inman and Rudin, 2000; and Turner, 1995). 
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The term Kriminalistic translates literally from Austrian-German to English as 
Criminology. Moreover, a Kriminalist was a reference to a generalist who studied the 
causes of crime, the behaviors and motives of criminals, and the scientific methods of 
their identification, apprehension, and prosecution (Gross, 1906). The term was intended 
to be inclusive of police officers, investigators, crime lab personnel, forensic pathologists, 
and forensic psychologists— anyone involved in the practice of applying criminology to 
casework. 
Regardless of the original definition and intent, the term criminalistics was borrowed 
from the works of Dr. Hans Gross in the late 1940s. The burgeoning forensic science 
community in the United States needed a way to conceptually separate “criminologists” 
working in police crime laboratories from the future police officers and social scientists 
studying in criminology, criminal justice, and police science programs at colleges and 
universities (Morn, 1995). The aim was to help professionalize the scientific examination 
and interpretation of physical evidence with specific principles and practice borrowed 
from criminology as well as the natural sciences (Morn 1995). Forensic scientists began 
referring to themselves as criminalists and to their work as criminalistics (O’Hara and 
Osterburg, 1972). This rebranding was widely accepted within the police lab community, 
as evidenced by the literature and the formation of associated professional organizations, 
including the California Association of Criminalists (CAC, 2011).
“Real” Forensic Scientists
The vast majority of full-time forensic science practitioners in the United States work for 
law enforcement agencies or in publicly funded government crime labs, providing their 
services exclusively to law enforcement and the prosecution (Thornton and Peterson, 
2007). As explained in the NAS Report7 (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; p.36):
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7 The NAS Report is mentioned in Chapter 1: Introduction, and will be discussed more extensively in future 
chapters, including Chapter 10 – Conclusions.
According to a 2005 census by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), 389 publicly funded forensic 
crime laboratories were operating in the United States in 2005: These included 210 state or 
regional laboratories, 84 county laboratories, 62 municipal laboratories, and 33 federal 
laboratories, and they received evidence from nearly 2.7 million criminal cases. These laboratories 
are staffed by individuals with a wide range of training and expertise, from scientists with Ph.D.s 
to technicians who have been trained largely on the job. No data are available on the size and 
depth of the private forensic laboratories, except for private DNA laboratories.
However, because of the current fractured state and the past “rebranding” of the forensic 
sciences, there is much confusion over who precisely the “real” forensic scientists are – 
and who they are not (Inman and Rudin, 1999). This confusion exists within the forensic 
science community, and among those operating in the criminal justice system, which has 
misinformed the media and the general public. An assessment of the discontinuity evident 
within the forensic science community is offered in Edwards and Gotsonis (2009; pp. 
6-7):
The term “forensic science” encompasses a broad range of forensic disciplines, each with its own 
set of technologies and practices. In other words, there is wide variability across forensic science 
disciplines with regard to techniques, methodologies, reliability, types and numbers of potential 
errors, research, general acceptability, and published material. Some of the forensic science 
disciplines are laboratory based (e.g., nuclear and mitochondrial DNA analysis, toxicology and 
drug analysis); others are based on expert interpretation of observed patterns (e.g., fingerprints, 
writing samples, toolmarks, bite marks, and specimens such as hair). The “forensic science 
community,” in turn, consists of a host of practitioners, including scientists (some with advanced
degrees) in the fields of chemistry, biochemistry, biology, and medicine; laboratory technicians; 
crime scene investigators; and law enforcement officers. There are very important differences, 
however, between forensic laboratory work and crime scene investigations. 
Furthermore (p. 36): 
Not all forensic services are performed in traditional crime laboratories by trained forensic 
scientists. Some forensic tests might be conducted by a sworn law enforcement officer with no 
scientific training or credentials, other than experience. In smaller jurisdictions, members of the 
local police or sheriff’s department might conduct the analyses of evidence, such as latent print 
examinations and footwear comparisons.
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The NAS Report ultimately concludes that the forensic science community is poorly 
focused and badly fragmented, with no clear practice standards, consistent terminology, 
or standardized means of practitioner certification.  That is to say, forensic science is not 
always practiced in a laboratory; forensic science is not always practiced by someone 
working for law enforcement; and forensic science is not always practiced by scientists.
At this point, it is also necessary to recognize the distinction that must be made between 
scientists and technician practitioners of forensic science. The NAS Report goes out of 
its way to explain (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; p.7):
There are also sharp distinctions between forensic practitioners who have been trained in 
chemistry, biochemistry, biology, and medicine (and who bring these disciplines to bear in their 
work) and technicians who lend support to forensic science enterprises. 
The greatest distinction between the forensic scientist and the forensic technician is that 
of testing versus interpretation (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; p. 59-60):
Because of the distinctly different professional tracks within larger laboratories, for example, 
technicians perform tests with defined protocols, and credentialed scientists conduct specialized 
testing and interpretation. Unlike many other professions, the forensic science disciplines have no 
organized control over entry into the profession, such as by degree, boards or exams, or 
licensure… Control mechanisms traditionally have been held through employment and job 
function.
The contrast between technician and scientist is at once subtle and tremendous. Adapted 
from Chisum and Turvey (2006, pp. xvi–xvii): A technician is trained in specific 
procedures that have been learned by routine or repetition. A forensic technician is trained 
in specific procedures related to collecting and even testing physical evidence found at 
crime scenes. This is often accomplished without any need for employing or 
understanding the scientific method and the limits of forensic science. This term 
describes police technicians documenting crime scenes and collecting evidence, and 
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many of the forensic personnel working in government crime labs performing 
instrumental analysis. Conversely, a scientist is someone who possesses an academic and 
clinical understanding of the scientific method and has the analytical dexterity to 
construct experiments that will generate the empirical reality which science mandates. A 
forensic scientist is educated and trained to examine and determine the meaning of 
physical evidence in accordance with the established limits of forensic science, with the 
expectation of presenting their findings as evidence under oath. 
Both forensic technicians and forensic scientists are considered forensic examiners, and 
as such both are included in the present study (in the present study n=100; this includes 
53 Laboratory Criminalists8, 15 Forensic Technicians9, 7 Law Enforcement Technicians, 
23 Medicolegal examiners, and 2 Digital Evidence examiners; see Chapter 8: Data, 
Parameters, and Frequency Results for descriptive detail).
The Role of Forensic Examinations
When there is a criminal complaint, law enforcement investigators are responsible for 
conducting the corresponding criminal investigation. This involves gathering evidence of 
all kinds, interviewing witnesses, and developing potential suspects. As explained in 
Savino and Turvey (2011; p.88-89): “responding law enforcement agencies have a duty 
of care—an obligation to be competent custodians of the criminal investigations they 
initiate and any evidence that supports or refutes allegations of criminal activity against 
accused suspects.” This implies a duty of care that should include determining what 
happened; whether or not a crime has actually taken place; and identifying and arresting 
any criminal perpetrators (Kappeler, 2006; SATF, 2009).
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8 A laboratory criminalist is a particular type of forensic scientist that is trained to examine physical 
evidence and interpret its meaning (see Chisum and Turvey, 2011).
9 A forensic technician is trained to collect or test physical evidence using rote instrumentation, but lacks 
the scientific education and training to perform examinations and interpretations on their own (see Chisum 
and Turvey, 2011).
Forensic examiners, however, are responsible for corresponding scientific investigations 
— acting as an objective foil to any case theories that might arise from any source. The 
unique role of the forensic examiner is ultimately that of an educator to decision makers 
in the justice system, including investigators, attorneys, judges, and juries. Thornton and 
Peterson (2007) describe the forensic examiner as a “handmaiden of the law”, while 
recognizing the potential for conflict between the goals of science and criminal justice 
system (p. 4): “Forensic science is science exercised on behalf of the law in the just 
resolution of conflict. It is therefore expected to be the handmaiden of the law, but at the 
same time this expectation may very well be the marina from which is launched the 
tension that exists between the two disciplines.”
While the justice system necessarily sets two legal sides against each other, objective 
examiners are not meant to take up the cause of either. In fact, their only theoretical value 
to the legal process is with respect to their objectivity. Forensic examiners are ostensibly 
employed only because of their oath to advocate for the evidence and its dispassionate 
interpretation— nothing more. They must be capable of demonstrating that they have no 
emotional, professional, or financial stake in the outcome. In other words, they cannot be 
paid to guarantee findings or testimony favorable to their employer, nor can their 
advancement be connected to the success of one party over another. This is separate from 
being compensated for time spent performing analysis, writing reports, and giving 
testimony.
It should also be stressed that the forensic examiner is not intended to be a decision 
maker in the justice system – despite some misinformed fictional portrayals to the 
contrary. They do not decide guilt or innocence, they do not rule on the admissibility of 
evidence in court proceedings, and they do not typically have the power to make arrests. 
This is intentional, as the goals of the forensic examiner with respect to explaining the 
strengths and limits of the evidence must remain ideologically separate to maintain any 
semblance of impartiality.
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Cardinal Traits of the Forensic Examiner
In the previous sections of this chapter there was some discussion regarding the cardinal 
traits of the forensic examiner. They are in essence the traits of any scientist – those 
necessary for maintaining scientific integrity (Gardenier, 2011; Jette, 2005; NAS, 2002; 
and NAS, 2009). The forensic examiner must develop, maintain and demonstrate 
impartiality, knowledge of scientific methodology, and the employment of scientific 
methodology in their work. Additionally, there is the corresponding need for maintaining 
transparency of methods so that others may peer review any findings that are offered. 
These are discussed further in Chapter 5: Fraud and Scientific Culture.
However, forensic examiners are separated from other scientists by the likelihood that 
they will be called upon to present and explain their findings, under oath, in a court of 
law. Subsequently, they will be asked to explain how their findings were derived and 
what they mean. As provided in Thornton and Peterson (2007; p. 4):
What then, of the forensic scientist? The single feature that distinguishes forensic scientists from 
any other scientist is the expectation that they will appear in court and testify to their findings and 
offer an opinion as to the significance of those findings. The forensic scientist will, or should, 
testify not only to what things are, but to what things mean. 
Consequently, the anticipation of sworn expert testimony and the offering of sworn expert 
testimony are distinctive traits possessed by the forensic examiner. The ability to provide 
sworn expert testimony being integral to forensic examinations, a trustworthy character 
requirement is also presumptively invoked. This is true for the majority of those working 
in the justice system. For example, the State Attorney General’s “California Crime 
Laboratory Review Task Force” reports on the necessity of employment disqualifiers 
related to criminal history and character (CCLRTF, 2009; p.25):
…the Task Force recognizes that background checks are necessary because of the sensitive and 
critical role criminalists play in the criminal justice system. Mistakes or lack of professional 
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standards by forensics professionals can lead, in a worst-case scenario, to wrongful convictions. 
The Task Force suggests that candidates, as well as those still in college who wish to become 
forensic scientists, be better informed that any association with criminal activity or lack of 
personal responsibility could preclude them from future employment in a crime lab.
Forensic examiners of every kind, like members of law enforcement, must achieve and 
maintain the trust of the court in order to be allowed the privilege of giving sworn 
testimony. This includes avoiding activities or affiliations that evidence criminality; a 
propensity for dishonesty; or poor character – whether past or present. If it can be shown 
that a forensic examiner cannot be taken at their word, or that they have a propensity for 
criminal activity, then the court may exclude their testimony.
A Tale of Two Cultures
In this chapter, the role of forensic examiners, and their cardinal traits, have been 
discussed with respect to satisfying ideal requirements within the justice system. The 
reality, however, is much different. The occupational culture of the forensic examiner is 
not framed by a single cohesive group with uniform professional or scientific values. As 
already suggested, it is routinely suffused with conflicted goals, directives, and 
expectations. Specifically, the objective and impartial creed of the forensic examiner is 
often at odds with the culture, code, and conduct engendered by the organizations that 
tend to employ them. 
Police crime laboratories have traditionally employed the majority of forensic scientists, 
primarily because of law enforcement dominion over the crime scene and a subsequent 
responsibility for physical evidence collection and testing (DeForest, 2005; O’Hara and 
Osterburg, 1972; Sullivan, 1977; Thornton and Peterson, 2007; and Turner, 1995). 
Despite the growth of private forensic laboratories, the regular and increased outsourcing 
of government forensic services to the private sector (Peterson and Hickman, 2005; 
Durose, 2008), and some court mandated funding for independent forensic examinations 
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brought about by Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) and its progeny, this occupational dominance 
remains (Durose, 2008; Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009). Some explication is necessary.
In the first chapter of this dissertation, the publication of the National Academy of 
Science Report on forensic science (aka the NAS Report; Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009) 
was referenced with respect to demonstrating the need for the present research. Among 
the findings in this watershed evaluation of the forensic sciences was the resolution that a 
true scientific culture cannot develop or even exist subordinate to a law enforcement 
agency. The NAS Report explains that the resulting conflicts are fiscal, organizational, 
and cultural, resulting in the wrong kind of examiner pressure (Edwards and Gotsonis, 
2009; pp.23-24):
Scientific and medical assessment conducted in forensic investigations should be independent of 
law enforcement efforts either to prosecute criminal suspects or even to determine whether a 
criminal act has indeed been committed. Administratively, this means that forensic scientists 
should function independently of law enforcement administrators. The best science is conducted in 
a scientific setting as opposed to a law enforcement setting. Because forensic scientists often are 
driven in their work by a need to answer a particular question related to the issues of a particular 
case, they sometimes face pressure to sacrifice appropriate methodology for the sake of 
expediency.
Pressure to achieve results is nothing new in scientific endeavor, however the context is 
quite different for the forensic examiner. As already discussed, the forensic examiner is 
often working in a pro law enforcement environment that is at odds with, and even hostile 
towards, their scientific mandate. Moreover, strong evidence has emerged over the past 
two decades revealing consistent and inappropriate influence exerted by the U.S. 
Department of Justice, and the FBI in specific, over the forensic science community 
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(Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; Hsu, Jenkins, and Mellnick, 2012; and Moore, 2009)10. In 
any case, when contradictory cultural directives strain the work of the forensic examiner, 
the dominant (and controlling) culture is best situated to prevail. 
The NAS Report was not the first to raise this issue, or to recommend cultural separation. 
Concerns about the inappropriate influence of law enforcement culture over the forensic 
examiners that they employ, focusing on their contradictory values and missions, have 
also been outlined in works such as Chisum and Turvey (2006 and 2011); Cooley (2004); 
Findley (2008); Giannelli (1997); Kirk and Bradford (1965); Risinger, Saks, Rosenthal, 
and Thompson (2002); Risinger, Saks, Rosenthal, and Thompson (2003); and Starrs 
(1993). Until very recently, however, the precise nature and consequences of any 
inappropriate influences that law enforcement exerts over forensic practice have been 
unexamined.
Summary
Forensic examiners are meant to be objective and impartial scientific instruments – for 
use in educating investigative and then legal proceedings. This places upon them the 
requirement that they conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve scientific 
integrity while also maintaining stringent personal ethics. However, the majority of 
forensic examiners work for law enforcement or government agencies on behalf of the 
police and prosecution. This work arrangement, which arises from the peculiar evolution 
of forensic science in tandem with law enforcement, creates competing cultural pressures 
that have been acknowledged but remain uncritically unexamined in the professional 
forensic literature until recently.
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10 The FBI crime laboratory holds itself out as the premiere forensic laboratory in the United States, 
offering services of every kind to domestic law enforcement agencies and others around the world. It is also 
the largest crime laboratory in the United States, “with some 500 scientific experts and special agents 
working in a state-of-the-art facility in rural Virginia, traveling the world over on assignment and providing 
forensic exams, technical support, expert witness testimony, and advanced training to Bureau personnel and 
partners around the globe,” (FBI, 2012). Furthermore, it is responsible for maintaining a number of national 
forensic databases, including those related to fingerprints and DNA. As will be discussed, it also has a 
history of fraud and scandal stretching from the mid-1990s to the present day.
Chapter 4 
Fraud in Law Enforcement Culture
"We would like, in an ideal world, to see every applicant 
with a clean record, but obviously that's not reality. 
I don't think you'll find any departments who hire 
only applicants with squeaky-clean records."
Lt. Elder Dancy
City of Atlanta Police Dept.
Recruitment Unit
In Chapter 2, we explored the literature related to the investigation and examination of 
general occupational fraud. This body of research focuses almost entirely on the study of 
financially motivated schemes. It also concerns itself chiefly with the private sector and 
not acts of fraud committed by those working for government agencies. However, the 
underlying concepts and theories were applicable to the cases associated with the current 
research effort, suggesting a general relevance. In Chapter 3, we learned of the role that 
forensic science is intended to play in the justice system, as well as the cultural 
challenges that practicing forensic scientists can face.
This chapter begins a more specific exploration of the literature associated with forensic 
fraud. Applying a sociological approach, and the theory of Differential Association 
(Sutherland and Cressey, 1966), we are admonished to accept up front that there is a 
“relationship between social and cultural conditions and crime” (Kennedy and Kennedy, 
1972; p.45). Specifically, we must accept that individuals develop criminal patterns in 
some part because they are socialized to do so by their interactions with other members of 
their primary group (Sutherland and Cressey, 1966; Matsueda, 2006; and Fitch, 2011). An 
extension of Differential Association, Social Learning Theory holds that “peer 
associations, attitudes, reinforcement, and modeling are predictors of delinquency and 
crime in general,” (Chappell and Piquero, 2004; p.89). These well-regarded 
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criminological theories offer a useful perspective for understanding the context of fraud 
committed by forensic scientists, and are also necessary for explaining the cultural 
attitudes that shape them. 
Law Enforcement Duties and Obligations
Law enforcement is the branch of the criminal justice system that is directly responsible 
for reported crime (Sullivan, 1977; Kappeler, 2006; and Turvey and Petherick, 2010). It is 
composed of various government agencies that are tasked with preventing crime, 
responding to criminal complaints, and recovering property within established 
jurisdictions (Bopp and Schultz, 1972). Law enforcement agents are also charged with 
keeping the peace, protecting the citizenry, and representing justice within a community 
(Kleinig, 1996; Kappeler, 2006; and Wolfe and Picquero, 2011). 
Law enforcement agencies have a duty to investigate criminal complaints, establish the 
facts, and determine whether a crime has actually been committed (Bopp and Schultz, 
1972; Kappeler, 2006; SATF, 2009; and Savino and Turvey, 2011). When their agents 
believe that a crime has been committed, they also have a related obligation to identify 
and apprehend any suspects (Bopp and Schultz, 1972; Kleinig, 1996). As explained in 
Sullivan (1977, p. 149): “It is the job of the police to enforce the law. Thus, officers must 
remember that they are primarily fact-finders for their department and have no authority 
or control over the judicial or legislative branches of government.”
Specific enforcement obligations and duties are a matter of individual agency policy as 
well as local statute (e.g., dereliction of duty, professional misconduct and excessive force 
regulations; negligent failure to supervise or investigate torts; and state penal codes 
prescribing law enforcement exemptions; see generally Bopp and Schultz, 1972; Hansen 
and Culley, 1973; Kappeler, 2006; Kleinig, 1996; and Vaughn, Cooper, and del Carmen, 
2001). These responsibilities are also a feature of the sworn oaths or pledges that officers 
must take when receiving their police credentials, generally relating to maintaining 
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professional integrity, protecting citizens and property, faithfully enforcing the laws of 
their state, and upholding the Constitution of the United States (Bopp and Schultz, 1972; 
IACP, 2011; Kleinig, 1996; Shane, 2010; and Stout, 2011). In some police agencies, a 
specific oath can be found on the backside of an officer’s credentials, affirmed with their 
signature or that of a supervisor. 
Law Enforcement Discretion and Integrity
In order to do their work, it is understood that law enforcement agents will need to violate 
some of the rules and laws that the rest of us must abide, including those related to traffic 
ordinances, privacy, firearms possession/ use, property seizure, the use of coercive force, 
and the use of lethal force (Bopp and Schultz, 1972; Brennan, Rostow, Davis, and Hill, 
2009; Chappell and Piquero, 2004; Kleinig, 1996; Leonard, 1969; and Marche, 2009). In 
other words, the police must sometimes break the law in order to uphold it. They are 
therefore exempt from numerous legal conventions (prescribed by specific 
circumstances) and enjoy the privilege of exercising authority over regular citizens, under 
the aegis that they are engaged in an official capacity (Brennan, Rostow, Davis, and Hill, 
2009; Chappell and Piquero, 2004; Kleinig, 1996; and Waddington, 1999).
This means that those employed by law enforcement agencies are required to walk a fine 
line while discharging their duties. On one hand, they must strive to represent law and 
justice to the community through honest, fair, and professional conduct. On the other 
hand, they are uniquely permitted to break laws that regular citizens are required uphold. 
As explained in Waddington (1999; p.287): “The notion that the police possess a 
distinctive occupation sub-culture… derives from the discovery that police work is rarely 
guided by legal precepts… police officers exercise extensive discretion in how they 
enforce the law.” Ideally, this requires the ability to exercise discretion without a great 
deal of direct supervision while consistently refusing endless opportunities to engage in 
graft and corruption (Chappell and Piquero, 2004; Hickman, Piquero, Lawton, and 
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Greene, 2001; Kleinig, 1996; Klockars, Ivkovich, Harver, and Haberfeld, 2000; Seron 
Pereira, and Kovath, 2004; and Westmarland, 2005).
Exercising the proper discretion under these conditions is key to maintaining public 
confidence in law enforcement integrity. Law enforcement agencies are therefore best 
served by the selection and employment of only the highest quality applicants (Vollmer, 
1971; Brennan, Rostow, Davis, and Hill, 2009). In part, this means that they are 
admonished to “strive to recruit, hire, and train only those who demonstrate strong moral 
values before they enter the academy,” (Fitch, 2011; p.1). 
Unfortunately, the literature makes it clear that the selection of even the best candidates, 
with the least predisposition for criminality, is insufficient to prevent corruption in law 
enforcement. As explained in Marche (2009; p.463): “…there is no evidence to support 
the traditional theory that police agency corruption is attributable to the ‘individual bad-
apple.’ Independent of other factors, the present analysis shows that police culture fosters 
corruption.”
This is a refutation of what is referred to as Bad Apple Theory (BAT) – the notion that 
corruption is attributable to isolated individuals acting against the values and norms of a 
group. Further refutation of BAT is found in a history of research demonstrating that the 
authority and discretion afforded to law enforcement agencies promotes and nurtures 
systemic corruption within the ranks, especially when relatively low levels of dishonesty 
are tolerated or rationalized by supervisors (Benoit and Dubra, 2004; Benson, 1988; 
Chappell and Piquero, 2004; Johnson and Cox, 2005; Ivkovich, 2003; Kleinig, 1996; 
Klockars, 1984; Klockars, Ivkovic, and Haberfeld, 2005; Klockars, Ivkovich, Harver, and 
Haberfeld, 2000; McCormack, 1996; and Rothwell and Baldwin, 2007). This body of 
research supports the view that police culture both creates opportunities and provides 
justifications for corruption, while at the same time tolerating and in many instances 
defending it.
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Cardinal Traits of Law Enforcement Culture
The literature provides numerous studies on the cardinal traits of law enforcement 
culture. While this body of research has not identified a universal police culture, there are 
reoccurring themes and elements. Though often developed to protect an agency and its 
members, many if not most of these traits can be seen as eventual facilitators of 
corruption. 
Waddington (1999) describes law enforcement as a canteen or clannish sub-culture, 
explaining (p.287): “The core referents of ‘police sub-culture’ are clear enough: its sense 
of mission; the desire for action and excitement, especially the glorification of violence; 
an Us/Them division of the social world with in-group isolation and solidarity on the one 
hand, and racist components on the other; its authoritarian conservatism; and its suspicion 
and cynicism, especially towards the law and legal procedures”. This is reinforced by the 
research presented in Terrill, Paoline and Manning (2003), that occupational pressure, 
anxiety, and strain “produce two defining outcomes of police culture – isolation and 
group loyalty,”(p.1006). Poaline (2004) goes on to report that law enforcement (p.207): 
“attitudes, values, and norms include a distrust and suspiciousness of citizens and a 
prescription to assess people and situations in terms of their potential threat (i.e., 
maintaining the edge), a lay-low or cover-your-ass orientation to police work that would 
discourage the initiation of contacts with citizens and supervisors, a strong emphasis on 
the law enforcement elements of the police role, a we-versus-they attitude toward 
citizens, and the norm of loyalty to the peer group.” Cancino and Enriquez (2004) 
similarly note the following as central traits: the employment of “street justice”, secrecy, 
solidarity, and the acceptance of peer-retaliation for violating any of these. Wolfe and 
Picquero (2011) agree, providing that (p.334): “Policing is characterized by a close-knit 
subculture because the ‘unique demands that are placed on police officers, such as the 
threat of danger as well as scrutiny by the public, generate a tightly woven environment 
conducive to the development of feelings of loyalty,’ (Skolnick, 2005, p. 302),”.
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Along these same lines, Benson (2001) posits that machismo, militarism, racism, and a 
code of the silence are primary elements of law enforcement culture, reporting (pp.
685-686): “Instead of acting upon the extensive evidence of differences between men and 
women police—and recruiting and promoting more women—police departments 
nationwide are bastions of … ‘open sex discrimination and sexual harassment’ and 
negative attitudes toward female officers.” This is expounded by research presented in 
Garcia (2005), which explains that law enforcement culture emphasizes crime fighting, 
force, and masculinity while at the same time devaluing its internal social service 
functions that are associated with femininity. See also Benson (2001), reporting that (pp.
682-683):
Machismo, or what some have called hypermasculinity, is the value system that celebrates male 
physical strength, aggression, violence, competition, and dominance. It denigrates the lack of these 
qualities as weak, female behavior…
The practical results of this police machismo are that male officers get themselves involved in 
hostile confrontations with the public, use of excessive force, shootings, drug dealing, and 
apparently, as we see now in the Rampart scandal, framing of suspects through deceit and lies.
This issue was also explored in research presented by Harris (2000), which revealed that 
men in law enforcement culture experience intense pressure not to be perceived as 
feminine or homosexual, and that violence and aggression are the means used to assert 
and maintain a strong male identity.
Based on the body of literature referenced in this section, the reoccurring trait-themes in 
law enforcement culture identified by this researcher include:
1. A “Noble Cause” belief system
2. Professional identity attached to authoritative/ coercive control of citizens
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3. Professional identity attached to masculinity and aggression, to the point of open 
discrimination and harassment within law enforcement ranks
4. Solidarity/ loyalty to the group
5. Fierce protection of group and co-worker image of integrity 
6. Deception as a viable means to an end
7. Isolation/ “Us vs. Them” outlook/ mistrust of outsiders
8. Cynicism and mistrust towards the law
9. Secrecy / “Code of Silence” / “The Blue Wall of Silence”
10. Punishment and ostracism for those who break the code
Noble Cause and Corruption
Law enforcement culture is defined by the belief that theirs is a noble cause. A feature of 
this belief is that a war against crime is currently being waged against particular evils or 
societal ills (e.g. drugs, terrorism, gang violence), and that those working for law 
enforcement are on the only good or moral side of the conflict. By extension, anyone not 
working with or supporting law enforcement is on the wrong side of the conflict, 
protecting or practicing evil. 
Commitment to this noble cause means a commitment to preventing illegal activity and 
apprehending criminal offenders, also referred to as “getting bad guys off the 
street” (Caldero and Crank, 2004; p. 29).  As described in Garcia (2005; p.68):
The officer is expected to seek out situations where crimes can be detected and criminals 
apprehended. Accordingly, the good officer holds to the noble cause of fighting crime and helping 
the victim… and to an image of being adventurous and brave… The good officer must carry a gun 
and handcuffs and ‘charge the tower’ at the sight of crime. However, in the process of becoming a 
good officer and internalizing police culture, the good officer also becomes cynical and distrusting 
of the citizens he or she polices…
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Dedication to the noble cause both inspires the values of law enforcement culture and 
acts as justification for individual officer decisions (Crank, Flaherty, and Giacomazzi, 
2007).
Noble cause corruption, as it is termed, refers to corrupt or illegal acts committed by law 
enforcement in order to secure or maintain an arrest or conviction, or some other worthy 
end (Caldero and Crank, 2004; Crank, Flaherty, and Giacomazzi, 2007; Martinelli, 2006; 
Porter and Warrender, 2009). It reflects dilemmas faced by law enforcement agents in 
which they must (Crank, Flaherty, and Giacomazzi, 2007; p.105) “select between 
competing ethics. They either selected the legal means, playing by society's rules even if 
sometimes that meant letting dangerous offenders go free, or they sought a good end: 
they acted to prevent truly dangerous offenders from committing additional crimes, 
however that end was accomplished.” 
The justification for noble cause corruption stems from the siege mentality of law 
enforcement officers who believe either they are at war or that their cause is particularly 
righteous. This is a learned belief system, and the corresponding illegal behavior must be 
culturally reinforced and molded through experience within the group culture (Sunhara, 
2004). When law enforcement culture reinforces a model of ends justifying the means, 
noble cause corruption becomes the norm that every “good” officer or agent aspires to (in 
comportment with Social Learning Theory). This in turn mandates acceptance of and 
reliance upon “The Blue Wall of Silence” for both individual and organizational survival. 
The Blue Wall of Silence
The law enforcement “Code of Silence,” aka “The Blue Wall of Silence” has long been a 
feature of the literature related to law enforcement corruption, as an international 
phenomenon (Chin and Wells, 1998; Cooper, 2009; Knapp Commission, 1972; Koepke, 
2000; Mollen, 1994; Rothwell and Baldwin, 2007; Shockley-Eckles, 2011; Skolnick, 
2002 and 2005; Wolfe and Picquero, 2011). It is described as (Chin and Wells, 1998; p.
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238): “an unwritten code in many departments which prohibits disclosing perjury or other 
misconduct by fellow officers, or even testifying truthfully if the facts would implicate 
the conduct of a fellow officer.” As explained further in Cooper (2009; p.7): “what many 
people know as the ‘Code of Silence’ or ‘Blue Wall of Silence’- merits concern. The 
police subculture is dominated by the Cop Code. Its foundational norm dictates that ‘cops 
protect cops.’”
According to Koepke (2000), the culture of secrecy is transferred between law 
enforcement members, in accordance with Social Learning Theory, via overt peer 
pressure (pp.214-215): “The Blue Wall of Silence is legendary among law enforcement 
officers and is arguably the strongest form of peer pressure. Because of the Blue Wall of 
Silence, police brutality and police perjury have been, and continue to be, protected and 
facilitated by the police culture.”
This is echoed in Wolfe and Picquero (2011), who explain (p.334): “Policing is 
characterized by a close-knit subculture because the ‘unique demands that are placed on 
police officers, such as the threat of danger as well as scrutiny by the public, generate a 
tightly woven environment conducive to the development of feelings of 
loyalty’ (Skolnick, 2005, p. 302). The code of silence, therefore, develops into a 
subcultural attitude on how one must behave to be perceived as a “good” officer by 
peers.” 
Gottschalk (2011) describes the problem as systemic, with all police officers involved in 
some level of corruption by virtue of engaging in either culturally approved illegal 
practice or its concealment (p.170): “The role of the police culture in terms of protection 
of each other reduces the likelihood of being caught for corruption. This called the code, 
the code of silence, or the blue curtain, or the blue wall of silence – the informal 
prohibition in the occupational culture of policing against reporting the misconduct of 
fellow police officers.”
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Shockley-Eckles (2011) goes further, arguing that the culture of secrecy in law 
enforcement protects not only those members in an immediate employment environment, 
but also those that have “gone rogue”, been forced out of an agency, and then relocated 
elsewhere (p.292):
Now referred to as The Blue Wall or The Thin Blue Line, the solidarity that defines police work is 
not without its critics and its proponents. Many in mainstream society view The Blue Wall as an 
impenetrable fortress whereby contemporary police officers protect their own—including those 
who engage in misconduct—beneath a cloak of secrecy…
The question of significance for the research presented here thus becomes, how far does loyalty 
extend itself when those in law enforcement find themselves working alongside the officer whose 
history is one of misconduct in another jurisdiction?
A little-known practice among most in the general public, but one that affects all in law 
enforcement, is the officer shuffle (see Goldman 2003 and Goldman and Puro 2001, 1987). As 
defined by Goldman (2003) and Goldman and Puro (2001, 1987), the officer shuffle refers to the 
ease with which disreputable officers move across jurisdictions, thus maintaining their police 
certification and continuing to serve in law enforcement. These officers, referred to as gypsy cops 
or rogue officers, place communities at risk while often tainting the image of all police.
Aptly named, the officer shuffle (see Goldman 2003; Goldman and Puro 2001, 1987) perpetuates 
the transmission of police corruption and misconduct over time and through space.
All of this conforms with Wolfe and Picquero (2011), which explains (p.334): “Research 
has shown that officers who adhere to the code of silence are less likely to report fellow 
officer excessive use of force or corruption… and more likely to commit perjury during a 
trial.” Wolfe and Picquero (2011) further agree that the problem is cultural, and that 
individual officer corruption is a reflection of their associations and group perceptions, in 
alignment with Social Learning Theory (p.347):
…officers who associate with deviant peers are more likely to subscribe to the police subcultural 
belief that an officer should protect his or her colleagues regardless of allegations of misconduct. 
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Furthermore, association with deviant officer peers places officers at increased risk to believe that 
violating suspect constitutional rights is required if one is to achieve justice and protect the public 
from harm. Conversely, officers adhere to the code of silence less strictly and have fewer beliefs 
that justify noble-cause corruption if they view their agency to behave in organizationally just 
ways. That is, as officers’ perceptions of organizational justice increase, their level of attitudes 
favorable to the code of silence and noble-cause corruption is likely to decrease.
While there are many forms of law enforcement corruption, Gottschalk (2011; p.170) 
found that the “Blue Wall of Silence” provided the most protection for those officers 
accepting “gratuities” or using “excessive force”. These are among the most tolerated 
forms of misconduct in law enforcement culture. This is detailed by research prepared in 
Chappell and Piquero (2004; p.90):
...acceptance of meals and gifts is the most common and most extensive form of police 
corruption... Many cities actually allow officers to accept free or discount meals. It is often 
accepted behavior when it is an act of gratitude toward the police, but sometimes the motive is to 
buy protection from the police. In other words, some businesses offer free items or services in 
expectation for quicker response times and extra protection from the police
Not surprisingly, free coffee, meal discounts, and other small gifts are also the gateway 
through which otherwise lawful officers are initiated into other corrupt group practices. 
This can be witnessed on a daily basis in just about every city around the country, at any 
eatery where multiple police units gather for a break or a meal. Officers will enter such 
establishments wearing their uniforms, or show their police radios or badges 
conspicuously when plain clothed. All of this with the hope, and often the expectation, of 
receiving a law enforcement discount. These “discounts” are actually bribes, enticing the 
officer to show favor, give special consideration, or merely for the security provided by 
their continual presence. 
Once a law enforcement officer gives up their integrity in lock step with the other 
members of their group, no matter how small the enticement, the potential for future and 
more severe forms of corruption is increased. It also provides a motive for looking the 
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other way when something more severe is witnessed involving fellow officers. While 
seeming minor to some, giving in to these kinds of initial temptations teaches the new 
officer to become morally and ethically malleable. From a public relations standpoint, 
accepting gifts and gratuities also reinforces the worst view of the police held by those 
that are successful with enticements: that the services of law enforcement are partial, or 
otherwise for sale.
The “Blue Wall of Silence”, or “Code of Silence”, is a distinct feature of the institutional 
corruption bred into the pedigree of law enforcement culture. It pressures new officers 
into conformity by exploiting their commitment to group loyalty and the threat of peer 
retaliation; it protects longstanding group members from exposure by ensuring that 
nobody talks to outsiders, and that “cops protect cops”; and it allows for the shuffling, or 
continued employment, of “gypsy cops” that would otherwise have been terminated or in 
extreme cases indicted on criminal charges. In essence, it makes those law enforcement 
officers who abide into liars, either by what they report or fail to report with respect to 
corrupt activity.
The Use of Deception 
When agents of law enforcement lack sufficiently reliable evidence to lawfully arrest a 
prime suspect in a criminal investigation, they tend to focus their efforts on obtaining a 
confession (Magid, 2001; Thomas, 2007). One means of obtaining a confession is 
through the use of deception. The courts tend to have a variable yet generally permissive 
attitude towards the police use of deception to gain inculpatory evidence from criminal 
suspects – to include under-cover work and ploys where false witness statements, false 
co-conspirator statements, and fabricated evidence are referenced or presented during 
interrogations (Kassin, Drizin, Grisso, Gudjonsson, Leo, and Redlich, 2010). 
Consequently, the use of pretense, trickery, and lies are standard instruments found in 
many police toolkits. 
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There are limits set on the acceptable use of deceptive methods, generally established by 
state laws and departmental policy. However, some criminal justice commentators argue 
that deception, and outright lying, is an integral feature of law enforcement culture. One 
overall view is presented in Slobogin (1997), which offers a continuum of falsity that 
runs from justifiable to inexcusable (pp. 775-776):
Many police, like many other people, lie occasionally, and some police, like some other people, lie 
routinely and pervasively. Police lie to protect innocent victims, as in hostage situations, and they 
tell “placebo lies” to assure or placate worried citizens. They tell lies to project nonexistent 
authority, and they lie to suspects in the hopes of gathering evidence of crime. They also lie under 
oath, to convict the guilty, protect the guilty, or frame the innocent.
Some of these lies are justifiable. Some are reprehensible. Lying under oath is perjury and thus 
rarely permissible. On the other hand, lying that is necessary to save a life may not only be 
acceptable but is generally applauded (even if it constitutes perjury). Most types of police lies are 
of murkier morality, however.
A more chilling perspective on police deception is reported in the research compiled by 
Dorfman (1999; pp.460-461):
Police officers can be expected to omit, redact, and even lie on their police reports, sworn or unsworn; 
they will conceal or misrepresent to cover up corruption and brutality; they are trained to deceive 
citizens during investigations as part of good police practice; they will obscure facts, and even lie, to 
cover up the misconduct of fellow officers. Additionally, command practice and policy gives officers 
every incentive to lie to cover for lack of productivity or to aggrandize themselves for recognition and 
promotion. And yes, police officers will commit perjury in our courts of law.
In any case, it is generally agreed that there must be clearly defined limits set against the 
use of deception-based police tactics, given the tremendous power that agents of the 
government wield (Dorfman, 1999; Kassin, Drizin, Grisso, Gudjonsson, Leo, and 
Redlich, 2010; Magid, 2001; and Thomas, 2007). However, unless there are salient 
penalties associated with violations of those limits, it seems unlikely that longstanding 
attitudes towards the use of deception will be changed. 
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Consider the following case example of police deception gone too far (repeatedly and 
without consequences):
 Matthew Christian, Detective
San Jose Police Department
This case was uncovered during the course of data gathering efforts described in 
Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results. It involves the use of 
deception by a police detective during the course of a suspect interrogation. As 
reported in Griffy (2007a), Matthew Christian, a detective with the San Jose 
Police Department in California, fabricated a report from the district attorney’s 
crime lab (the regional crime lab is a division of the district attorney’s office: 
“The Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Criminalistics Laboratory”). Det. 
Christian used the official crime lab seal to construct the fake report, and he also 
invented a false criminalist’s name to “confirm” the presence of semen on a 
blanket related to an alleged sex crime. He then used this “report” as evidence 
during a suspect interview to gain an inculpatory statement.
Det. Christian testified later that he forgot about his deception when he put the 
“ruse report” into his case file alongside a real lab report that contradicted it. The 
district attorney proceeded to trial thinking she had hard physical evidence of the 
defendant’s guilt—denying several defense requests inquiring after the 
contradictory lab results provided in pre-trial discovery. When asked about it on 
the stand during a preliminary hearing, Det. Christian falsely testified as though 
the fake lab report and fake criminalist were real –as though the laboratory 
findings had actually been inculpatory. The nonexistent criminalist was even 
placed on the district attorney’s witness list. 
70
With trial approaching, defense counsel was able to speak directly with the crime 
lab and the scope of the detective’s deception was revealed. This information was 
forwarded to the district attorney’s office, which had yet to contact their lab and 
verify the report. In December of 2006, all charges were dropped against the 
accused. However, the use of false laboratory reports remains standard practice 
for the San Jose Police Department11. 
This case involves a police detective fabricating a false lab report regarding 
physical evidence to obtain a suspect confession within the timeframe parameters 
set for the present study. However, he was not employed as a forensic examiner in 
any capacity. Consequently, the data from this case were necessarily excluded 
from the present study. Specific criteria for inclusion in the present study are 
discussed in Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results.
Internal Tolerance for Criminality
The hiring and retention practices of many law enforcement agencies suggest that there is 
an internal tolerance for some level of overt criminality in the culture. That is to say, 
being convicted of a crime does not always result in an automatic prohibition from law 
enforcement employment. Nor is termination from law enforcement employment 
automatic when an officer is arrested, convicted of crime, or is proved to have given false 
testimony (Spector, 2008). 
First, many police agencies openly acknowledge the fact that they hire recruits with 
criminal records; however they claim to avoid hiring those with felony convictions. 
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11 In 1990, the same police department had been warned by the judiciary to cease the practice of creating 
phony lab reports. However, in 2002, “detective Juan Serrano [of the San Jose Police Department] 
described the use of ruse crime lab reports as ‘standard procedure’ at that time” (Griffy, 2007b).
Consider the State of Georgia. Approximately 1/3 of police recruits out of the city of 
Atlanta have criminal records, and more than half have admitted to drug use. As reported 
in Eberly (2008):
More than one-third of recent Atlanta Police Academy graduates have been arrested or cited for a 
crime, according to a review of their job applications. The arrests ranged from minor offenses such 
as shoplifting to violent charges including assault. More than one-third of the officers had been 
rejected by other law enforcement agencies, and more than half of the recruits admitted using 
marijuana.
A further investigation of State records revealed 1,384 Officers with arrests and 
convictions for serious offenses that also remained certified to practice law enforcement 
with the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council (POST); many were still 
on active duty with police agencies (Moore, 2008). Law enforcement spokespersons in 
Atlanta cited shrinking budgets and fierce competition with other police agencies for the 
need to relax hiring standards, but also explained that it was common for many law 
enforcement agencies to hire applicants with misdemeanor convictions (Eberly, 2008).
Consider also the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Currently, the City of Milwaukee Police 
Department allows the hiring of candidates with up to four misdemeanor convictions and 
two drunken driving offenses (Wooten, 2007). However, in responding to a Freedom of 
Information Request, the city refused to release the exact number of officers with 
criminal convictions, saying that such an effort would be too burdensome (Wooten, 
2007). Despite a promise to make this data publicly available, the Milwaukee Fire and 
Police Commission has yet to do so (Barton, 2011).
Second, many police agencies find ways to retain brother officers convicted of fraud, 
false statements, and even violent crimes rather than fire them.
Consider the case of U.S. v. Hayes (2009). This litigation arose from Federal legislation 
enacted in 1996: Possession of Firearm After Conviction of Misdemeanor Crime of 
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Domestic Violence, 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9): “As of September 30, 1996, it is illegal to 
possess a firearm after conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. This 
prohibition applies to persons convicted of such misdemeanors at any time, even if the 
conviction occurred prior to the new law's effective date. A qualifying misdemeanor 
domestic violence crime must have as an element the use or attempted use of physical 
force or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.” 
Since that time, some law enforcement defendants have attempted to get around the 
consequences of this legislation by pleading “down to a plain simple assault not called 
domestic violence” (Rider, 2010), when charged with offenses that might cause them to 
lose their right to carry a firearm – and any related employment. A simple assault, for 
example, is a criminal charge without the predicate “domestic” descriptor. 
Additionally, a percentage of law enforcement officers, and other government employees, 
faced the possibility of retroactively losing their guns and jobs in the resulting fallout 
from the 1996 legislation. These were individuals that had been convicted of violent 
offenses against their intimate partners, but not subsequently terminated by their law 
enforcement employers (May, 2005).  Immediate reaction to the legislation by those in 
the law enforcement community included claims that it was unfair, as reported in 
Rodriquez (1997):
A new federal law that makes it illegal for anyone convicted of domestic violence to carry a gun is 
threatening the jobs of dozens of police officers around the country.
Officers in Texas, Colorado, California, Minnesota and Michigan have been re-assigned or put on 
administrative leave as a result of their past arrests. The numbers are growing, and those affected 
are claiming the law is unfair and even unconstitutional.
Others in law enforcement have expressed gratitude that the existence of convicted 
domestic violence offenders among the ranks of law enforcement has been made an issue 
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by the new legislation, considering such violations a firing offense (Davidow and 
Teichroeb, 2003).
In any case, Hayes, a ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court, closes any perceptual loophole: 
it holds that a domestic relationship need not be a consideration in the specific criminal 
conviction; only the actual relationship between the victim and the offender matters. If 
anyone is convicted of any crime that involves violence against a domestic partner, 
whether it is a misdemeanor or a felony, they are banned from carrying a firearm by 
Federal law. If one’s profession requires carrying a firearm, then one must find other 
employment if so convicted. It remains to be seen whether law enforcement agencies will 
find a new loophole in this recent ruling to further retain those personnel with related 
convictions.
Consider the actions of the New Haven Police Department in the recent case of Police 
Officer Sam Streater, as reported in Kaempffer (2009). In this case out of Connecticut, 
Officer Streater was arrested and convicted of soliciting a known prostitute, Vanessa 
DiVerniero, by paying her $20 to have sex with him in his car while off duty. He was 
caught by a police sting operation being run in the neighborhood, and made false 
statements to fellow officers about his activities during the investigation. While he was 
suspended without pay for two weeks, he was not terminated. The New Haven Police 
Department made it clear that this is typical of how they handle such offenses, even when 
they involve law enforcement personnel (Kaempffer, 2009).
Consider that also, until recently, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office employed a 
more creative solution when sworn personnel engaged in criminal activity: law 
enforcement offenders were often sent to work in the Los Angeles County Jail. As 
explained in Leonard and Faturechi (2011): “For years, the department transferred 
problem deputies to the system's lockups as a way of keeping them from the public. Other 
deputies were allowed to remain working in the jails after being convicted of crimes or 
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found guilty of serious misconduct”. This included deputies with convictions related to 
fraud, loan sharking, death threats, assault, beating inmates, smuggling contraband into 
the jail, and falsified reports (Leonard and Faturechi, 2011).
Finally, consider the case of Ross Mirkarimi, the Sheriff of San Francisco. He was 
recently convicted of a domestic violence offense involving his wife, a Venezuelan 
actress – however he subsequently refused to resign from office and announced plans to 
run for re-election (Elias, 2012). In a case that is still unfolding as of the writing of this 
dissertation, the civilian Mayor of San Francisco was forced to suspended Sheriff 
Mirkarimi while administrative charges are being pursued in order to facilitate his 
termination.
A tradition of hiring and retaining those with a criminal background, and failing to 
terminate members convicted of a crime subsequent to hiring, suggests some tolerance 
for criminality within the culture of law enforcement. This practice, often a violation of 
policy and the law, undermines the overall credibility of law enforcement agencies and 
the reputations of all those they employ. Some law enforcement agencies agree, including 
those in Illinois, as explained in Barton (2011):
An officer who has been convicted of a crime can be rendered useless as a prosecution witness - 
especially if dishonesty is involved, said Kenosha County Assistant District Attorney Richard 
Ginkowski, who once worked as a police officer in Iowa. The defense can use that information to 
cast doubt on the cop's testimony.
"If an officer is caught lying, that dilutes their credibility in other cases and makes them less 
effective as an officer," he said. "That's a significant concern."
That's one reason departments in many other states, including Illinois, preclude people convicted 
of certain misdemeanors - generally involving deception, drugs and abusive behavior - from 
carrying a badge and a gun.
"It's just overwhelming how people in communities really do believe law enforcement officers 
have to be held to this standard," said Kevin McClain, executive director of the Illinois Law 
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Enforcement Training and Standards Board. "People feel that police officers should be models in 
society."
Not only are people convicted of those types of crimes barred from being hired as Illinois officers 
- working officers who are convicted of those crimes are automatically decertified under state law, 
which means they immediately lose their jobs and can't be rehired, McClain said. Any officer who 
fails to notify the state of a conviction - either during the application process or after hiring - can 
be charged with a felony.
It should not need mention that there is also hypocrisy in the practice of policing the 
citizenry with convicted criminals; it violates the ideal of personal integrity that is held up 
as a necessary hiring mandate within the law enforcement literature already cited. It also 
further nurtures a culture tolerance for corruption, in accordance with the tenets of Social 
Learning Theory.
Fraud Diamond Theory: 
Assessing Common Forms of Law Enforcement Fraud 
Fraud Diamond Theory states that in order for an act of occupational or employment 
fraud to occur, there must be a convergence of four elements: offender motivation (aka, 
pressure or need), opportunity, rationalization, and individual capability. With respect to 
law enforcement culture, the literature is clear that it provides each of these elements to 
its members even when initially absent in a new recruit. In this section we will review 
two of the most prevalent forms of law enforcement fraud in order to assess whether this 
model holds true when considering specific corrupt practices: Improper Use of 
Government Databases and False Statements, Reports, and Testimony. An exhaustive 
evaluation of every conceivable type of law enforcement fraud would be excessive, and is 
beyond the scope of the current research.
It should be noted that each of these examples involves either an administrative violation 
of law enforcement policy that can get a law enforcement employee suspended or 
terminated, or a criminal violation that can get them indicted, arrested and even convicted 
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of a crime. Whether the violation is administrative or criminal depends in some part on 
the nature of local criminal statutes and how they are applied, as we have learned from 
the previous sections. 
Improper Use of Government Databases
Law enforcement employees have rapid accessibility to information that the general 
public does not, as explained in Berkow (2004): “Police departments have access to 
national databases of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the National 
Law Enforcement Telecommunication System (NLETS) and many other systems such as 
their state motor vehicle records, criminal warrant records, and wanted information.” 
When logging in to these and other proprietary government databases, personnel are 
generally required to use a secure password and make a record of the ongoing case that 
their query is associated with. In other words, they must have a legitimate “need to know” 
that is attached to an official investigation.
Law enforcement employees frequently access government databases for personal 
reasons using false pretenses. For example, out of Michigan, Elrick (2001) reports:
 
Over the past five years, more than 90 Michigan police officers, dispatchers, federal agents and 
security guards have abused the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN), according to a 
Free Press examination of hundreds of pages of LEIN records and police reports.
In many cases, abusers turned a valuable crime-fighting tool into a personal search engine for 
home addresses, for driving records and for criminal files of love interests, colleagues, bosses or 
rivals.
This is similar to reports out of California, where officers are routinely found guilty of 
(Cassidy, 2009): “using law enforcement databases to meet women, investigate romantic 
rivals and keep tabs on ex-girlfriends.” This includes abuse of the California Law 
Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), which connects to the DMV, state, 
and federal law enforcement databases. Abuse of this system, which is a misdemeanor, is 
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so common that there is actually a “CLETS MISUSE INVESTIGATION REPORTING 
FORM” included with the “CLETS POLICIES, PRACTICES and PROCEDURES” 
manual made available to subscribing agencies.
In a more severe case out of Maryland, Delores Culmer, a Montgomery County police 
officer, was charged with drug and fraud related offenses after using a police computer 
database. She used the database to help her fiancé, a drug trafficker, intimidate and keep 
track of his competition (News Release, 2011). She eventually pled guilty to conducting 
unauthorized warrant checks on her fiancé, a person who owed a drug related debt to her 
sister, and vehicle checks on her fiancé’s brother (Castaneda, 2011). She resigned from 
law enforcement and was sentenced to five months home detention and two years 
probation.
A pernicious aspect to this type of fraud is that it can continue even after retirement. Law 
enforcement agents retire to the private sector, or are terminated, but can continue to 
access law enforcement databases with unexpired passwords or through their 
relationships with former co-workers. The ability to achieve this kind of unauthorized 
access is a major consideration in the hiring of retired law enforcement agents by private 
security or insurance firms.
Law enforcement employees that engage in improper and illegal access of law 
enforcement databases tend to be motivated by personal gain; they have the opportunity 
by virtue of their law enforcement status and co-worker affiliations; they have cultural 
rationalization in the form of either noble cause or entitlement; and they have individual 
capability by virtue of their training and a culture which tolerates it in comportment with 
Social Learning Theory.
False Statements, Reports, and Testimony
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False statements, reports, and testimony are so common in law enforcement culture that 
police training officers actually developed their own term for what would eventually be 
required in the courtroom: “testilying” (Mollen, 1994; McClurg, 1999). As provided by 
the research presented in Dorfman (1999; p.457): “Judges, prosecutors and defense 
attorneys report that police perjury is commonplace, and even police officers themselves 
concede that lying is a regular feature of the life of a cop.” This kind of fraud occurs in 
all manner of contexts related to the work of law enforcement officers, whether it is a 
falsified timesheet related to overtime, sick days, or firearms qualification (e.g., Aseltine, 
2011; Boyd, 2011; and Litz, 2011); a false statement in a report or affidavit about directly 
observing a suspect drop drugs, weapons, or other contraband (referred to as “dropsy” 
evidence; Capers, 2008; Cloud, 1996; Dorfman, 1999; and McClurg 1999); false 
testimony about finding evidence on suspect when it was actually planted (referred to as 
“flaking”; Dorfman, 1999; see also the recent scandal involving the NYPD Brooklyn 
Narcotics Squad with respect to “flaking” innocent suspects with no criminal record in 
order to boost arrests for overtime, chronicled in Jarrett, 2011; Stelloh, 2011; and Yaniv, 
2011); or false testimony in a pretrial hearing, or before a Grand Jury, about the results of 
forensic testing to bolster an indictment prior to actually seeing the results (Smith, 2008). 
As reported in McClurg (1999; p.394): “many police officers have come to believe that 
lying is a necessary and justifiable component of their jobs. ‘Doing God's work’ is how 
one officer defended the practice of falsification for the purpose of apprehending and 
convicting criminals.” 
Law enforcement employees that engage in fraudulent statements, reports, and testimony 
tend to be personally motivated by noble cause and peer pressure; they have the 
opportunity by virtue of their law enforcement status and a corresponding presumption of 
integrity; they have cultural rationalization in the form of either noble cause or an “Us v. 
Them” world view; and they have individual capability by virtue of their training, 
experience, and a culture which openly encourages it.
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Conclusion
Law enforcement organizations provide employees with the training, opportunity and 
authority to commit acts of fraud on a variety of levels, which requires a high level of 
personal integrity to abjure. Law enforcement culture is often defined by traits that afford 
the motivations and rationalizations for a deviant internal subculture, actively cultivating 
fraud within its ranks. At the same time, law enforcement culture also furnishes otherwise 
lawful members with the skills, incentives, motivations and rationalizations for ignoring, 
protecting, and even publicly defending their unlawful co-workers 12. These employment 
circumstances and cultural features, in strong conformity with Fraud Diamond Theory, 
Differential Association Theory, and specifically Social Learning Theory, increase the 
likelihood that those in law enforcement will commit, tolerate, conceal, and even defend 
acts of overt fraud. 
In addition, as Terrill, Paoline, and Manning (2003) explain (p.104): “coercive behavior 
is implicitly, and perhaps even explicitly, viewed as a salient correlate of police 
culture.” If this holds true within a given law enforcement agency, it stands to reason that 
any subordinate culture will ultimately be directed or forced into alignment with its 
values should there ever be a conflicting interest. Failure of the subordinate culture to 
align would be expected to result in the traditional peer group consequences and 
retaliation that law enforcement is known for and committed to (Cancino and Enriquez, 
2004; Chin and Wells, 1998; and Cooper, 2009). This reality places any forensic 
examiner employed by a law enforcement agency into a weak subordinate capacity 
within a culture that is opposed to the core tenets of scientific praxis.
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12 Although addressing these cultural features of law enforcement may seem dated to some, they are in step 
with the observations of modern law enforcement researchers as cited - as well as the observations of this 
researcher. Additionally, it is important to note that while the academic community make take these 
observations at face value as being established and uncomplex, criminal justice practitioners will likely not. 
Especially those vested in the current model of law enforcement aligned forensic science. There is a 
continued and persistent disconnect between those working in the justice system and the research that is 
published by those studying it. As this dissertation is written to be read by criminal justice practitioners and 
policy-makers alike, a detailed and carefully referenced accounting, covering what may be obvious and 
simplistic to those in academia, is necessary. 
Chapter 5 
Fraud and Scientific Culture 
“The scientific endeavor is based on vigilance, not trust.”
Jonathan King (1999; p.215)
Prof. of Molecular Biology, MIT
In the preceding chapter, we explored the culture of law enforcement – the first of two 
competing occupational environments that payroll and maintain the forensic sciences. 
This chapter explores the second culture associated with the forensic sciences – that of 
scientific inquiry. Specifically, this chapter will establish the nature of science and then 
define its culture by identifying ideal cardinal traits from the literature. This will lead to a 
discussion of the development of terms and definitions related to scientific fraud; the 
estimated frequency of scientific fraud; and the varying manifestations of scientific fraud 
in both research and clinical contexts. It will also be demonstrated, by adducing case 
examples, that the existing literature on occupational scientific fraud is relevant for 
contextualizing the current research effort. 
Science, Scientific Knowledge, and the Scientific Method 
The classic definition of a science is provided in Thornton and Peterson (2007; p.13): “an 
orderly body of knowledge with principles that are clearly enunciated,” as well as being 
reality oriented and having conclusions susceptible to testing. Giddens (1991) further 
explains that science involves (p.20): “the use of systematic methods of investigation, 
theoretical thinking, and the logical assessment of arguments, to develop a body of 
knowledge about a particular subject matter.” In other words, the development of any 
field of study as a science requires building a knowledge base that is “accurate and 
systematized” (Ross, 1964; p.66).
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Scientific knowledge is understanding, enlightenment, or awareness that comes from 
examining events or problems through the lenses of analytical logic and the scientific 
method; it is necessarily less fallible than, and distinct from, common knowledge or mere 
observation (Ross, 1964; Judson, 2004; and Popper, 2002). The generation of scientific 
knowledge in a particular area (e.g., chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, or 
criminology) leads to its development as a science. Suggested earlier, this process is 
intended to be ongoing and self-correcting (NAS, 2002; Popper, 2002; and Ross, 1964). 
The scientific method is a systematic way to investigate how or why something works, or 
how something happened, with the development of hypotheses and subsequent attempts 
at falsification through testing (Cooley, 2004; DiFonzo and Stern, 2007; Giddens, 1991; 
Kennedy and Kennedy, 1972; Popper, 2002; and Thornton and Peterson, 2007). The 
scientific method may be regarded as a path to knowledge, involving steps that cannot be 
skipped. Initially, empirical information (e.g., observation and experience) identifies a 
question or a problem. This is developed into a testable hypothesis for which specific 
empirical data is identified and then systematically gathered. According to Popper (2002; 
p.1): “A scientist, whether theorist or experimenter, puts forward statements, or systems 
of statements, and tests them step by step.” Theory testing is generally accomplished by 
one of four means: logical comparison of conclusions for internal consistency; 
investigation of the logical form of a theory; comparison with other theories; and testing 
empirical applications of the theory with conclusions that can be derived from it (Popper, 
2002). With sufficient testing, marked by a consistent failure to falsify, hypotheses can 
become working scientific theories (Popper, 2002; Raven and Johnson, 1986). 
Eventually, over time, scientific theories can survive to become scientific principles. 
The scientific method is universally accepted as the best approach to knowledge building, 
as it (Dewey, 1995; p.397):
…is not just a method which it has been found profitable to pursue in this or that abstruse subject 
for purely technical reasons. It represents the only method of thinking that has proved fruitful in 
82
any subject - that is what we mean when we call it scientific. It is not a peculiar development of 
thinking for highly specialized ends; it is thinking so far as thought has become conscious of its 
proper ends and of the equipment indispensable for success in their pursuit.
The scientific method is therefore the definitive approach to logical inquiry, knowledge 
building, and problem solving used by scientists of every kind (DiFonzo and Stern, 2007; 
Popper, 2002). It must be pointed out that the opposite is also true. Any investigator or 
examiner that does not understand or use the scientific method as the foundation of 
inquiry is not engaging in scientific practice.
Science as Falsification 
Subsumed in the previous section, a cornerstone of the scientific method is falsification. 
This is achieved by subjecting a theory to repeated attacks in order to disprove it, which 
means testing it against case facts or alternative theories (Popper, 2002). Any study, 
method or experiment designed only to confirm a hypothesis or theory is not, by 
definition, scientific. The scientific prohibition against seeking only proofs or 
confirmations was described by Sir Karl Popper (1902–1994), the noted Austrian-British 
psychologist, philosopher, and scientist (Popper, 1963; pp. 33–39):
SCIENCE AS FALSIFICATION
These considerations led me in the winter of 1919–20 to conclusions which I may now reformulate 
as follows.
1. It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory—if we look for 
confirmations.
2. Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is to say, if, 
unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was 
incompatible with the theory—an event which would have refuted the theory.
3. Every “good” scientific theory is a prohibition: It forbids certain things to happen. The more a 
theory forbids, the better it is.
4. A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is nonscientific. Irrefutability is not a 
virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.
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5. Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is 
falsifiability; but there are degrees of testability: Some theories are more testable, more exposed to 
refutation, than others; they take, as it were, greater risks.
6. Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the 
theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the 
theory. (I now speak in such cases of “corroborating evidence.”)
7. Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers—for 
example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc 
in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the 
theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. (I 
later described such a rescuing operation as a “conventionalist twist” or a “conventionalist 
stratagem.”)
One can sum up all this by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its 
falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.
Falsification being an essential “criterion”, scientific inquiry demands objectivity, doubt, 
and skepticism at every step. Useful stipulations along these lines are found in Kennedy 
and Kennedy (1972, p. 4):
To be objective, an inquirer should be prepared to accept and record whatever facts he may 
encounter. He must not let personal feelings affect what he sees or hears. Although he does not 
need to like the nature of the information, he must be willing to investigate it. When such an 
investigation is begun, it must be carried through with a degree of skepticism. Skepticism does not 
imply cynicism or a distrust of the world. It only suggests that the [scientist] must be prepared to 
distinguish truth from the opinion or inclinations of others.
Science, consequently, does not seek confirmation of beliefs or ideas; it seeks eradication. 
Failing at this, hypotheses or theories that survive genuine attempts at falsification are 
sufficiently “accurate and reliable” to be considered scientific.
The Cardinal Traits of Scientific Culture
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Some commentators have argued that “scientific culture” is an indefinite and disputed 
term “that is used to imply a variety of different things” (Cole, 2010; p.439).  This may be 
true at an applied level, where specific scientific constructs can be inconsistently defined 
or ineptly exercised by those without genuine scientific education or training. However, a 
careful examination of the scientific literature reveals the existence of consistent core 
scientific values, ideals, and prohibitions. 
The scientific literature is replete with explanations of the requisite ethics and obligations 
for achieving trustworthy practice across the spectrum of scientific endeavor, whether in 
conducting research or engaging in clinical practice (e.g., Anderson, Martinson, and De 
Vries 2007; Bosch and Titus, 2009; Dewey, 1995; Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; Elgin, 
2011; Hardwig, 1991; Judson, 2004; Kennedy and Kennedy, 1972;  Martinson, Anderson, 
and de Vries, 2005; NAS, 2002; NAS, 2009; ORI, 1995; ORI, 2000; Popper, 1963; 
Popper, 2002; Richardson, 2004; Ross, 1964; Stanbrook, MacDonald, Flegel, and Hébert, 
2011; Steneck, 2007; and Titus, Wells, and Rhoades, 2008). This body of work, and that 
supporting it, collectively provides a unifying set of cultural objectives intended to 
distinguish scientists from other types of investigators. It also becomes clear that 
scientific culture is not just defined by accepted practices, but strict prohibitions. 
Specifically, all scientists must adhere to ethical guidelines and practice standards 
intended to fulfill and maintain what is referred to as “scientific integrity”; they must also 
avoid intentional violations of that integrity (Jette, 2005; Judson, 2004; Martinson, 
Anderson, and de Vries, 2005; NAS, 2002; NAS, 2009; Steneck, 2007; and Titus, Wells, 
and Rhoades, 2008). 
Robert Merton famously wrote of basic scientific norms, or “normative principles” in the 
1940s, as explained in Anderson, Martinson, and De Vries (2007; p.4): 
Merton (1942) identified four norms of science, which he expressed as principles of desirable 
behavior. He saw the normative principles as morally binding, but most other commentators 
now see them as representing ideals that are not binding on behavior (Hess, 1997; Ziman, 
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2000). They do, however, carry the weight of a group’s near-consensus and therefore 
influence behavior. Communality refers to the shared ownership of scientific methods and 
findings. Universalism is the principle that a scientist’s findings and body of work should be 
judged on the basis of their merit, without reference to the scientist’s personal or other 
irrelevant characteristics. Disinterestedness represents the understanding that scientists’ work 
should be free of self-interested motivation and pursuit of wealth. Organized skepticism 
requires that scientific findings be made available for scrutiny and that such scrutiny be 
performed in accordance with accepted scientific standards.
Subsequently, these norms (or their equivalent) have become generally accepted as the 
fundamental obligations of scientists to their employers, colleagues, students, and even 
the public at large (Anderson, Martinson, and De Vries, 2007; Hardwig, 1991; Jette, 
2005; Steneck, 2007; and NAS, 2009). For example, Steneck (2007) advises that 
scientific culture is ultimately found in honest and unbiased reporting  (p.xi): 
“Researchers who report their work honestly, accurately, efficiently, and objectively are 
on the right road when it comes to responsible conduct. Anyone who is dishonest, 
knowingly reports inaccurate results, wastes funds, or allows personal bias to influence 
scientific findings is not.” While Anderson, Martinson, and De Vries, (2007; p.4) 
“proposed two additional norms: governance as a mode of decision-making, and quality 
as an evaluative standard” intentionally consistent with Mertonian norms.
The National Academy of Sciences (aka, the NAS)13 offers more to the equation, 
describing a specific relationship between scientists and their employers. They observe 
that a culture of science exists as a function of both individual and institutional integrity. 
This begins with the institutional obligation to create an environment where scientific 
practice is encouraged and protected, and misconduct is not tolerated (NAS, 2002; p.26):
The human contribution to the research environment is greatly shaped by each individual’s 
professional integrity, which in turn is influenced by the individual’s educational background and 
cultural and ethical upbringing. These result in values and attitudes that contribute to the formation 
of the individual’s identity, unique personality traits, and ethical decision-making abilities. 
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13 The NAS was formed and given Congressional authority to advise the United States Federal Government 
on scientific and technical matters in 1863. It has done so ever since.
Because each researcher brings unique qualities to the research environment, the constants must 
come from the environment itself. Research institutions should consistently and effectively 
provide training and education, policies and procedures, and tools and support systems. 
Institutional expectations should be unambiguous, and the consequences of each individual’s 
conduct or misconduct should be clear.
The NAS further describes scientific culture as being comprised of honorable values and 
standards similar to those expected from lawful citizens in everyday life (NAS, 2009; p.
3):
Research is based on the same ethical values that apply in everyday life, including honesty, 
fairness, objectivity, openness, trustworthiness, and respect for others.
A “scientific standard” refers to the application of these values in the context of research. 
Examples are openness in sharing research materials, fairness in reviewing grant proposals, 
respect for one’s colleagues and students, and honesty in reporting research results.
This is consistent with Edwards and Gotsonis (2009), which characterizes the culture of 
science as rewarding humility, openness, and criticism as it strives to refine itself through 
self-correction (pp. 125):
The methods and culture of scientific research enable it to be a self-correcting enterprise. Because 
researchers are, by definition, creating new understanding, they must be as cautious as possible before 
asserting a new “truth.” Also, because researchers are working at a frontier, few others may have the 
knowledge to catch and correct any errors they make. Thus, science has had to develop means of 
revisiting provisional results and revealing errors before they are widely used. The processes of peer 
review, publication, collegial interactions (e.g., sharing at conferences), and the involvement of 
graduate students (who are expected to question as they learn) all support this need. Science is 
characterized also by a culture that encourages and rewards critical questioning of past results and of 
colleagues. Most technologies benefit from a solid research foundation in academia and ample 
opportunity for peer-to-peer stimulation and critical assessment, review and critique through 
conferences, seminars, publishing, and more. These elements provide a rich set of paths through which 
new ideas and skepticism can travel and opportunities for scientists to step away from their day-to-day 
work and take a longer-term view. The scientific culture encourages cautious, precise statements and 
discourages statements that go beyond established facts; it is acceptable for colleagues to challenge one 
another, even if the challenger is more junior. 
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Self-correction can only come in an environment that embraces critical thinking and 
skepticism. As explained in Brookfield (1987), critical thinking requires strict adherence 
to logical analysis, and the discipline to scrutinize the strengths, weaknesses, and overall 
rationality of all arguments and assertions. It also requires (p.6): “continual questioning 
of assumptions”; (p.8): “challenging the importance of context”; (p.9): “imagining and 
exploring alternatives” and “reflective skepticism”; and (p.11-12): “the ability to 
distinguish bias from reason and fact from opinion.” Critical thinking necessitates doubt 
and proof, no matter the source of data or the strength of assertions about the integrity of 
findings. This means that scientists are prohibited from blindly accepting what they are 
told by anyone. The importance of this scientific norm is echoed in Gardenier (2011), 
which explains that (p.3):
Analytic methodology cannot be divorced from the data. Both must be specifically congruent in 
structure, relevance, and assumptions. Even more important than any measure of confidence or 
significance in the output is the logic that the conclusions follow from the data…
Scientists may mistakenly consider it an ethical obligation to accept data from colleagues or 
superiors for statistical analysis without detailed attention to all of the considerations above. That 
is incorrect. Without data integrity, it is impossible to achieve research integrity.
This advisory is universally applicable to any context where a scientist is being asked to 
assume the integrity of information they are provided from any source: such assumptions 
are impermissible. Scientific integrity must be earned at all junctures and not presumed. 
When weaknesses exist, they must be acknowledged, considered, and then reported as a 
function of limits set against any reliable interpretation.
Scientific understanding is also intended to be regenerative – constantly evolving as new 
information is developed and assimilated. Consequently, the caution and humility advised 
for responsibly exploring “new truth” requires acceptance that there is no such thing as 
absolute scientific certainty (Botkin, 2011). The scientist must therefore show an 
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appreciation for exploring the limitations of their findings and inferences. They must also 
accept the need for clearly expressing those limitations to others, and for admitting that 
any scientific findings “are not absolute truths or immutable facts” (Inman and Rudin, 
1999; p.164)14.
From all of this discussion, a consistent pattern of core scientific obligations associated 
with the establishment of scientific integrity is evident. As suggested by the NAS, these 
are appropriately divided into requisite values and practices associated with either the 
individual scientist or their institution/employer. This acknowledges the reality that every 
scientist has their own variable personality, education, abilities, and professional identity; 
and that (NAS, 2002; p.4): “Since each individual researcher brings unique qualities to 
the research environment, the constants must come from the environment itself.”
Individual Obligations to Scientific Culture
• Maintain an ethical professional character
• Embrace empiricism and the Scientific Method 
• Maintain a disposition towards critical thinking and skepticism
• Maintain objectivity and disinterest towards predetermined outcomes
• Show humility towards inherent limitations and uncertainty of findings 
• Use logical analysis and argumentation when interpreting findings
• Maintain honesty and precision in reporting, attributions, and authorship
• Maintain openness to peer review to enable independent validation
• Maintain transparency regarding personal conflicts of interest
• Demonstrate fairness in peer reviewing the work of others
• Report the misconduct of others
• Avoid reckless disregard for maintaining scientific integrity
Institutional Obligations to Scientific Culture
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14 It comes as a surprise to many that nothing in science is 100% infallible and “if you thought before that 
science was certain-- well, that is just an error on your part,” (Feynman, 2001; p.77).
• Employment of qualified individuals with ethical professional character 
• Provide mentorship and leadership promoting scientific literacy and integrity
• Provide clearly stated practice standards and ethical guidelines
• Provide opportunities for ongoing collaboration, education and training
• Encourage peer review and self correcting enterprise
• Quality Control: Monitor and evaluate the environment for scientific integrity
• Maintain transparency regarding institutional conflicts of interest
• Zero pressure on employees to produce results favoring the institution
• Promotions and pay raises based on scientific competence, not outcomes 
favorable to the institution
• Zero tolerance for misconduct; all allegations investigated and appropriately 
sanctioned 
• Provide protection for whistleblowers; no negative consequences or reprisals
• Avoid reckless disregard for maintaining scientific integrity
While these obligations are not the set limit of what scientific culture requires, they are 
generally accepted as the basic starting point for building and preserving scientific 
integrity.
It is also agreed that “counternorms”, antithetical to scientific culture, can develop in the 
context of (Mitroff, 1974; p. 585) “fierce, sometimes bitter competitive races for 
discovery” that involve inappropriate (Anderson, Martinson, and De Vries, 2007; p.4) 
“personal” and “emotional commitment to theories and ideas.” These include: secrecy, 
particularism, self-interestedness, and organized dogmatism, to which have been added 
“administration as opposed to governance, and quantity as opposed to quality as an 
evaluative standard,” (Anderson, Martinson, and De Vries, 2007; p.4). As will be 
demonstrated, the failure of scientific norms within an occupational environment can 
incubate a cultural of counternorms that provide for and even encourage fraud.
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Scientific Fraud: Terms and Definitions
The literature is clear with respect to the obligations of scientists and their institutional 
employers. However, there is also general agreement that many of those operating within 
different scientific communities recklessly or intentionally fail to understand, uphold, and 
promote those obligations (Judson, 2004; Martinson, Anderson, and de Vries, 2005; 
Sovacool, 2008; and Titus, Wells, and Rhoades, 2008). This is in part because of human 
error, and the fact that (Anderson, Martinson, and De Vries, 2007; p.3): “[scientific] 
norms represent ideal behavior, and so it is to be expected that scientists’ actual behavior 
will fall short of perfect adherence to the norms.” This is also, in part, owing to acts of 
fraud (McDowell, 2010). The need to clearly distinguish fraudulent intent from inevitable 
human error has generated ongoing debate regarding the specified actions and motives 
that constitute scientific fraud. This has resulted in the development of specific terms and 
definitions that may be used to investigate the phenomenon.
The United States government employs a disproportionate number of scientists, and 
funds a significant amount of scientific research worldwide15. It also requires any 
organization that receives government funding to have policies and procedures in place 
for the reporting, investigation, and identification and any questionable research 
practices. As mandated in ORI (2009b; p.4): “All institutions receiving research funds 
from Public Health Service (PHS) agencies must have on file an assurance form with the 
Office of Research Integrity (ORI). This assurance is to ensure that the institution has in 
place policies and procedures for dealing with allegations of research misconduct, has 
provided ORI with contact information for its assurance official, and will submit an 
annual report to ORI identifying any activity from the previous year requiring inquiries 
and investigations into allegations of possible research misconduct involving research 
supported by PHS funds.” To that end, the U.S. ORI has developed related terms and 
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15 In 2003, as reported in Sovacool (2008; p.271): “between six and eight million scientists were employed 
in research and development in the United States. Their activities— roughly 40% of the world’s R&D effort
—constituted a $300 billion industry, accounting for roughly 3.2% of the entire country’s gross domestic 
product.”
definitions in order to create uniformity and consistency during investigations into 
scientific misconduct. These are intended to serve as a guide for institutions receiving 
government research money – facilitating their obligation to report, investigate, and stem 
internal violations of scientific integrity (Redman and Mertz, 2005).
The most serious violations of scientific integrity are referred to by the ORI as scientific 
misconduct, which is defined as “fabrication, falsification16, or plagiarism (FFP) in 
proposing, performing, or reviewing research, or in reporting research results” (NAS, 
2009; p.3). As described, scientific misconduct is a reference to fraud; it involves 
intentional misrepresentations by scientists designed to secure an unfair or unlawful gain. 
In fact, the literature treats the terms “scientific fraud” and “scientific misconduct” as 
essentially interchangeable. However, the term “fraud” is fraught with legal 
implications17. As not all research violations involve a crime, the term “misconduct” has 
been adopted as the official substitute when dealing with actionable allegations in the 
context of internal institutional investigations (Catano and Turk, 2007; Resnick, 2003; 
and Reynolds, 2004). 
The major forms of scientific misconduct are operationalized in the ORI’s “Policies on 
Research Misconduct” (ORI, 2009b; p.5)18:
(a) Fabrication is making up data or results and recording or reporting them. 
(b) Falsification is manipulating research materials, equipment, or processes, or changing or 
omitting data or results such that the research is not accurately represented in the research record. 
(c) Plagiarism is the appropriation of another person’s ideas, processes, results, or words without 
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16 Not to be confused with the Popperian concept of falsification associated with the scientific method.
17 Despite the liabilities and legal tools available, scientific fraud is rarely criminalized except in extreme or 
high profile cases, even with recommendations from the scientific community that this is a necessary 
reform (Bogner and Menz, 2006; Kuzma, 1992 and 2010; Redman and Kaplan, 2005; Resnick, 2003; and 
Kline, 1993). 
18 It is important to note that error is cleaved sharply from discussions of scientific misconduct in the 
literature as unintentional, expected, and on many levels unavoidable.
giving appropriate credit. 
(d) Research misconduct does not include honest error or differences of opinion. 
These concepts are further described in Reider (2010; p.445): “The colloquial term for 
fabrication is ‘dry-labbing,’ making up results for experiments or trials that never 
occurred… The term falsification is applied when research actually took place, but the 
results have been manipulated, modified, or edited so that the published work no longer 
accurately reflects the scientific findings.” Though not listed by the ORI in a pedantic 
sense, it has been demonstrated that scientific misconduct also includes ghost authorship, 
suppressing unfavorable results, the falsification of researcher credentials, and sexual 
harassment when these actions have to potential to affect the results or interpretations of 
scientific inquiries  (Parrish, 1996 and Krimsky, 2007). 
For the purposes of the present research, it bears explaining that ghost authorship, also 
referred to as honorary or gift authorship, is a common yet highly misleading practice, 
described in Krimsky (2007; p.450): “Ghost authorship occurs when the person whose 
name appears on the publication was not involved either in doing the research, framing 
the ideas behind the article, or in writing the article. Alternatively, it also occurs when an 
individual who has made substantial contributions to the manuscript was not named as an 
author or whose contributions were not cited in the acknowledgments.” Examples of 
ghost or gift authorship include giving a byline to a lab supervisor who has made no 
meaningful contribution to a given research publication; or a supervisor taking the 
research of a graduate assistant and publishing it under their own name without 
attribution19. Essentially the reverse of plagiarism, it is viewed as a dishonest practice that 
violates the covenant between the scientists and their intended reader, whether this 
includes supervisors, colleagues, policy makers, lawmakers, or members of the general 
public. The reasons are straightforward. First, it involves deception regarding what work 
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19 Ghost/gift authorship is common in many research environments – a longstanding tradition in some 
circles that masquerades as legitimate scientific practice (Judson, 2004).
was done and by whom; that it is to say it is a lie about accomplishment. Second, the 
purpose of the deception is to inappropriately enhance the credibility of an author or a 
publication; this illusion of credibility has the capacity to affect the beliefs and actions of 
others. The inherent dangers of giving anyone credit for work that they did not do, with 
respect to biasing outcomes and misrepresenting the true origins of reported findings, are 
discussed in Judson (2004); Marusic, Katavic, and Marusic (2007); NAS (2009); and 
Lexchin (2007).
Falsifying scientific credentials occurs when someone reports having scientific 
qualifications that they have not actually earned, or that do not actually exist. This 
includes padding an otherwise competent scientific resume with publications and 
certifications that are unearned or non-existent. It can also involve the fabrication of an 
entire pedigree, from formal education to work history. In either circumstance, fraud has 
occurred which may be considered to be a form of scientific misconduct – especially 
when the false credentials are material to employment, legal requirements for practice, 
promotions, or applications for grant money (Parrish, 1996; Krimsky, 2007; and ORI, 
2009a)20. 
In many jurisdictions, there are criminal statutes that apply to instances of credential 
fraud, especially when used to gain a financial reward (e.g., employment, promotions, 
pay raises, and grants that can involves thousands or even millions of dollars). However, 
law enforcement generally shows little interest in responding to or initiating the 
prosecution of scientific fraudsters accused in such matters (Parrish, 1996). This may be 
due to the complicity of many law enforcement agencies with respect to condoning the 
use of “diploma mills” for officer advancement. In other words, the unwillingness of an 
94
20 The ORI has a long-standing tradition of asserting scientific misconduct based largely on findings of 
credential falsification, despite the fact that it is not listed as one of the three major forms of research 
misconduct (Parrish, 1996). 
agency or investigator to go after those engaged in credential fraud may in some 
instances reflect their own similar misconduct21. 
Irrespective of criminal charges, which are inconsistently applied at best, the violations 
discussed in this section are each consistent with ORI (2000), which provides that (p.5): 
“’Scientific misconduct’ or misconduct in science means fabrication, falsification, 
plagiarism, or other practices that seriously deviate from those that are commonly 
accepted within the scientific community for proposing, conducting, or reporting 
research.” Admittedly, the last part of this definition has caused significant disagreement 
within the scientific community (Judson, 2004 and Reynolds, 2004). It was criticized by 
some for being too ambiguous, while praised by others for recognizing the variety of 
fraud that can actually occur in scientific practice (Redman and Mertz, 2005; Resnick, 
2003; Reynolds, 2004; Sovacool, 2008; and Weed, 1998). Subsequently, the language 
was changed to: “Research misconduct means fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism in 
proposing, performing, or reviewing research, or in reporting research results,” (DHSS, 
2005; Sec. 93.103). This and related definitions are necessarily a starting point for the 
majority of publications examining the issue of scientific fraud.
The Babbage Typology
The concept of scientific fraud, and its examination, has significant history. Charles 
Babbage, the 19th Century English mathematician, engineer, and inventor (he developed 
an original concept for a programmable computer) was the first to publish a formal 
typology of scientific fraud (Judson, 2004). As explained in Babbage (1830; Ch.5, 
Section 3):
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21 There is, especially among those seeking promotion into high-ranking positions, a tradition of using 
“diploma mills” that give officers college degrees based on “life experience”, without coursework, for a fee 
(e.g., Clayton, 2003; Grolleau, Lakhal, and Mzoughi, 2008; Holguin, 2007; Hutchison, 1999; Schemo, 
2008; and Stepankowski, 2009). This despite many states having laws that forbid using these kinds of fake 
degrees to gain employment, threatening fines and even imprisonment (Clayton, 2003). 
There are several species of impositions that have been practised in science, which are but little 
known, except to the initiated, and which it may perhaps be possible to render quite intelligible to 
ordinary understandings. These may be classed under the heads of hoaxing, forging, trimming, and 
cooking.
Scientific inquiries are more exposed than most others to the inroads of pretenders; and I feel that I 
shall deserve the thanks of all who really value truth, by stating some of the methods of deceiving 
practised by unworthy claimants for its honours, whilst the mere circumstance of their arts being 
known may deter future offenders.
As defined in Babbage (1830), hoaxing refers to frauds that are “intended to last for a 
time, and then be discovered, to the ridicule of those who have credited it”; forging refers 
to the behavior of those “who, wishing to acquire a reputation for science, records 
observations which he has never made”; trimming refers “clipping off little bits here and 
there from those observations which differ most in excess from the mean, and in sticking 
them on to those which are too small; a species of "equitable adjustment," as a radical 
would term it, which cannot be admitted in science,”; and cooking refers to giving 
“ordinary observations the appearance and character of those of the highest degree of 
accuracy,”. 
Of cooking, Babbage further explains: “One of its numerous processes is to make 
multitudes of observations, and out of these to select those only which agree, or very 
nearly agree. If a hundred observations are made, the cook must be very unlucky if he 
cannot pick out fifteen or twenty which will do for serving up.” Currently, this practice is 
referred to colloquially as cherry picking (Chisum and Turvey, 2011).
The Babbage Typology survives in the modern scientific literature, echoed in the 
definition of scientific misconduct already discussed: fabrication, falsification, and 
plagiarism (aka FF-P; ORI, 2009b). Forging is akin to fabrication – the invention of data 
or findings from tests not performed and observations not made. Trimming is akin to 
falsification – the alteration or manipulation of present elements to support predetermined 
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results. Cooking is also akin to falsification, and is further accounted for in other forms of 
fraud detailed in the literature, including the self-explanatory suppression of unfavorable 
results. 
The continued relevance of this typology will be demonstrated as we discuss the case 
examples in this chapter and those yet to come.
Scientific Fraud: From High Profile to Mundane
Scientific misconduct, synonymous in the literature with scientific fraud, is both 
pervasive and extensive (Kline, 1993; De Vries, Anderson, and Martinson, 2006; Judson, 
2004; Marshall, 2000; Reider, 2010; and Resnick, 2003). As reported in Martinson, 
Anderson, and de Vries (2005), the top 12 questionable research practices reported by 
scientists are (p.737):
1. Falsifying or ‘cooking’ research data
2. Ignoring major aspects of human-subject requirements
3. Not properly disclosing involvement in firms whose products are based on one‘s own research
4. Relationships with students, research subjects or clients that may be interpreted as questionable
5. Using another’s ideas without obtaining permission or giving due credit
6. Unauthorized use of confidential information in connection with one’s own research
7. Failing to present data that contradict one’s own previous research
8. Circumventing certain minor aspects of human-subject requirements
9. Overlooking others' use of flawed data or questionable interpretation of data
10. Changing the design, methodology or results of a study in response to pressure from a funding 
source
11. Publishing the same data or results in two or more publications
12. Inappropriately assigning authorship credit
Some high profile examples from the past decade include:
• The infamous Bell Labs scandal involving Jan Hendrick Schon, described in 
Resnik (2003; pp.123-124):
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On September 25, 2002, a panel of independent investigators found that Jan Hendrick 
Schön, a 32-year-old physicist at Bell Laboratories, had fabricated or falsified data in 17 
published papers, some of which had appeared in highly prestigious journals, including 
Science, Nature, and Applied Physics Letters (Service, 2002). The panel investigated a 
total of 25 papers with 20 coauthors. On November 1, 2002, Schön and 7 coauthors 
published a retraction of 8 papers that had been published in Science from 2000–2001 
(Bao et al., 2002). The papers raised suspicions because they reported revolutionary 
breakthroughs in organic electronics, superconductivity, and nanotechnology.
Schön had even received a $3000 prize for his work, and Technology Review named him 
one of science’s top young investigators (Service, 2002). Many scientists believe that 
Schön could have gotten away with his misdeeds if his papers had not been so 
sensational.
• In March of 2005, Dr. Eric T. Poehlman agreed to plead guilty to falsifying and 
fabricating research data in multiple federal grant applications and academic 
articles from 1992 to 2002 (ORI, 2005). His research focused on obesity, 
menopause, and aging. As reported in Interlandi (2006):
Poehlman pleaded guilty to lying on a federal grant application and admitted to fabricating 
more than a decade’s worth of scientific data on obesity, menopause and aging, much of it 
while conducting clinical research as a tenured faculty member at the University of Vermont. 
He presented fraudulent data in lectures and in published papers, and he used this data to 
obtain millions of dollars in federal grants from the National Institutes of Health — a crime 
subject to as many as five years in federal prison. Poehlman’s admission of guilt came after 
more than five years during which he denied the charges against him, lied under oath and tried 
to discredit his accusers. By the time Poehlman came clean, his case had grown into one of 
the most expansive cases of scientific fraud in U.S. history.
U.S. Attorney David V. Kirby explained (ORI, 2005): "This prosecution 
demonstrates that academic researchers will be held fully accountable for fraud 
and scientific misconduct. Dr. Poehlman fraudulently diverted millions of dollars 
from the Public Health Service to support his research projects. This in turn 
siphoned millions of dollars from the pool of resources available for valid 
scientific research proposals. As this prosecution proves, such conduct will not be 
98
tolerated." Dr. Poehlman was sentenced to one year and a day in federal prison, 
followed by two years of probation (Interlandi, 2006).
• In May of 2006, Hwang Woo-suk, the South Korean stem cell researcher, was put 
on trial and (Dorey, 2010; p.16): “given a suspended custodial sentence for his 
part in fraudulent claims to have cloned the first human embryos and extracted 
stem cells from them.” He had defrauded public and private contributors of 
around US $3 million, publishing his fabricated data and results throughout 2005 
(Bognar and Menz, 2006).
• A 2009 report from the ORI revealed research fraud involving two surgeons 
experimenting with drugs intended to help prevent rejection of transplanted 
organs  - using public money (Murdoch, 2009; p.29):
In a series of studies designed to assess two anti-tissue-rejection drugs, former University 
of Alabama-Birmingham surgeons Judith Thomas and Juan Contreras carefully detailed 
experiments in which they replaced one kidney in rhesus monkeys with a foreign one 
and, a month later, removed the remaining native kidney. The new organs took, they 
reported. The drugs worked.
But according to a July report from the federal Office of Research Integrity, that second 
kidney was never removed from at least 32 of the 70 animals. The scientists denied 
intentional wrongdoing, but the promising drug has been deemed bogus. The experiments 
also cost taxpayers: The National Institutes of Health poured $23 million into the work 
over eight years.
These cases are not representative of typical scientific misconduct given the large scale, 
extensive publicity, and severe consequences involved. They are, however, the kind of 
cases that get the attention of the media.
As a counterbalance, consider also the recent case studies of scientific misconduct 
published by the ORI between December 2010 and June of 2011:
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1. Hung-Shu Chang, Ph.D., a visiting post-doctoral fellow / endocrinologist at 
Washington State University: “engaged in research misconduct in research 
supported by National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS), 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), grant R01 ES012974… by fabricating and 
falsifying,” experiments, data, and findings (ORI, 2010; p.6). Dr. Chang’s fraud 
was discovered when he returned home to Taiwan and subsequent researchers 
were unable to duplicate his data. They referenced his original data, which did not 
match his published work (Luiggi, 2010).
2. Elizabeth Goodwin, Ph.D., a former associate professor of genetics and medical 
genetics University of Wisconsin-Madison: “engaged in scientific misconduct 
involving research supported by the National Institute of General Medical 
Sciences (NIGMS), National Institutes of Health (NIH), grants R01 GM051836 
and R01 GM073183… by falsifying and fabricating data that she included in 
grant applications” which misrepresented research findings and their origins 
(ORI, 2010; p.7).
3. Sagar S. Mungekar, Ph.D., a former MD/ PhD student at the New York University 
School of Medicine in the Sackler Institute of Graduate Biomedical Sciences: 
“engaged in research misconduct in research supported by National Institute of 
General Medical Sciences (NIGMS), National Institutes of Health (NIH), grants 
R01 GM35769, R01 GM55624, and T32 GM07308, and National Institute of 
Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), NIH, grant T32 AI007180… by 
fabricating and falsifying data” related to tables and figures in his PhD, and “also 
claimed to have constructed 53 different reporter plasmids with RNase E mutants, 
when sequencing data did not exist to support this claim,” (ORI, 2011a; p.6).
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4. Meleik Goodwill, Ph.D., a former postdoctoral Fellow, Wadsworth Center, N.Y.S. 
Department of Health: “engaged in research misconduct in research supported by 
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS), National Institutes 
of Health (NIH), grant R21 ES013269-02… by the fabrication of data for growth 
curves” and falsely labeled figures and articles in a publication that was ultimately 
retracted (ORI, 2011a; pp.6-7).
5. Bengu Sezen, Ph.D., a former graduate student in the Department of Chemistry at 
Columbia University: “engaged in misconduct in science in research funded by 
National Institute of General Medical Sciences (NIGMS), National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), grant R01 GM60326… based on evidence that she knowingly and 
intentionally falsified and fabricated, and in one instance plagiarized, data 
reported in three (3) papers and her doctoral thesis” (ORI, 2011a; p.7).
6. Junghee J. Shin, Ph.D., a former graduate student at New York Medical College: 
“engaged in research misconduct in research supported by National Institute of 
Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), National Institutes of Health (NIH), 
grants R01 AI048856 and R01 AI043063… by falsifying data” in the form of 
figures, tables, and images in his published work (ORI, 2011b; p.6).
7. Vipul Bhrigu, Ph.D., a former post-doctoral fellow with the University of 
Michigan Medical School: “engaged in research misconduct in research funded 
by National Cancer Institute (NCI), National Institutes of Health (NIH), grant R01 
CA098730-05”; and “knowingly and intentionally tampered with research 
materials, and switched the labels on culture dishes… to cause false results to be 
reported in the research record,” (ORI, 2011b; p.6). He also “tampered with 
laboratory research materials by adding ethanol to his colleague’s cell culture 
media, with the deliberate intent to effectuate the death of growing cells, which 
caused false results to be reported in the research record,” (ORI, 2011b; pp.6-7). 
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When the campus police became involved, he lied to them about his role and took 
no responsibility for what he had done. He came clean, however, when he was 
informed that his evidence tampering activities in the lab had been recorded by 
video surveillance (ORI, 2011b).
8. Philippe Bois, Ph.D., a former post-doctoral fellow with the Department of 
Biochemistry at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital: “engaged in misconduct in 
science and research misconduct in research funded by National Institute of 
General Medical Sciences (NIGMS), National Institutes of Health (NIH), grant 
R01 GM071596, and National Cancer Institute (NCI), NIH, grants P30 
CA021765, P01 CA071907, R01 CA072996, and R01 CA100603” when he 
“knowingly and intentionally falsified data reported in two (2) papers,” (ORI, 
2011b; p.7).
These case examples serve a number of purposes, not the least of which is to demonstrate 
the mundane variety of fraud that is traditionally uncovered in scientific research settings. 
It is significant that the majority of fraud recently reported to and founded by the ORI 
involves newly minted laboratory subordinates, not supervisors. Only one instance 
involved a senior researcher (Elizabeth Goodwin). This is a stark contrast to the high 
profile examples mentioned. 
It is also significant that the majority of the cases during this time frame involved 
falsification and fabrication in tandem, with publication of the phony data under the aegis 
of multiple co-authors. This demonstrates that it is not unexpected to find multiple types 
of fraud being committed by a single individual within a group of honest but trusting 
researchers. Moreover, it is not uncommon for researchers to take the word of their 
colleagues at face value, without question or skepticism, past the point of publication. 
This type of faith is a violation of scientific integrity, as explained in King (1999; pp.
215-216): “In all of these efforts the criteria for professional scientific integrity were 
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similar; even if the individual was your best friend, you asked to see the data; and if the 
data was in summary form, you asked to see the raw data. It was common to challenge a 
colleague's claim that he had carried out some procedure very carefully or precisely.”
The Frequency of Scientific Fraud
While numerous cases of scientific fraud are published in the literature and publicized by 
the media each year, assessments of overall frequency are wide ranging. This is because 
confirmed cases of scientific misconduct are often unreported; handled internally and not 
publicized; and handled without actual consequences save perhaps termination. For these 
reasons, reported cases of scientific fraud are considered merely the “tip of the 
iceberg” (Marshall, 2000; Judson, 2004; Redman and Mertz, 2005; Sovacool, 2008; 
Steneck, 2002; and Weed, 1998). Still, some compelling studies have been published over 
the past decade, which begins to scrape the surface regarding incidence and prevalence in 
different scientific communities. 
In a report by Geggie (2001), a survey of 194 newly appointed medical consultants 
working for seven separate hospitals revealed some interesting insights and attitudes with 
respect to research fraud: 55.7% of respondents reported observing some form of research 
misconduct; 5.7% admitted to prior acts of research misconduct; and 18% admitted to 
willingness or uncertainty regarding future acts of research misconduct.
Anderson, Martinson, and De Vries (2007) published a study regarding (p.3) “normative 
dissonance in the research environment”, defining normative dissonance as 
“inconsistency or lack of consonance between beliefs and behaviors related to norms”. 
They conducted a survey of 3,247 U.S. scientists working on research funded by the 
National Institutes of Health, comprised somewhat evenly of a mid-career sample (those 
who had received their first research grants between 1999 and 2001), and an early-career 
sample (those who had received postdoctoral training grants during 2000 or 2001). As 
explained in their methods section, (Anderson, Martinson, and De Vries, 2007; p.6): 
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“[t]he questionnaire included items to measure subscription, enactment, and perceptions 
of other’s typical behavior, each in terms of norms and counternorms.” Their findings 
“reveal an uneasy tension in the research environment,” (p.13). They found that “[g]iven 
a choice between characterizing their own and others’ behavior as normative or 
counternormative, most put themselves quite solidly on the normative side but other 
scientists on the opposite,” (p.8). Specific data includes the following (p.8):
In terms of their own behavior, most scientists still have higher norm than counternorm 
scores, though much larger percentages, 26 and 32%, have equal norm and counternorm 
scores, and 5 and 7% rate their own behavior as more counternormative than normative. 
Finally, and most strikingly, a majority of researchers in the two samples, 61 and 76%, rank 
the typical behavior of scientists as more counternormative than normative.
In their discussion of findings, they argue their results (Anderson, Martinson, and De 
Vries, 2007; p.12) “show that scientists do not just live in a world of normative 
dissonance: they are also subject to pressures and influences in their environments that 
compromise collective adherence to traditional norms.” They also explained that 
normative dissonance provides otherwise principled scientists with a rationale to (p.12) 
“align one’s own behavior with others’, instead of with one’s principles, in cases where 
the two are opposed.” The implications for building and maintaining a culture of 
scientific integrity at an institutional level, with respect to preventing misconduct, are 
significant.
In a disturbing report by Tilbert, Emanuel, Kaptchuk, and Curlin, (2008), a survey of 679 
physicians revealed that 46-58% prescribed placebo treatments to their patients on a 
regular basis – without necessarily telling them. Placebos that were reportedly prescribed 
included saline, sugar pills, over the counter analgesics, vitamins, and antibiotics. In the 
majority of cases, the phony “treatment” was described as beneficial, with the caveat that 
it was not typically used for treating the specific symptoms or condition at hand. 
Additionally, the study found that 62% of respondents believed that this practice was 
ethically permissible because of the outcome (Harris, 2008): “Everyone comes out happy: 
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the doctor is happy, the patient is happy.” This despite an advisory from the American 
Medical Association (AMA) discouraging the use of placebos by physicians when 
represented as helpful to their condition (Harris, 2008).
More recently, Fanelli (2009) offered the first ever meta-analysis of research regarding 
the frequency with which scientists fabricate, falsify, or commit other forms of scientific 
misconduct. It involves the examination of 21 different surveys conducted between 1986 
and 2005. Fanelli’s study revealed that 1.97% of scientists admitted to having fabricated, 
falsified, or modified data or results at least once (a low result was expected, as most 
scientists would not want to admit fraud in their own work); and 33.7% were willing to 
concede using other questionable research practices22. However, when asked about the 
behavior of colleagues, the same scientists reported 14.12% had falsified data or findings, 
and as many as 72% had engaged in other questionable research practices. The final 
analysis states (p.9): “while surveys asking about colleagues are hard to interpret 
conclusively, self-reports systematically underestimate the real frequency of scientific 
misconduct. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that data fabrication and falsification –
let alone other questionable research practices- are more prevalent than most previous 
estimates have suggested.” These findings are consistent with Anderson, Martinson, and 
De Vries (2007), with respect to scientists reporting that they generally avoid misconduct 
while their immediate colleagues do not – by a wide margin.
Fraud Diamond Theory and Scientific Misconduct
This section will consider whether the previous research related to occupational fraud of a 
non-scientific nature, and Fraud Diamond Theory in specific, may be applied to the 
variety of fraud committed by scientists (see Chapter 2: Occupational Fraud). As 
previously referenced, Fraud Diamond Theory states that in order for an act of 
occupational or employment fraud to occur, there must be a convergence of four 
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22 Questionable research practices included things like trimming data and failing to report data that 
contradicted previous research.
elements: offender motivation (aka, pressure or need), opportunity, rationalization, and 
individual capability. These elements will be considered and discussed in the case 
examples that follow.
Ann Marie Gordon, MS & Barry Logan, PhD23
Washington State Patrol Crime Lab
According to his professional resume, which lists a PhD in Forensic Toxicology, Dr. 
Barry Logan became the Washington State Forensic Toxicologist in 1990. In 1999, 
he was hired to be the Director of the Washington State Patrol Forensic Laboratory 
Services Bureau – responsible for overseeing four full service crime labs, two 
satellite labs, two latent print labs, and all of their combined 160 employees. He 
served in both positions simultaneously until he resigned in 2008 (Johnson, 2008).
According to her professional resume, Ann Marie Gordon holds a BA in “Genetics” 
and an MS in “Microbiology and Immunology”, both from the University of 
California at Berkeley. She was hired as a forensic toxicologist for the Washington 
State Toxicology Laboratory (WSTL) in 1998, and promoted to Laboratory Manager 
in 2000. She served in that position until 2007, when she resigned while still under 
investigation for laboratory fraud (Johnson and Lathrop, 2007).
Based on anonymous tips regarding fraudulent certifications of blood-alcohol related 
tests from inside the WSTL, an investigation was launched that ultimately led to the 
dismissal of at least 100 criminal cases, and harm to the credibility of thousands 
more. According to a joint three judge panel decision granting an “Order of 
Suppression” across multiple criminal cases (Washington v. Amach, et al, 2008; 
Judge David Steiner, Judge Darrell Phillipson, and Judge Mark Chow), the findings 
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23 All documents, exhibits, and testimony referenced in this case example can be found archived online at: 
“KING COUNTY, 3 JUDGE PANEL RULING,”; url: http://www.waduicenter.com/?page_id=470. Cited as 
Washington v. Amach, et al (2008).
of fact regarding accusations of fraud and misconduct by Ann Marie Gordon and Dr. 
Barry Logan are as follows, detailed in the section of the decision labeled “False 
Certifications” (pp.3-4):
1. Ann Marie Gordon [AMG] became lab Manager at WSTL by appointment of Dr. Logan.
2. [In 2000] AMG informed Dr. Logan that her predecessor as lab manager had engaged in a 
practice of having other toxicologists prepare and test simulator solutions for him and yet 
certify that he had prepared and tested the simulator solutions.
3. AMG told Dr. Logan that she did not approve of this procedure and was then also informed by 
Dr. Logan that it was not acceptable for a toxicologist to engage in this practice.
4. Nonetheless, AMG did engage in this practice beginning in 2003. Ed Formoso was a lab 
supervisor; he prepared and tested simulator solutions for AMG from 2003-2007. This 
involved 56 simulator solution tests.
5. Each test was accompanied by a CrRLJ 6.13 certification that AMG had performed the test 
and that the test was accurate and correct24.
6. Melissa Pemberton was the quality control manager at the WSTL during a part of this time, 
and knew that AMG was not performing tests but was certifying them.
7. This deception was uncovered after two anonymous tips received by the Chief of the 
Washington State Patrol.
8. The first was received on March 15, 2007. Dr. Logan was directed by Assistant Chief Beckley 
to investigate this complaint.
9. Dr. Logan directed AMG and Formoso to investigate the complaint25.
10. AMG and Formoso discussed the procedure and agreed that Formoso would no longer 
perform tests on behalf of AMG.
11. AMG informed Dr. Logan that she did not perform the tests of the solutions but that she 
signed the forms indicating that she did.
12. AMG and Formoso prepared a report stating that there was no problem with the certifications 
and that no solution had left the lab with an incorrect solution in 20 years.
13. Dr. Logan, AMG, and Formoso knew, or should have known, that this report was incorrect 
and misleading, but took no steps to correct it provide for another investigation.
14. Melissa Pemberton had run vials prepared for AMG by Formoso through the gas 
chromatograph along with her own sample, knowing that these were to be attributed to AMG, 
and that AMG would sign certificates alleging that she did this.
15. Dr. Logan was aware of this by August of 2007.
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24 The record is clear that the forms signed by Ann Marie Gordon indicate they are signed “under penalty of 
perjury” (McEachran, 2008; O'Brien, 2007; and Washington v. Amach, et al, 2008; p.20).
25 The wrongness of directing those committing fraud to investigate themselves was not lost on the panel, 
which they referred to as (Washington v. Amach, et al, 2008; p.23): “a situation screaming with irony.”
16. Dr. Logan and Pemberton both testified under oath that no one other that Formoso ever ran 
test for AMG26.
The three judge panel decision (Washington v. Amach, et al, 2008) goes on to 
describe other significant problems with the WSTL under the direction of Dr. Barry 
Logan and the management of Ann Marie Gordon, including: various “Defective and 
Erroneous Certification Procedures”; numerous detailed instances of “Software 
Failure, Human Error, Equipment Malfunction, and Violation of Protocols”; the 
ongoing use of “Improper Evidentiary Procedures”; the persistence of “Inadequate 
and Erroneous Protocols and Training”; the overall “Impact on Tests Conducted in 
the Field”; the WSTL’s intentional “Nondisclosure of Machine Bias” to defendants, 
attorneys, or the public; and the WSTL’s “Systematic Inaccuracy, Negligence, and 
Violation of Scientific Protocols” – all of which affected “Thousands of Tests”. The 
judicial panel determined that all of this misconduct combined to create a “culture of 
compromise” in the WSTL. Furthermore, the panel explained that ongoing “ethical 
compromises” and “fraud” committed by Ann Marie Gordon and her colleagues 
must have been known to others in their immediate work environment27. 
Aside from describing false testimony (e.g., that no one other that Mr. Formoso ever 
ran tests for Ann Marie Gordon), the judicial panel also made it clear that Dr. Barry 
Logan was responsible for allowing a “culture of compromise” to develop. 
Additionally, the panel elicited inconsistent testimony from Dr. Logan in which he 
stated that he was not aware of the specific certifications that were being provided by 
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26 Dr. Logan testified before the three judge panel in Washington v. Amach, et al (2008) from January 7-9th, 
2008.
27 Dr. Barry Logan had a history of hiring known forensic frauds to work for the Washington State Patrol 
Forensic Laboratory, to including Charles Vaughan, a former criminalist with the Oregon State Police crime 
lab made infamous over his role in the Boots and Proctor wrongful conviction case (Teichrobe, 2004a); and 
Arnold Melnikoff, former Director of the Montana State Crime Laboratory (from 1970 to 1989), made 
infamous for misrepresenting the evidence in multiple rape and murder cases that were eventually 
overturned (Bohrer, 2002). In 2003, The Washington State Patrol issued a report recommending that Mr. 
Melinkoff be terminated for a three year track record of incompetence and reaching conclusions that were 
“weak or unsupported by sufficient data” (Geranios, 2003; See also Chapter 7: Forensic Fraud – A 
Literature Review).
his lab personnel in toxicology cases. However, the manual of laboratory protocols 
explaining these certifications in detail bears his signature on each protocol. 
Subsequently, and in accordance with other findings of fraud, negligence, 
incompetence, and error already mentioned, the judicial panel determined that Dr. 
Logan’s ignorance, incompetence, and negligence as Director prevented these 
problems from being identified, revealed, and corrected (Washington v. Amach, et al, 
2008; pp.22-23). 
Ann Marie Gordon resigned on July 20th of 2007, only a few days after the 
investigation into her misconduct was initiated (Johnson and Lathrop, 2007). In 
2008, the Office of the Medical Examiner for the County of San Francisco hired her 
as a forensic toxicologist. She worked in that system for two years, testifying under 
oath, before her history of fraud in Washington State was made known to local 
prosecutors and defense attorneys (Van Der Beken, 2010). She has since asserted her 
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and not self-incriminate in subsequent court 
proceedings. She remains a member of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences 
(AAFS) in good standing, and as recently as 2011 hosted the annual meeting for The 
International Association of Forensic Toxicologists (TIAFT) in San Francisco, where 
she apparently enjoys the continued support of her peers (Verstraete, 2011).
Dr. Barry Logan resigned from the Washington State Patrol Forensic Laboratory in 
2008, one year after the resignation of Ann Marie Gordon. Dr. Logan’s resignation 
was necessary for “restoring public and judicial confidence”, according to 
Washington State Patrol Chief John R. Batiste (Batiste, 2008). However, Dr. Logan 
himself strongly disagrees with the findings of the judicial panel in Washington v. 
Amach, et al (2008) and takes only some responsibility for the problems that 
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occurred under his management; he believes that the problems with the WSTL were 
"dramatically overstated" by defense attorneys (Johnson, 2008)28.
Dr. Barry Logan remains a Fellow of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences 
(AAFS) in good standing; became Vice-President of the AAFS subsequent to his 
resignation from the WSTL; and also remains a member in good standing of 
International Association of Forensic Toxicologists (TIAFT), the Society of Forensic 
Toxicologists (SOFT), and the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors 
(ASCLD). He is currently the National Director of Forensic Services for National 
Medical Services Labs, and continues to testify in major cases throughout the United 
States (Longo, 2011).
This case involved ongoing fraud by supervisory forensic scientists employed by an 
ASCLD-LAB (2011) accredited police forensic laboratory. It continued for a period 
of at least four years (2003-2007), involved hundreds of false certifications, and 
resulted in false testimony to conceal them. In terms of maintaining scientific 
integrity, the worst practice standards were embraced, acculturated, and then 
minimized by those involved upon public discovery. Not only did multiple high-
ranking scientists certify lies about who had conducted testing bound for court under 
penalty of perjury, they did so knowing that it was unacceptable scientific practice. 
Furthermore, they conspired to conceal ongoing fraud and error from the courts, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, criminal defendants, and the general public with 
reports and testimony denying it. 
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28 In April of 2008, the Washington State Forensic Investigations Council (FIC) wrote a report condemning 
fraud among Dr. Logan's subordinates at the crime lab. However it did not hold Dr. Logan himself 
accountable (McEachran, 2008). Comprised of appointees from the law enforcement community with a 
mandate to preserve and protect the lab system, the FIC ignored the court’s findings of fraud in Washington 
v. Amach, et al (2008). It also did not appear to hold Dr. Logan accountable for the negligence it agrees 
occurred under his supervision – failing to adequately supervise Ann Marie Gordon and others, failing to 
know what certifications were being provided by lab employees to the courts, and failing to be aware of 
ongoing fraud and error despite the fact that everyone else in the lab was aware of it.
From a scientific misconduct point of view, these cases involved falsification of 
certifications and reports; a variation on ghost authorship; and the suppression of 
unfavorable evidence. From an occupational fraud perspective, there was 
opportunity to engage in fraud and conceal it by virtue of being in a trusted 
supervisory position; there was rationalization by virtue of a “culture of 
compromise”; there was motivation by virtue of pressure to maintain the illusion of 
supervisory competence; and there was individual capability by virtue of positioning, 
coercion of others to conform, the willingness to deceive others in order to prevent 
detection, and ego manifested in the unwillingness to accept personal responsibility 
once the facts were brought to light. This is consistent with the necessary elements of 
Fraud Diamond Theory.
It is of significant concern that an enduring culture of fraud, incompetence, and 
compromise was created and sustained during the overlapping tenures of Barry 
Logan and Ann Marie Gordon. Of equal concern, however, is the complicity of the 
criminal justice and forensic science communities in general, both of which continue 
to employ and protect these examiners without significant consequence. This is 
demonstrated by the failure to suspend or revoke professional memberships; the 
failure to disclose the history of false certifications by supervisors in Ms. Gordon’s 
new employment environment; the downplaying of fraud by supervisors in Ms. 
Gordon’s new employment environment; and the failure of ASCLD-LAB to suspend 
or revoke the certification of the WSTL. 
These law enforcement employed criminalists, having committed their acts within 
the parameters and timeframe set for this study (2000-2010), were both included in 
the final data set. Impact data was not replicated for both individuals, to prevent 
duplication in the data. See Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results for 
details regarding inclusion criteria and data collected.
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Raymond Cole, Criminalist
San Diego County Sheriff’s Crime Laboratory
This case involves the falsification of relevant scientific credentials by a criminalist 
in a law enforcement forensic laboratory accredited by ASCLD-LAB (2011). As 
described in Strumpf (2006), it was Raymond Cole’s job to “explain to judges and 
jurors how alcohol and drugs impair drivers and how the police measure levels of 
intoxication.” He also gave training in related instrumental analysis to forensic 
scientists and police officers. 
According to the official memo from the Office of the District Attorney in San Diego 
County (Rodriguez, 2006): “Ray Cole was a criminalist employed by the San Diego 
County Sheriff’s Crime Laboratory who has testified as a prosecution witness in a 
number of criminal prosecutions from 1974 to January 2006.” If not read carefully, 
this language might leave the impression that the number of times Mr. Cole testified 
was not actually in the thousands. As more accurately explained in Moran (2006): 
“A criminalist who testified for San Diego prosecutors in possibly thousands of 
drunken-driving cases falsely described his background on his résumé for years, 
which could imperil some convictions.” This is consistent with Strumpf (2006), 
which reports that the number is in the thousands, but that officials don’t see it as the 
government’s job to find and review each case:
According to testimony from a 2003 DUI trial, Cole estimated he'd testified “well over 4,000 
times” during his career, but representatives of [District Attorney Bonnie] Dumanis, [City Attorney 
Mike] Aguirre and the crime lab all say they have no way of tracking those cases. Instead, they put 
the responsibility for unearthing the trail of their expert witness on defense attorneys.
[Justin Brooks, a professor at California Western School of Law and head of the California 
Innocence Project] said the government, not defense attorneys, should be responsible for notifying 
individuals in whose cases Cole testified. “I don't think it's practical or appropriate as a solution,” 
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he said, noting that during the past 30 years, many defense attorneys may have moved, quit, retired 
or died.
The memo from the Office of the District Attorney in San Diego County goes on to 
relate that (Rodriguez, 2006): “The Sheriff’s Crime Laboratory has informed us there 
was an error on Mr. Cole’s resume that may have been provided in discovery in 
those cases. Mr. Cole’s resume stated that his 1957 undergraduate degree was in 
premedical studies. His actual degree was in Political Science.” If not read carefully, 
this description provided by the Office of the District Attorney might leave the false 
impression that this act of deliberate fraud was akin to an unintentional clerical error 
or a bookkeeping mistake. However, the nature of the false information could only 
have been offered to support employment as a forensic scientist and subsequently 
bolster the credibility of related expert testimony in court. It served no other purpose. 
As Mr. Cole had no actual science background, and gained employment and 
credibility as a criminalist based initially on false credentials, this meets the 
threshold definition of fraud and not error.
However, other law enforcement representatives have also shown interest in 
minimizing Mr. Cole’s fraud, which was discovered during an internal audit. 
According to Chris Morris, head of the criminal division in the San Diego City 
Attorney's Office (Moran, 2006): “The strength of his testimony was based on his 
years as a criminalist, not whatever his course of study was back in the 1950s.” 
While this may have been true later in Mr. Cole’s career, his initial employment was 
achieved under false pretenses. Moreover, each time the phony resume was offered 
to the court, as evidence of Mr. Cole’s background and credibility, it involved a new 
deception to protect the initial fraud. The fact that he lied consistently to the court 
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and also deceived his employers for 30 years makes his fraud worse, not better, with 
respect to the strength of professional credibility 29. 
Greg Thompson, the San Diego County Sheriff’s Crime Laboratory’s director of 
forensic services explained that: “When Cole was hired in 1974, a degree in science 
was not a requirement for the job.” This additional attempt to minimize Mr. Cole’s 
fraud is an admission that the County has not always been in the practice of hiring 
scientists, or those with a scientific background, to perform forensic casework at the 
crime lab. This admission does not speak well of employment standards, or the 
remaining personnel, at the crime lab. Again, it would suggest that things are much 
worse, and certainly does not excuse repeated credential fraud in court. 
Defending himself, Mr. Cole explained that he never actually testified under oath 
regarding the phony degree; that he only listed it on his resume (which was provided 
to the court, prosecutors, and defense attorneys every time he testified). This attempt 
to excuse fraudulent conduct suggests that he does not feel he has done anything 
wrong – that the ends (e.g., his good work for the police and subsequent testimony in 
court) justify the means (e.g., obtaining employment and court acceptance as a 
forensic expert by means of fraud). Consequently, Mr. Cole’s rationalization appears 
akin to a noble cause justification. 
From a scientific misconduct point of view, this case involved falsification of 
scientific credentials in a context where they were material to both initial 
employment and ongoing expert forensic testimony. From an occupational fraud 
perspective, there was opportunity engage in the fraud and conceal it by virtue of 
being in a trusted position; there was rationalization by virtue of a noble cause; there 
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29 It should be noted that current employment application guidelines for San Diego County require an 
affirmation that all information provided by the applicant be true; that providing any false or incomplete 
information can lead to denial of the application or termination subsequent to employment (San Diego 
County, 2011). In other words, the County takes resume fraud seriously, and considers it a termination 
offense. This is consistent with the language on most employment application forms.
was motivation by virtue of the need for employment and demonstration of expertise 
in the courtroom; and there was individual capability by virtue of positioning, the 
willingness to deceive others in order to prevent detection, and ego manifested in the 
unwillingness to accept personal responsibility once the facts were brought to light. 
This is consistent with the necessary elements of Fraud Diamond Theory.
This criminalist’s fraud, having committed while employed by a law enforcement 
ASCLD-LAB accredited crime lab, was revealed within the parameters and 
timeframe set for this study (2000-2010). It was therefore included in the final data 
set. See Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results for details regarding 
inclusion criteria and data collected.
Edward J. Wolfrum
Audio Graphic Services, Royal Oak, Michigan
This case involves a private consultant operating out of Royal Oak, Michigan. 
Through his company, Audio Graphic Services, Mr. Edward J. Wolfrum provides 
forensic analysis of audio recordings. As provided in the appellate court decision 
affirming his conviction (Idaho v. Wolfrum, 2007):
In 2000, Wolfrum testified as an expert witness on behalf of a defendant in a Cassia County 
criminal case. He testified that in his opinion, an audio recording upon which the State relied as 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt had been altered by editing. As part of his qualifications as an 
expert witness, Wolfrum testified that he held a Ph.D. in advanced mathematics from the 
“Michigan Institute of Technology.” Wolfrum was later charged with perjury because he held no 
such degree.
Mr. Wolfrum testified to holding an advanced degree in to bolster his forensic 
expertise from an institution that does not exist. He was subsequently arrested and 
tried for the crime of perjury, a violation of Idaho Code § 18-5401, which provides 
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that perjury is committed by a person who, having taken an oath to testify truthfully, 
“willfully and contrary to such oath, states as true any material matter which he 
knows to be false” (Idaho v. Wolfrum, 2007). 
In his defense of the perjury charge, Mr. Wolfrum testified that when he erroneously 
referred to the “Michigan Institute of Technology”, he actually meant the Michigan 
Technological University – a well-known institution of higher education. According 
the court record from Mr. Wolfrum’s perjury trial (Idaho v. Wolfrum, 2007): “the 
registrar from Michigan Technological University (MTU) testified that the institution 
had no record of Wolfrum ever attending or being registered at MTU, much less 
having received a degree, and that the institution offered no graduate degree in 
advanced mathematics.” 
Mr. Wolfrum was convicted of perjury, and subsequently failed in his appeal. He was 
not and is not a member of any relevant professional forensic organizations and 
continues to own and operate Audio Graphic Services. Though numerous services 
are offered and referenced on the company’s website at 
www.audiographicservices.com, forensic analysis is not among them.
From a scientific misconduct point of view, this case involved falsification of 
scientific credentials in a context where they were material to expert forensic 
testimony. From an occupational fraud perspective, there was opportunity engage in 
the fraud and conceal it by virtue of being in a trusted position; there was 
rationalization by virtue of a possible financial incentive; there was motivation by 
virtue of the need for demonstrating expertise in the courtroom; and there was 
individual capability by virtue of the willingness to deceive others in order to prevent 
detection, and ego manifested in the unwillingness to accept personal responsibility 
once the facts were brought to light. This is consistent with the necessary elements of 
Fraud Diamond Theory.
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The fraud of this independent forensic expert, committed in the course of physical 
evidence examination and related courtroom testimony, was revealed within the 
parameters and timeframe set for this study (2000-2010). It was therefore included in 
the final data set. See Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results for details 
regarding inclusion criteria and data collected.
These case examples, which are representative of the sample in the present study, suggest 
that the previous research related to occupational fraud of a non-scientific nature, and 
Fraud Diamond Theory in specific, may be successfully applied to fraud committed by 
scientists. They also suggest the utility of scientific misconduct as a construct for 
classifying cases of forensic fraud. At the same time, they further demonstrate the limited 
nature of a “bad apple” approach to understanding occupational fraud; all but Wolfrum 
evidence an abiding connection to employment cultures that permit, minimize, and 
ultimately fail to criminalize fraud by its members.
Summary
Scientific culture is defined by a history of consistently referenced practices, values, 
obligations, and prohibitions intended to achieve and protect scientific integrity. These 
include honesty, use of the scientific method, skepticism, objectivity, transparency, and a 
host of other related scientific ideals and norms. The development of these scientific 
norms has involved the corresponding generation of specific terms and definitions related 
to the investigation, identification, and remedy of scientific misconduct (referred to 
commonly as scientific fraud). These prohibitions, with a history that goes back to at least 
the 1830s, include fabrication (aka forging or dry-labbing); falsification (aka cooking); 
suppression of unfavorable results (aka cherry-picking); plagiarism; ghost authorship (aka 
honorary or gift authorship); falsification of scientific credentials; and the reckless 
disregard for practice standards that ensure scientific integrity.
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Scientific misconduct is both pervasive and extensive. High profile cases reported in the 
media over the past decade have generally involved years of ongoing misconduct by 
those operating at a supervisory level; millions of dollars misappropriated in each 
instance; and cultural environments where prior subordinate attempts to abide with basic 
standards of scientific integrity had been discouraged or punished. In contrast, recently 
reported cases of scientific misconduct tended to be more mundane: they generally 
involved student researchers or newly minted scientists engaged in both fabrication and 
falsification past the point of publication. They also tended to occur without the 
knowledge of more senior co-authors that uncritically accepted the integrity of the 
fraudster’s data and findings – a common violation of scientific norms. 
Despite the steady volume of cases involving scientific misconduct that are published in 
the literature and publicized by the media each year, assessments of overall frequency are 
inconsistent. This is because confirmed cases of scientific misconduct are often 
unreported; are handled internally and not publicized; and do not always involve 
consequences for those responsible. As a result, the reported and known cases of 
scientific fraud are considered merely the “tip of the iceberg” (again, this is a problem 
with most crime data). 
The “iceberg” theory of estimated frequency is consistent with research from multiple 
studies which have found that the vast majority scientists believe themselves to be 
generally engaged in ethical and honest scientific practice (or generally unwilling to self 
report misconduct). These scientists also reported being surrounded by a majority of 
colleagues that regularly engaged in data fabrication, falsification, and other questionable 
research practices. This same research goes on to suggest that scientists exist 
predominantly in a state of  “normative dissonance”, subject to “counternormative” 
pressures and influences within their work environments that can eventually weaken 
adherence to traditional scientific norms.
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In the context of the present study, the body of research related to occupational fraud of a 
non-scientific nature, and Fraud Diamond Theory in specific, was successfully applied to 
cases of fraud committed by scientists in their work environment. Additionally, the case 
examples adduced in this chapter were instructive as to the relationship between fraud, 
science, and employment culture. Not only did they suggest the relevance of occupational 
and scientific fraud research to instances of forensic fraud, they also suggested the 
weaknesses inherent in a “bad apple” approach to understanding occupational fraud.
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Chapter 6 
Contrasting Scientific Integrity with Law 
Enforcement Culture 
“Persons acquire patterns of criminal behavior in 
the same way they acquire patterns of lawful behavior
— through learning in interaction with other persons.”
Criminologist Donald R. Cressey, PhD (1919 –1987)
(Cressey, 1952; p.43)
In the preceding chapters, we explored the occupational environments of law 
enforcement and science as they relate to fraud. Given that we are examining the 
phenomenon of forensic fraud by scientific examiners who are most often employed by 
law enforcement agencies, these were critical first steps. Primarily, we established how 
fraud presents and is regarded in each of these professional cultures, as well as the 
methods used in fraud assessment. This exploration of the literature also confirmed the 
values and consequent pressures that necessarily exist within scientific and law 
enforcement cultures, all of which constrain members to conform.
The current chapter will contrast the established values of law enforcement culture 
against those required for scientific integrity, and theorize at the potential impact on the 
forensic examiner. Specifically, there will be a discussion of scientific fraud in light of 
Routine Activities Theory, Differential Association Theory, and Role Strain to 
contextualize the relevance of focusing on cultural and institutional traits as they 
influence acts of workplace fraud. Using these criminological constructs, we can 
juxtapose scientific and law enforcement cultures in an informed manner. This will reveal 
the strain that law enforcement alignment can bring to bear upon the already stressed 
forensic examiner. Based on this comparison of traits and values, and in the light of 
related criminology theory, it will be argued that scientific integrity is essentially 
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incompatible with law enforcement culture. 
Dispensing with “Bad Apple” Theory
Before a meaningful discussion of relevant criminological theory can be had, it is 
necessary to dispense with the traditional explanations provided by those responsible for 
managing issues of fraud and error within the law enforcement and forensic science 
communities.
To avoid personal responsibility and institutional liability for instances of employee 
misconduct, those in a supervisory or leadership role are known for making declarations 
that focus primarily on individual examiner impurity and the conduct of isolated “bad 
apples”. This approach towards explaining misconduct, which ignores supervisory, 
environmental, and cultural factors, is referred to as Rotten Apple, Bad Apple or Bad 
Actor theory (Adams and Pimple, 2005; Judson, 2004; Marshall, 2000; Resnick, 2003; 
and Sovacool, 2008). In this paradigm, it is argued that the problem of misconduct within 
a given agency or institution is all but solved by identifying, retraining, punishing, or 
terminating one or two troubled (or “rogue”) individuals (Judson, 2004).
Supervisory law enforcement authorities, in response to accusations of fraud and error, 
are known for these kinds of defensive assertions – dismissively suggesting that any 
known instances of forensic fraud are isolated to a “few rogue practitioners” or “bad 
apples” (Budowle, 2007; Chemerinsky, 2005; Collins and Jarvis, 2007; Dorfman, 1999; 
Jarrett, 2011; Martinelli, 2006; Olsen, 2002; Pyrek, 2007; Taylor, 2011; Taylor and Doyle, 
2011; and Thompson, 2009). These claims are useful as they protect the reputations of 
remaining employees and the overall image of the institution; at the same time, they 
require no further action, investigation, or responsibility on the part of remaining 
supervisors. As explained in Sovacool (2008; p.280):
To blame only a few individual violators or institutions divides the scientific community into the 
guilty and the innocent, and heaps large amounts of contempt on the few singled out as violators. 
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It therefore creates the illusion of solidarity among the scientific community, reaffirming their 
central virtue. And by isolating a few behaviors as corrupt, it stamps all others as blameless. In this 
way the interests of corporate and government patrons of science are less likely to come under 
attack.
The rationale for invoking Bad Apple Theory to explain scientific misconduct is provided 
in Judson (2004; p.26): “The grandees of the scientific establishment regularly proclaim 
that scientific fraud is vanishingly rare and that perpetrators are isolated individuals who 
act out of a twisted psychopathology. As a corollary, they insist that science is self-
correcting.” Certainly there are internal causes and motives that compel particular 
examiners to engage in misconduct, including: financial stasis, financial gain, ego, vanity, 
professional advancement, the need to conceal incompetence, apathy, addictions, and 
other mental infirmity (Kumar, 2010; Judson, 2004; Redman and Mertz, 2005; and Weed, 
1998). Yet these elements are only part of the overall equation. Researchers have found 
that focusing on individual “bad apples” without consideration of how they were planted 
or grown in a particular environment provides an incomplete understanding of the 
problem at best. 
Scientific fraud is conceived in the literature as arising largely from three factors acting 
separately or in concert: individual examiner impurity (e.g., a personal lack of ethics or 
integrity); localized institutional failure; and structural crisis within a scientific 
community at large (Sovacool, 2008). Adams and Pimple (2005) further explain that acts 
of scientific misconduct (p.229) “require both internal states (propensity) as well as 
external resources (opportunity).” This is consistent with the environmental and 
employment constraints described in Dorey (2010; p.17): “There is no reason to think 
that scientists are fundamentally different from other human beings when it comes to the 
pursuit of fame and financial reward… The pressure in terms of ‘publish or perish’ and 
the increasing difficulty of getting jobs and grants funded certainly adds to the problem.” 
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It is also generally agreed that individual propensity is less of a factor in scientific 
misconduct than external situational strains – including the pressure to publish, 
competition for funding, lack of adequate training or supervision, the lack of 
opportunities for quality mentoring, mentors setting bad examples, or working in an 
environment that tolerates or encourages misconduct as a means to an end (Adams and 
Pimple, 2005; Judson, 2004; Marshall, 2000; Redman and Mertz, 2005; Resnick, 2003; 
Sovacool, 2008; and Weed, 1998). Therefore, as explained in Judson (2004; p.149): “The 
lesson must be that the laboratory, its hierarchy, and the larger institutional setting – 
factors that can be analyzed, anticipated, perhaps modified – may make such conflicts 
between an individual’s intellectual and personal motives more likely, or less likely.” 
Breaches of scientific integrity, including acts that fall within the parameters of scientific 
misconduct, are primarily the result of institutional failures to uphold scientific values 
and nurture scientific culture; such breaches are therefore the institution’s responsibility 
to detect, investigate, and correct (Adams and Pimple, 2005; De Vries, Anderson, and 
Martinson, 2006; Eliot, 2000; Franzen, Rödder, and Weingart, 2007; Jette, 2005; Judson, 
2004; Kline, 1993; Martinson, Anderson, and de Vries, 2005; NAS, 2002; Redman and 
Kaplan, 2005; Sovacool, 2008; and Weed, 1998).
Ultimately, as provided in Judson (2004; p.28): “that fraud is almost always the work of 
isolated, twisted individuals seems inherently unlikely.” Moreover, given the dearth of 
solid research into the specific causes, origins, and frequencies of scientific fraud, there is 
a lack of empirical “evidence” to support the general assertion of Bad Apple Theory; as 
argued in Judson (2004; pp.26-27): “The grandees make these claims as a matter of 
faith… Their claims about science are unscientific.” It is argued in this dissertation, and 
consistent with the scientific literature presented in this section, that corrupt individuals 
cannot be hired, or retained, by any employer without some level of institutional or 
environmental negligence, apathy, tolerance, or even encouragement. Consequently, it is 
inappropriate to place the blame for misconduct solely on bad or rotten apples; to 
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marginalize the suggestion of systemic corruption; or to close ranks in order to protect the 
appearance of institutional integrity. 
Relevant Criminological Theory: 
Routine Activities Theory, Differential Association Theory, and Role 
Strain
The choice to commit an act of fraud does not occur in a vacuum: by definition, the 
perpetrator willfully follows a path that leads them to intentionally deceive others. The 
question becomes the degree to which they were constrained or encouraged by their 
environment along the way. In other words, in order to understand the causes of forensic 
fraud, as with any other potentially criminal act, it is necessary to first establish and 
understand the relationship between the motivated perpetrator and the environment that 
allows fraud to occur. Specifically, once the level of “individual examiner impurity” has 
been established, the influence of localized institutional failure, as well as any structural 
crises within a scientific community at large, must also be assessed. This requires the 
employment of criminological theories appropriate to the task.
In the present research, Routine Activities Theory, Differential Association Theory, and 
Role Strain proved valuable to the development of our thesis statements. These 
criminological theories embrace and support the premise that crime is a function of 
individual choice shaped heavily by environment factors. A brief discussion of each is 
necessary.
In their foundational research describing what has come to be known as Routine Activities 
Theory (RAT), criminologists Cohen and Felson (1979) explain (p.604): “the 
convergence in time and space of three elements (motivated offenders, suitable targets, 
and the absence of capable guardians) appears useful for understanding crime rate trends. 
The lack of any of these elements is sufficient to prevent the occurrence of successful 
direct-contact predatory crime.” In other words, RAT proposes that (Sasse, 2005; p.547): 
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“victimizations occur when there is a convergence in space and time of a motivated 
offender, a suitable target, and an absence of a capable guardian.” 30,31 
This theory of crime is well suited to assist with the present study of causality and 
prevention related to forensic fraud: in accordance with Judson (2004), it focuses on the 
location or place (e.g., workplace) where a crime occurs, and corresponding institutional 
responsibility, as opposed to theories that emphasize primarily the personality traits of the 
individual (Reid, 2003).  
Differential Association Theory (DAT; aka Differential Association-Reinforcement) was 
first published in 1947 by Edwin Sutherland, a sociological criminologist, as a means to 
(Vold and Bernard, 1988; p. 210): “organize the many diverse facts known about criminal 
behavior into some logical arrangement”, or as Cressey (1952) explains, to provide (p.
43): “a general theory of crime causation.” DAT, in association with Social Learning 
Theory discussed in Chapter 4, proposes that criminal behaviors, crime specific 
techniques, criminal motives, and corresponding rationalizations for violating the law are 
not genetic; that they are learned through direct social interaction with others; and that 
criminal values vary, depending on a individual’s perception of related social, cultural, 
and peer attitudes (Jefferey, 1965; Matsueda, 2006; Sutherland, 1947; Reid, 2003; and 
Vold and Bernard, 1986). As explained in Cressey (1952; p.43):  “persons acquire 
patterns of criminal behavior in the same way they acquire patterns of lawful behavior—
through learning in interaction with other persons.” As an adjunct to this theory, the 
propensity for criminal behavior is maintained by material and social consequences, or 
their absence (Jefferey, 1965). This theory of crime is also well suited to assist with the 
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30 Variations of this theory (e.g., Rational Choice Theory and the theory of crime prevention by 
environmental design) have been developed by the criminologist Ronald Clarke and his colleagues, who 
have empirically tested its salience under a wide variety of crime related conditions (see generally Clarke 
and Felson, 2004; and Clarke, Newman, and Shoham, 1997).
31 It bears mentioning that Routine Activities Theory (formalized in 1979), is remarkably similar to, if not 
simply a broader application of the concepts in, Fraud Triangle Theory (formalized in 1953; discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 4). However, Fraud Triangle Theory has not been subjected to the same empirical testing, 
hence our greater reliance on Routine Activities Theory when considering the present data.
present study of causality and prevention related to forensic fraud: it provides that the 
development criminal patterns by an individual are a reflection of their contact with those 
who accept, rationalize, and engage in criminal activity – including supervisors and 
workmates (Matsueda, 2006; Ruiz-Palomino and Martinez-Canas, 2011).  
Related to DAT, General Strain Theory suggests that criminogenic propensity arises 
“from the failure of institutions, families and other structures to provide for the functional 
and affective needs of individuals” (Donegan and Danon, 2008; p.4). This can result in 
personal feelings of alienation, which in turn can manifest as anti-social or even criminal 
behavior. In this paradigm, criminal behavior is viewed as an individual response to 
external sources of stress or strain (Akers, 2000; Colvin, Cullen, and Vander Ven, 2002).
Role Strain, as a part of General Strain Theory, posits that individuals experience 
difficulty when required to fulfill competing or contradictory role demands (Goode, 
1960; Hecht, 2001; and Kennedy and Kennedy, 1972). Specifically, it provides that 
individual strain increases when: “demands associated with one role interfere directly 
with one's ability to satisfy the demands of another role” (Hecht, 2001; p.112). In an 
employment context, employee role obligations are prescribed by institutional policy and 
supervisory instruction; however, these can be contradicted or even contravened by 
directives from multiple supervisors, work overload, and pressure from workmates to 
conform with adverse cultural norms (Pettigrew, 1968). Individuals experiencing role 
strain continually bargain with themselves regarding which of their competing role 
demands to satisfy, and tend to seek out options that reduce or alleviate the anxiety 
caused by strain (Goode, 1960). 
The theory of Role Strain can be used “to illuminate the problem of structurally 
determined tension and conflict in organizations” (Pettigrew, 1968; p.206). This includes 
role strain within a law enforcement context where cultural loyalty is highly valued, 
direct supervision is often inadequate or absent, and role demands continuously shift from 
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one ambiguous situation to the next (Kennedy and Kennedy, 1972; Maahs and Pratt, 
2001). 
The same argument applies to a scientific community, where an examiner’s desire to 
maintain scientific integrity may be in conflict with professional and institutional 
pressures (Dorey, 2010; Martinson, Anderson and de Vries, 2005). For example, in a 
clinical or university setting, there may be pressure on scientists to continuously publish 
research in order to sustain employment, achieve advancement, or secure and maintain 
funding. Stressing quantity over quality can thin the actual science in some publications 
to unacceptable levels, or even encourage ghost/ gift authorship. In forensic laboratories, 
the same kind of quantity over quality pressure can be applied to maintain increasing 
caseloads or reduce backlogs despite staff or budgetary shortfalls – which may cause 
some to cut corners, ignore protocols, and then to conceal what hasn’t been done. 
Additionally, in a forensic science context, there are numerous examples of law 
enforcement employers pressuring scientists to report findings that are in accordance with 
suspect theories, or of law enforcement aligned scientists perceiving pressure to avoid the 
appearance of helping the defense32. 
Applying these criminological theories as a lens to the present research, we will juxtapose 
scientific values and law enforcement culture to “illuminate” institutional responsibility 
(RAT), workmate pressure (DAT), and subsequent examiner role strain as they contribute 
to the problem of forensic fraud in the subsequent sections of this chapter33. 
Overt Pressure to Conform
Over the past decade, the subconscious influences on the forensic examiner to bias their 
efforts in favor of law enforcement theories have slowly been acknowledged in the 
literature. These influences are referred to as observer effects. Observer effects are 
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32 Examples provided later in this chapter.
33 Additional related discussions will also be found Chapter 7 – Forensic Fraud: A Literature Review and 
Chapter 10 – Conclusions.
present when the results of a forensic examination are distorted by the employment 
context and mental state of the forensic examiner, to include subconscious expectations 
and desires imposed by their employers, supervisors, and workmates (Cooley and Turvey, 
2011; Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; Dror, Charlton, and Peron, 2006; Risinger, Saks, 
Rosenthal and Thompson, 2002; and Saks, Risinger, Rosenthal and Thompson, 2003). 
Observer effects are governed by fundamental principles of cognitive psychology 
asserting that subconscious needs and expectations, which are heavily influenced by 
external pressures and expectations, work to shape both examiner perception and 
interpretation. As the term “subconscious” implies, this happens without the awareness of 
the forensic examiner. In the context of a forensic examination, this includes a distortion 
of what is recognized as evidence, what is collected, what is examined, and how it is 
interpreted. However, subconscious forms of bias are beyond the scope of the present 
research.
Presently, we are concerned with forensic examiners that perceive overt institutional, 
supervisory, or workmate pressure to conform with biased values and norms (e.g., in 
1995, the acknowledgement of Dr. Fred Whitehurst, FBI Whistleblower, in sworn 
testimony, that “there was a great deal of pressure put upon me to bias my interpretation”, 
as reported in Hsu, Jenkins, and Mellnick, 2012). Specifically, we are concerned with the 
differential association and subsequent role strain that law enforcement alignment and 
influence can bring to bear upon the forensic examiner. It is theorized that these 
circumstances make conscious acts of fraud by law enforcement employed or affiliated 
forensic examiners more likely.
At this point, some examples of the kinds of overt pressure suffered by law enforcement 
employed and affiliated forensic examiners within the temporal scope of the present 
research are appropriate.
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Kathleen Lundy, Forensic Scientist
FBI Crime Laboratory
Kathleen Lundy held a BS in metallurgy and was employed as a forensic scientist by 
the FBI Crime Laboratory; as part of her work, she would routinely testify that 
bullets or bullet fragments associated with a crime were “chemically” and 
“analytically indistinguishable”, or “consistent with”, boxes of ammunition found in 
the possession of law enforcement suspects (Ragland v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
2006). The chemical test that she used in these cases is referred to as comparative 
bullet lead analysis (aka CBLA). As described in Giannelli (2007; pp.199-200):
In Ragland v. Commonwealth, a Kentucky murder case, Lundy got herself in trouble while 
testifying at a pretrial admissibility hearing. She stated that the elemental composition of a .243 
caliber bullet fragment removed from the victim’s body was “analytically indistinguishable” from 
bullets found at the home of the defendant’s parents. Lundy further testified that the Winchester 
Company purchased its bullet lead in block form prior to 1996 and then remelted it at its 
manufacturing plant. During cross-examination at trial, however, Lundy admitted that she knew 
prior to the hearing that Winchester had purchased its lead in billet form in 1994. This was not a 
minor point. Millions more bullets could have the same “source” if they were last melted by a 
secondary smelter instead of by Winchester. Lundy subsequently admitted to her superiors that she 
had lied, and on June 17, 2003, she pleaded guilty to testifying falsely and was sentenced to a 
suspended ninety-day jail sentence and a $250 fine.
Further detail regarding the circumstances of Ms. Lundy’s false testimony, and the 
pressure she was under, was reported in Solomon (2003):
FBI lab scientist Kathleen Lundy, an expert witness in murder trials who performs chemical 
comparisons of lead bullets, was indicted by Kentucky authorities earlier this year on a charge of 
misdemeanor false swearing after she acknowledged she knowingly gave false testimony in a 2002 
pretrial hearing for a murder suspect.
Lundy informed her FBI superiors of the false testimony a couple of months after it occurred. By 
that time she had corrected her pretrial testimony at the trial and had been questioned about it by 
defense lawyers.
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Federal authorities decided not to prosecute her, but Kentucky prosecutors brought the 
misdemeanor charge.
In memos and a sworn affidavit, Lundy stated she had an opportunity to correct her erroneous 
testimony at the hearing, but didn't. "I had to admit it was worse than being evasive or not 
correcting the record. It was simply not telling the truth," Lundy wrote in a memo to a superior. "I 
cannot explain why I made the original error in my testimony ... nor why, knowing that the 
testimony was false, I failed to correct it at the time," Lundy wrote in a subsequent sworn affidavit.  
"I was stressed out by this case and work in general."
Lundy also said she was increasingly concerned that a former lab colleague, retired metallurgist 
William Tobin, was beginning to appear as a defense witness in cases and openly questioning the 
FBI's science on gun lead. "These challenges affected me a great deal, perhaps more than they 
should have. I also felt that there was ineffective support from the FBI to meet the challenges," 
Lundy wrote.
While Kathleen Lundy pleaded guilty to false swearing and lost her job at the FBI 
crime laboratory, she had already testified as an expert in CBLA for the FBI in more 
than a hundred cases. As of this writing, those cases have all come under review, and 
at least three convictions secured with her testimony have been overturned. 
Ultimately, subsequent to being declared junk science by the National Academies of 
Science in 2004 (NAS, 2004), the FBI acquiesced and put an end to all CBLA 
casework in their lab.
While this case involves an admission to fraud by a single forensic examiner, it 
involves years of questionable science and similarly aggressive testimony from other 
forensic examiners working for the same agency. The circumstances of this case 
comport with RAT (e.g., a motivated offender without proper supervision) and DAT 
(e.g., learning by example give false testimony about match probabilities). They also 
reveal the strain experienced by the forensic examiner to stay the course with respect 
to the certainty of findings and testimony despite the fact that she knew the evidence 
did not warrant it. This pressure, the examples set by FBI supervisors and co-
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workers, and the lack of institutional support perceived, cannot be discounted when 
considering her decision to commit fraud on multiple occasions.
This law enforcement employed forensic examiner, having committed her acts of 
fraud within the parameters and timeframe set for this study (2000-2010), was 
included in the final data set. See Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency 
Results for details regarding inclusion criteria and data collected.
Lynn Scamahorn, Forensic Scientist
Indiana State Police Crime Lab – Evansville
David Camm, a former Indiana State Police trooper, was arrested for killing his wife, 
Kimberly, 35; son, Bradley, 7; and daughter, Jill, 5. He was tried and convicted for 
all three murders in March of 2002. In 2004, however, the Indiana Court of Appeals 
overturned these convictions. He was charged and tried again in 2006. 
Lynn Scamahorn is a Forensic Scientist and DNA criminalist with the Indiana State 
Police Evansville Regional Laboratory. In February of 2006, she took the stand for 
the prosecution in the second trial of David Camm. Under oath, she reportedly broke 
down and recounted being pressured during the first trial to change her findings, 
specifically that: “former Floyd County Prosecutor Stan Faith cursed and shouted at 
her and threatened to charge her with obstruction of justice if she wouldn't testify as 
he expected” (Zion-Hershberg, 2006). As further reported in Zion-Hershberg (2006):
Scamahorn said that during a break in her testimony in the first trial, Faith took her to his office 
and closed the door.
She said she believes he wanted to influence her to testify that she had found Camm's DNA on the 
sweat shirt...
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"I felt that was something I could not say," Scamahorn said, adding that the evidence she found on 
the sweat shirt didn't support that conclusion.
…Scamahorn said yesterday that Faith was asking her about DNA evidence that was actually 
inconclusive and might have contained DNA from several people, including Camm. But she 
couldn't determine whose it was, Scamahorn said. "He wanted me to say David Camm was on the 
sweat shirt, but I couldn't," Scamahorn said.
Faith also wanted her to say more about unidentified bodily fluids on another piece of evidence 
than was supported by her tests, Scamahorn said.
She said she has felt no pressure to influence her testimony from Owen or from Keith Henderson, 
the current Floyd County prosecutor. "It has been more of a team effort," Scamahorn said.
She also said… that she told Faith he could talk with her immediate supervisor if he felt she was 
testifying improperly. But Faith said he would contact a colonel in the state police several ranks 
above her supervisor, Scamahorn said. She said she took it "as a threat" to her continued 
employment.
In a telephone interview, Faith denied threatening Scamahorn in any way. He said he recalled his 
conversation with her during a break in the first trial. But, he said, they were discussing her 
reluctance to say that a bodily fluid found on some of the evidence was that of an unknown 
female.
In a letter of complaint to her supervisor (F. Joseph Vetter, First Sergeant and
Manager of the Indiana State Police Evansville Regional Laboratory), written only a 
few days after her testimony in the first trial, Lynn Scamahorn provided specific 
details regarding the pressure applied by the prosecutor’s office (Scamahorn, 2002):
On Friday February 8, 2002 at a break, Mr. Faith called me into his office. There were no 
witnesses as it was only Mr. Faith and myself. Questioning was now on defense cross and recross 
stage. Mr. Faith shut the door to his office and began yelling at me very loudly using foul 
language. I felt it was totally inappropriate behavior and it was extremely unsettling to me due to 
the fact that I had to go back on the stand after break. Mr. Faith was upset at the fact that he 
wanted me to state that a stain was identified as vaginal secretions or saliva. To which (on the 
stand) I said that it could be. Mr. Faith was not satisfied with this answer. He said how could I let 
the defense lead me allover the place and when he (Mr. Faith) questioned me that I tried to second 
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guess him and was so "damned literal". Mr. Faith stated that he felt I was being biased. Mr. Faith 
also wanted me to make a statement that David Camm could be included on the sweatshirt and the 
DNA types clearly do not include David Camm and I felt this is not something that could be 
stated. I told Mr. Faith that I could not make a statement of identity for vaginal secretions or saliva 
due to the fact that there is not an identifying test for these types of stains. To which Mr. Faith 
replied that I was being "told how to testify" and this was a "Class D Obstruction of Justice". I told 
Mr. Faith that he was welcome to contact my supervisor at Indianapolis ISP Laboratory, Paul 
Misner and discuss this. Mr. Faith said he would not call Indianapolis, he would call Brackman. 
Mr. Faith staled that he would open his own laboratory and his analyst could "say whatever they 
wanted". I told Mr. Faith that if he felt I was being biased then I apologized but restated that I 
could not testify to the things he wanted me to. He then said "They have been horrible to you over 
this". At this point I excused myself to the restroom to be able to go back on the stand. After 
coming out of the restroom, I asked Detective Sean Clemons from Sellersburg district to sit with 
me so that Mr. Faith would be less likely to yell at me again.
It is important to note that the forensic examiner in this case properly reported overt 
pressure and threats from an external law enforcement agency (the Floyd County 
Prosecutor’s office) to change DNA interpretations mid-trial. This is the very 
definition of role strain. However, she had the character to ignore these threats and 
testified in accordance with the evidence as she perceived it. She also filed an 
immediate notification of these threats with her own police laboratory manager in 
order to make a record of the Prosecutor’s misconduct. 
This example does not involve fraudulent behavior by a forensic examiner. Rather, 
this example serves to demonstrate that extreme pressure to conform exists, that role 
strain is real, and that there is an ethical way to handle it. In accordance with DAT, it 
also suggests the culture that the Floyd County Prosecutor’s office expected and 
intended to create with respect to the forensic personnel in it’s employ, and begs the 
question regarding the possibility of other forensic examiners under similar pressure 
to conform.
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Robert Stites, Bloodstain Analyst
Private Law Enforcement Consultant
Robert Stites was a retired police officer that testified as an expert in bloodstain 
pattern analysis for the prosecution in both of David Camm’s murder trials (see 
previous example - Lynn Scamahorn). During the second trial, however, Mr. Stites 
admitted to falsely testifying about his education, training, and experience during the 
first, as reported in Kozarovich (2006):
[Defense attorney Stacy Uliana] read from the transcript of the first trial where Stites said he had 
testified as a blood-stain-pattern expert three previous times, but on Wednesday he admitted he 
had never testified as a blood stain expert.
Stites also told the previous jury he was pursuing his master’s degree and Ph.D., though he hadn’t 
been accepted to any program and wasn’t taking any classes at the time. In fact, Uliana said, 
Stites’ only degree is in economics, not forensics or blood-stain analysis. At the time of the 
murders, he had not taken the basic, 40-hour blood analysis course, the defense noted. There are 
no required standards or tests for crime scene reconstructionists. 
Uliana even pointed out that Stites had failed basic college chemistry, which drew a sharp 
objection from Floyd County Prosecutor Keith Henderson.
Under cross-examination, Uliana also determined the Camm murder scene was the first one Stites 
had processed as a crime scene specialist without his 
mentor Rod Englert.
Mr. Stites admitted to being without bloodstain training or experience, and without 
scientific background or credentials, while testifying under oath to precisely the 
opposite. From a scientific misconduct standpoint, he gave false testimony about his 
education, training, and experience. It is unclear, however, whether he also gave 
false or misleading testimony regarding his findings. In any case, there were no 
consequences to this examiner for his false testimony.
While this case involves an admission to fraud by a single forensic examiner, it is 
significant that it occurred in an employment environment reported to be suffused 
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with pressure and strain from the prosecutor’s office, which comports with DAT and 
role strain theory (see the prior example involving Lynn Scamahorn).
This law enforcement employed forensic examiner, having committed his acts of 
fraud within the parameters and timeframe set for this study (2000-2010), was 
included in the final data set. See Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency 
Results for details regarding inclusion criteria and data collected.
Danielle Weiland, Criminalist
Orange County Sheriff’s Department crime lab
In 2005, police arrested 20 year old James Ochoa for robbery and carjacking near a 
Buena Park nightclub in Orange County, California. Although DNA found on 
evidence from the crime scene did not match him, Mr. Ochoa was pressured by the 
District Attorney to accept a two-year plea, mid-trial, or face life in prison should the 
jury find him guilty. While Mr. Ochoa was sitting in prison for a crime that he did 
not commit, the unknown DNA sample from the scene was matched to the actual 
offender, a career criminal already serving time in Los Angeles (Moxely, 2008b).
Mr. Ochoa was subsequently released from prison and filed a civil complaint for 
damages related to wrongful arrest, prosecution and conviction. During a deposition 
for that case, Danielle Weiland, a DNA criminalist for the Orange County Sheriff’s 
Department crime lab, testified that prosecutors had pressured her to “alter key 
exculpatory evidence,” (Moxley, 2008a)34. As further reported in Moxely (2008a):
Wieland performed numerous tests to determine if Ochoa’s DNA could be found on items the 
bandit inadvertently left at the crime scene: a black baseball cap, a gray plaid long-sleeve shirt and 
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34 It is significant to note that this evidence did not come out during the trial of Mr. Ochoa. Had Mr. Ochoa 
not been exonerated at a later date, not filed a civil complaint, and not deposed Ms. Weiland, this example 
of prosecutorial misconduct would not have been made public.
a BB gun. There was also DNA left in the stolen car that didn’t belong to the two victims. All of 
the sheriff’s department tests excluded Ochoa as a DNA contributor. Two other crime-lab officials 
independently double-checked and confirmed Wieland’s results. In her official records, she 
recorded “no [Ochoa] match.”
…On Oct. 14, 2005, [prosecutors] asked to meet with Wieland before she shared her findings with 
defense attorney Scott Borthwick, a young Santa Ana-based lawyer who’d taken the case pro bono 
because he thought officials were railroading Ochoa. In those meetings—one by phone, two more 
in person—a deputy district attorney asked Wieland to do something she knew was not supported 
by the science and possibly outright unethical: Tell Borthwick that Ochoa’s DNA had been found 
on the shirt.
In a civil deposition taken last month for Ochoa’s wrongful-prosecution lawsuit, Ochoa attorney 
Patricio A. Marquez of Morrison & Foerster asked Wieland, “Did anyone ever exert pressure on 
you to change your [DNA] conclusions?”
“Yes,” Wieland replied. “Camille Hill from the DA’s office . . . She called me and asked me to 
change the conclusion that Mr. Ochoa was eliminated from [DNA found on] the left cuff of the 
shirt.”
According to the transcript, Hill told Wieland she “didn’t care” about the crime lab’s findings. “I 
want him [Ochoa] not excluded,” Wieland recalls Hill saying.
…In a subsequent face-to-face confrontation, Hill arrived with four other DA staffers including 
Deputy District Attorney Christian Kim, who was assigned to Ochoa’s case. They argued that 
eyewitness and police-dog identifications of Ochoa as the bandit (sloppy and tainted, respectively) 
must have been right.
Wieland brought her own crime-lab colleagues as backup. According to Wieland’s deposition, “We 
kind of went back and forth [with the DA’s office] on why we felt the sample was eliminated as a 
contributor. And it ended up with us pretty much not backing down and saying he’s still excluded, 
still eliminated.”
Hill, a veteran prosecutor and DNA expert who once worked as a forensic specialist for the 
Houston Police Department, thinks this is a non-story. She describes herself as a “lawyer/scientist” 
and defends her contact on the Ochoa case with Wieland. “I, in no way, did anything unusual,” 
Hill tells the Weekly. “About every week, we ask the crime lab to reconsider findings. Sometimes, 
they make changes.”
136
In 2008, Mr. Oxchoa’s civil complaint successfully resulted in a payment from the 
State of California for nearly $30,000 (Moxely, 2008b).
It is important to note that, in this case, the forensic examiner perceived overt 
pressure and threats from an external law enforcement agency (the Orange County 
Prosecutor’s office) to suppress exculpatory DNA evidence. This is, again, the 
definition of role strain in an employment context that threatens to encourage fraud 
(and punish ethical behavior), in comportment with DAT. As with the prior example 
from Indiana, this forensic examiner had the character, and perceived sufficient 
institutional support, to ignore these threats and testified in accordance with the 
evidence as she found it. 
This example does not involve fraudulent behavior by a forensic examiner, but rather 
serves again to demonstrate that extreme pressure to change findings and testimony 
exists, that role strain is real, and that there is proper way to respond35. It also 
suggests the culture that the Orange County Prosecutor’s office expected and 
intended to create with respect to the forensic personnel in its employ. Specifically, it  
demonstrates that at least one prosecutor, Camille Hill (a former forensic scientist 
from the embattled Houston Police Department Crime Lab), viewed herself as a 
“lawyer/scientist”. In that capacity, which is rife with conflict, it is significant that 
Ms. Hill admitted her office requests the crime lab to reconsider its scientific 
findings on a regular basis. This, again, would seem to be the very definition of 
inappropriate pressure, creating role strain for the forensic examiners working in that  
employment environment.
These examples, which are representative of cases revealed in the present study, are 
primarily intended to demonstrate the overt cultural hazards suffered upon forensic 
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35 Indeed, had the forensic scientists in these cases lacked the character to maintain the integrity of their 
findings, we would likely never have learned of it.
examiners employed by law enforcement agencies. Some experience differential 
association and strain by virtue of their agency’s cultural tendencies and failings; others 
experience differential association and strain from the intense pressure placed on them by  
prosecutors to align their testimony with desired results. 
Contrasting Scientific Values and Law Enforcement Culture
Using the criminological theories described previously in this chapter as a guide, and 
with the full understanding that there can be intense strain placed on law enforcement 
employed forensic examiners, this section juxtaposes the cardinal traits of law 
enforcement culture with those required for scientific integrity, as revealed in Chapters 4 
and 5 respectively. 
In Chapter 4, it was established that law enforcement organizations provide their 
employees with the training, opportunity and authority to commit acts of fraud on 
a variety of levels. This demands a high level of personal integrity to avoid 
corruption. However, law enforcement culture is often locally defined by traits that 
afford the motivations and rationalizations for a deviant internal subculture, 
actively cultivating fraud within its ranks. Law enforcement culture also provides 
otherwise lawful members with the skills, incentives, motivations and 
rationalizations for ignoring, protecting, and even defending their unlawful co-
workers. In light of RAT and DAT, these employment circumstances and cultural 
facets increase the likelihood that those employed by law enforcement agencies 
will commit, tolerate, conceal, and even defend acts of overt fraud. 
In Chapter 5, the culture of science was defined by a history of consistently referenced 
practices, values, obligations, and prohibitions intended to achieve and protect scientific 
integrity. Ideal traits for reliable scientific practice include honesty, use of the scientific 
method, skepticism, objectivity, transparency, and a host of other related scientific norms. 
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At the same time, scientific integrity prohibits the fabrication of results (aka forging or 
dry-labbing); falsification of data (aka cooking); suppression of unfavorable results (aka 
cherry-picking); plagiarism; ghost authorship (aka honorary or gift authorship); 
falsification of scientific credentials; and the reckless disregard for established practice 
standards. Therefore, in order for scientific integrity to prevail, it must be nurtured and 
maintained by examiners and institutions that understand the obligations required.
As shown in Table 6.1: Law Enforcement Culture v. Scientific Integrity, there is almost 
complete direct conflict between the reality of one and the needs of the other. Law 
enforcement culture promulgates a noble cause belief system that tolerates corruption at 
variable levels depending on localized leadership and norms; alternatively, scientific 
integrity demands zero tolerance for misconduct of any kind. Law enforcement culture is 
authoritative and coercive, training officers to take charge, solve problems, and maintain 
control on a continuum of force that includes handcuffs and firearms; alternatively, 
scientific integrity demands that examiners achieve results through empirical research 
and analytical logic while embracing overall fairness, without the use of threats or 
coercion of any kind. Law enforcement culture is essentially masculine and aggressive in 
its approach to problem solving; alternatively, scientific integrity demands conservative 
humility and the consideration of alternatives. Law enforcement culture rewards members 
for unwavering group loyalty and solidarity regardless of the circumstances; alternatively, 
scientific integrity demands that the findings of others be questioned, to the point of 
skepticism being a scientific virtue. Law enforcement culture embraces the use of 
differing levels of deception as a means to an end, lawful and otherwise; alternatively, 
scientific integrity demands honesty at all levels of reporting. Law enforcement culture 
instills an “Us vs. Them” mentality in its members, creating a sense of isolation from the 
community and hostility towards outsiders; alternatively, scientific integrity requires 
examiners to welcome peer review and external inquiry as a necessary part of any 
validation process. Law enforcement culture is marked by an overall secrecy, or “code of 
silence”, with respect to the errors and misconduct of its membership; those who break 
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this code are punished and in extreme cases ostracized. Scientific integrity mandates 
transparency of all methodology, including errors, as well as the reporting of any and all 
misconduct; those who report misconduct, referred to as “whistleblowers”, are 
theoretically entitled to absolute protection without sanction. 
- TABLE 6.1 -
Law Enforcement Culture v. Scientific Integrity
Law Enforcement Culture Scientific Integrity
• A “Noble Cause” belief system/ 
varied toleration for corruption
• Zero tolerance for misconduct
• Authoritative/ coercive • Logical, empirical, and fair
• Masculinity and aggression • Humility re: limits of findings
• Group loyalty/ solidarity • Critical thinking / skepticism
• Deception as a viable tool • Honesty in reporting
• Isolation/ “Us vs. Them” • Openness to peer review and 
independent validation
• Secrecy / “Code of Silence” towards 
error and misconduct
• Transparency of errors/ Report 
all misconduct
• Punishment / ostracism for those who 
break the “code of silence”
• Protection for whistleblowers
• Project and protect image of 
professional integrity
• Project and protect image of 
professional integrity
However, law enforcement culture and scientific integrity do share one significant trait: 
the need to project and protect an overall image of integrity. Both must maintain the 
appearance of integrity to outsiders in order to sustain institutional functionality. Without 
the appearance of integrity, neither institution could receive outside funding; offer 
believable reports or testimony; maintain liability insurance; or keep the faith of 
supervisors and the general public. When the perception of institutional integrity 
disappears, institutional functionality erodes, sometimes slowly, until the institution itself 
becomes unsustainable.
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On this issue, the demands of law enforcement and science differ primarily with respect 
to the means by which the perception of integrity is achieved and maintained. Law 
enforcement sustains this perception through the aforementioned culture of secrecy, the 
“Code of Silence”, and the punishment or blacklisting of any detractors. Additionally, as 
previously described, Bad Apple Theory is invoked when institutional integrity is 
questioned, and anyone not closing ranks is suddenly found outside of them. In this 
paradigm, secrecy is essential and the outcome is all that matters – that the perception of 
institutional integrity remains defensible for lack of public evidence to the contrary. 
Scientific integrity, on the other hand, can only be secured by using the scientific method, 
which regards secrecy and cronyism as anathema to trustworthiness  (Frye v. United 
States, 1923; Judson, 2004; Kennedy and Kennedy, 1972; and Popper, 2002). For the 
scientific examiner, a strict adherence to scientific methodology is more important than 
any actual outcome, given that scientific examination seeks reliable knowledge and not 
merely the confirmation of preconceived ideas. In a scientific paradigm, outcomes are 
less important than the methods of inquiry that are being observed.
As mentioned previously, the overall conflict that exists between law enforcement culture 
and scientific integrity is significant because of the fact that (Thornton and Peterson, 
2007; p.2): “[m]ost forensic examinations are conducted in government-funded 
laboratories, usually located within law enforcement agencies, and typically for the 
purpose of building a case for the prosecution.” Edwards and Gotsonis (2009) warn us 
further that (pp.183-184): “The majority of forensic science laboratories are administered 
by law enforcement agencies, such as police departments, where the laboratory 
administrator reports to the head of the agency. This system leads to significant concerns 
related to the independence of the laboratory and its budget” as well as “cultural 
pressures caused by the different missions of scientific laboratories vis-à-vis law 
enforcement agencies.” 
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Forensic examiners employed under these conditions are continuously exposed to a 
culture where members are encouraged (or instructed) to commit, tolerate, conceal, or 
defend acts of overt misconduct36. They also experience variable pressure to conform 
to, and take sides with, the localized ethos of law enforcement institutions from their 
supervisors and workmates37. Given the theories of RAT, DAT and Role Strain, 
continuous exposure to, and pressure from, law enforcement culture increases the 
likelihood that subordinate forensic examiners will also commit, tolerate, conceal, 
and even defend acts of overt fraud. 
Summary
Breaches of scientific integrity, including acts that fall within the parameters of scientific 
misconduct, are primarily the result of institutional failures to uphold scientific values 
and nurture scientific culture; these breaches are therefore an institution’s responsibility 
to detect, investigate, and correct. More specifically, corrupt individuals cannot be hired, 
or retained, by any employer without some level of institutional negligence, apathy, 
tolerance, or encouragement. It is therefore inappropriate, and even misleading, to blame 
forensic fraud solely on “bad apples”. 
Three criminological theories have proved useful for understanding forensic fraud as a 
cultural and environmental issue: Routine Activities Theory, Differential Association 
Theory, and Role Strain.
Routine Activities Theory makes misconduct and criminality more likely among law 
enforcement professionals and their subordinate forensic examiners given their 
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36 Even as this dissertation is in its final stages, a new scandal involving the FBI has emerged wherein the 
results of unfavorable task force findings regarding forensic casework under review since the late 1990s 
have been intentionally suppressed and concealed, harming an untold number of criminal defendants (Hsu, 
Jenkins, and Mellnick, 2012). 
37 Some of these forensic examiners are actually little more than “cops in lab coats”, without any formal 
scientific education, grounding or investment (Giannelli, 2003; Findley, 2008; Moreno, 2004). See also 
Case Example: Robert Stites in this chapter.
employment training and constant opportunities; their fierce cultural loyalty, tolerance for 
misconduct, and code of silence; and their lack of consistent supervision. 
Differential Association Theory goes deeper, providing that the development of criminal 
patterns by an individual are necessarily a reflection of disproportionate contact with 
those who accept, rationalize, and engage in criminal activity. Evidence of forensic fraud 
by even a single examiner suggests that they have learned from either the present 
employment culture, or a previous one, that such behavioral is institutionally acceptable 
on some level. Moreover, ongoing fraud, and fraud by multiple forensic examiners, is 
evidence of willful institutional and supervisory negligence – if not ongoing cultural 
pressure to commit acts fraud. 
Role strain is often high within a law enforcement context, where cultural loyalty is 
highly valued, direct supervision is often inadequate or absent, and role demands 
continuously shift from one ambiguous situation to the next. The strain from multiple and 
competing role obligations is even higher for forensic examiners.  This is because most 
are meant to uphold values and ideals that are in direct conflict with law enforcement 
culture while working subordinate to or alongside of it38. 
Under the contextual weight of law enforcement employment, alignment, and cultural 
pressures, and given full consideration of the criminological theories discussed in this 
chapter, it is theorized that the already fragile ideals of scientific integrity necessary for 
objective forensic examinations are more likely to crack, or shatter, given the absence of 
sufficient institutional safeguards.
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38 It bears mentioning that, as discussed in Chapter 5 – Fraud and Scientific Culture, the requisite traits for 
scientific integrity are ideals, and that scientific misconduct outside of law enforcement influence is not 
difficult to find. The scientific endeavor is fraught, as discussed, with all manner of strain. Imposing law 
enforcement culture on a scientist adds additional and unnecessary strain. 
Chapter 7
Forensic Fraud: A Literature Review
“While there have always been bad labs, their shoddy 
work has been difficult to detect because the worst  labs 
tend to be found in jurisdictions that have historically 
shielded crime labs from external scrutiny.”
William Thompson, JD, PhD 
Department of Criminology, Law & Society
University of California at Irvine
(Thompson, 2006; p.11)
The preceding chapter contrasted the established values of law enforcement culture 
against those required for scientific integrity, and theorized at the potential impact on the 
forensic examiner in light of relevant criminological theory. This was supported by 
literature reviews related to general occupational fraud, law enforcement culture, and 
scientific integrity. It was also determined that the already fragile ideals of scientific 
integrity necessary for objective forensic examinations are essentially incompatible with 
law enforcement culture. 
Having reviewed the literature related to fraud, law enforcement culture, and scientific 
integrity, the present chapter will provide the final pillar required to support and 
contextualize the present research effort: a review of the literature that has addressed the 
issue of forensic fraud. First, it will suggest why there is a dearth of attention paid to the 
subject, resulting in the absence of direct empirical research. Then it will review the 
nature of the limited (and indirect) studies that do exist, both ideographic and nomothetic. 
Finally, based on the relevant literature, a typology of forensic fraud will be discussed 
and expounded with case examples.
Background: Public Employee Restrictions and Fear of Retaliation
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Forensic fraud has an undeniably devastating impact: it destroys the reputations of the 
forensic examiners involved, if not their careers; it erodes public confidence in the 
institutions where they are employed; it can result in overturned convictions, individual 
and institutional liability, and costly civil judgments; and it is corrosive to the collective 
faith in the justice system as a whole. However, as mentioned in previous chapters, there 
is a perception that problems related to fraud and error in the forensic sciences are 
primarily the result of a “few rogue practitioners” or “bad apples” – primarily owing to 
the public assurances of crime lab managers and supervisors (Budowle, 2007; Collins and 
Jarvis, 2007; Giannelli, 2007; Olsen, 2002; Pyrek, 2007; Taylor and Doyle, 2011; and 
Thompson, 2009). Despite the fact that “Bad Apple Theory” is contradicted by 
established criminological theories relating to fraud and corruption (see Chapter 6 – 
Contrasting Scientific Integrity with Law Enforcement Culture), criminal justice 
professionals and the public they serve tend to accept this explanation in so much as they 
offer little in the way of resistance to it. Consequently, and despite the broad spectrum of 
harm that can result, forensic fraud is given relatively narrow recognition or attention in 
the published forensic literature.
The dearth of literature disclosing and examining cases of forensic fraud may be the 
result of general ignorance regarding the nature and scope of the problem. This state of 
overall blindness is perhaps made possible by two factors working in concert: (1) 
institutional secrecy protected by law, and (2) employees operating under strict 
contractual obligation and related general self-interest. In other words, the lack of 
professional and public awareness regarding forensic fraud, and the resulting absence of 
any meaningful data or research, may be a result of the reality that those who have direct 
knowledge also have a vested interest, if not a contractual obligation, to keep it from 
becoming public.
Government (aka public) institutions, including law enforcement agencies and their 
respective crime laboratories, generally have written policies and rules of conduct that 
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restrict the speech of their employees – in and outside of the workplace. Consider that 
law enforcement policies are adapted from, or draw heavily on, the “Model Policy on 
Standards of Conduct” developed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 
which states (IACP, 2012):
1. Officers shall not, under color of authority,
a. make any public statement that could be reasonably interpreted as having an adverse 
effect upon department morale, discipline, operation of the agency, or perception of 
the public;
b. divulge or willfully permit to have divulged, any information gained by reason of 
their position, for anything other than its official, authorized purpose; or
c. unless expressly authorized, make any statements, speeches, or appearances that 
could reasonably be considered to represent the views of this agency
An example of an adapted standard comes from the Seattle Police Department’s Policy 
and Procedure Manual (SPD, 2012):
IV. Communication and Confidentiality
A. Through Chain of Command
1. Employees shall direct communications through their chain of command 
unless directed otherwise. If an employee believes they have information of such 
a sensitive nature as to require communication outside the chain of command, 
the employee may communicate directly with any higher-ranking officer, 
including the Chief of Police, and at that point the responsibility for any further 
dissemination of that information lies with the higher-ranking officer.
B. Representation of the Department
1. Responsibility for management of the Department and promulgation of policy 
and budget rests with the Chief of Police.
2. Employees shall not disseminate information concerning their personal 
interpretations of Department policy, investigations, crime patterns, budget, 
deployment or other opinions that could be construed as representing the 
Department or the Chief of Police. Subordinate employees may be granted 
authority to represent Department issues on a case-by-case basis, but only 
following delegation by their chain of command. Specific employees (e.g. 
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Media Relations Officers) may be granted broad authority to represent 
Department issues outside their chain of command, or on behalf of the Chief of 
Police (or his designee).
This kind of language is a part of most government employee contracts, intended to 
maintain the confidentiality of sensitive issues, to provide for operational authority, and 
to help maintain overall agency effectiveness.
A careful read of these regulations makes it clear that government employees with 
concerns or grievances regarding co-workers, supervisors, or other internal matters must 
report them only within the institutional chain of command. Having done this, they are 
forbidden from pursuing such matter themselves or speaking out about them publicly – 
lest they harm the “operation of the agency, or perception of the public”. Consequently, 
unless a matter of public interest is involved (which is a subjective standard at best), 
government employees can be punished, and even terminated, for violating these and 
related administrative policies (Ronald, 2007). 
Restrictions on employee speech have a longstanding tradition within government 
agencies, and currently enjoy coverage from the United States Supreme Court, which 
holds that (Garcetti, et al. v. Ceballos, 2006): “When public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer 
discipline.” In a work environment where punishment, termination, and loss of employee 
benefits (e.g., wages, medical coverage, and pensions) can result from sharing internal 
matters outside of the chain of command, institutional secrecy is all but assured except in 
perhaps the most extreme cases (Diehl, 2011; Papandrea, 2010; and Wright, 2011)39. 
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39 Concern regarding retaliation against public employees, and the resulting culture of secrecy, is something 
that the U.S. Supreme Court generally acknowledged and warned against when ruling on anti-retaliation 
legislation subsequent to the Garcetti decision in Crawford v. Metro. Government of Nashville et al (2009), 
arguing: “if an employee reporting discrimination in answer to an employer's questions could be penalized 
with no remedy, prudent employees would have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII offenses [e.g., 
employer retaliation in the form of discrimination, unlawful employment practices and sanction, unlawful 
investigations of employees, and procedural denial].”
In sum, government employees that are in a position to have direct knowledge, and an 
applied understanding, of forensic fraud do not enjoy unfettered freedom of speech. They 
are contractually bound to report such violations strictly within their chain of command. 
They are also contractually bound to refrain from speech that harms the image or 
effectiveness of their agency. By abiding with their employment contracts and keeping 
agency secrets, they preserve its image to the public, their professional reputation within 
the community, and their continued employment prospects40. As a consequence, what is 
publicly known about the nature and scope of forensic fraud is best viewed as the tip of 
the iceberg – as has been suggested in previous chapters. 
To alleviate the tendency to maintain institutional secrecy, forensic examiners working 
for crime labs or law enforcement agencies that receive federal funding are meant to 
enjoy immunity from employer retaliation when acting as a whistleblower (Giannelli, 
2007). As explained in a report by The Innocence Project (IP, 2009; p.4): 
In 2004, Congress established an oversight mechanism within the Paul Coverdell Forensic Science 
Improvement Grant Program, which provides federal funds to help improve the quality and 
efficiency of state and local crime labs and other forensic facilities. In order to receive the federal 
funds, applicants are required to designate independent external government entities to handle 
allegations of serious negligence or misconduct affecting the quality of forensic analysis in 
facilities that receive Coverdell grants, and those oversight entities must also have a process for 
handling such allegations.
This immunity is theoretical, however, because agencies don’t always understand, abide, 
or enforce required whistleblower protections. This can result in a whistleblower that is 
initially terminated or otherwise sanctioned, who must then bear any legal costs of 
proving their status and asserting related protections. As reported in Maier (2003):
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40 It was only recently revealed, for example, that the results of unfavorable task force findings regarding 
forensic casework under review since the late 1990s have been intentionally suppressed and concealed the 
U.S. Department of Justice and the FBI, harming an untold number of criminal defendants (Hsu, Jenkins, 
and Mellnick, 2012).
…forensic scientists who levy charges of incompetence or corruption against their labs often find 
themselves unemployed. Former FBI forensic expert Whitehurst was suspended, then fired, before 
settling in 1997 for a $1.46 million payment in a lawsuit for wrongful discharge. Elizabeth 
Johnson, former director of a DNA lab in the Harris County Medical Examiner's Office in Texas, 
now often works as a consultant for criminal-defense teams, but she found herself unemployed in 
1997 after failing to be a "team player" and link a murder suspect's blood to the scene of a crime. 
She was vindicated in a jury trial and settled for $375,000. When DNA lab worker Laura Schile 
called attention to serious problems in Oklahoma, she found herself under investigation and 
resigned in 2001 because of a "hostile work situation."
A more recent example includes Donald Mikko, chief of the firearms branch at the U.S. 
Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory. As reported in Taylor (2012):
Earlier this month, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory warned its firearms branch 
chief, Donald Mikko, in a memo of its plans to fire him, in part for talking to a McClatchy 
Newspapers reporter.
As part of an internal investigation, Mikko was interrogated for about four hours and questioned 
about his contacts with McClatchy, according to his attorney, Peter Lown. The Army Criminal 
Investigation Command, which oversees the lab, launched the inquiry after McClatchy published a 
story late last year about the lab losing evidence.
McClatchy has written more than a dozen stories about the lab since last March; the stories 
included details of the misconduct of two former analysts who made serious errors during DNA 
and firearms testing and who later were found to have falsified and destroyed documents when 
confronted with the problems.
As a result of McClatchy's articles, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy, D- Vt., 
and Sen. Charles Grassley of Iowa, the committee's top-ranking Republican member, urged the 
military to look into the lab's handling of the misconduct by one of the analysts. An investigation 
by the Pentagon's inspector general is ongoing.
…The Criminal Investigation Command, abbreviated as CID, says it's never targeted anyone for 
talking to the news media, and it's asserted that McClatchy's series of stories has overblown 
isolated mistakes and misconduct that shouldn't reflect on the lab's overall reputation.
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As of this writing, the outcome for Donald Mikko remains uncertain and his career 
remains in jeopardy. However, it is clear that without his efforts the ongoing problems of 
fraud and error at the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory would have remained 
hidden from public and congressional scrutiny.
Whatever the circumstance, public employees understand that successful lawsuits are 
personally expensive and don’t always end well – a problem compounded by the strain of 
suspension or termination. This weighs heavily on any decision to come forward with 
allegations against an employer or fellow employees. The outcome of any administrative 
complaint, investigation, or subsequent legal proceeding is never guaranteed – regardless 
of the evidence – and can cost more than the uncertain outcome is worth to the individual.
This state of affairs deprives the research community at large of complete or easily 
referenced data sources, hampering meaningful independent study.  For example, 
consider the NAS Report – perhaps the most important comprehensive investigation and 
review of the forensic sciences published in history. While full of important findings and 
suggested reforms related to the forensic sciences, the NAS Report provides little direct 
coverage of forensic fraud. It does explain that (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; pp.44-48): 
• there have been many major crime lab scandals involving both fraud and error; 
• a disturbing number of forensic scientists refuse to concede the possibility of error 
in their methods, and are “resistant” to the findings of research critical of the 
forensic sciences; 
• explanations of scientific limitations, demonstrations of scientific rigor, and 
transparency of methodology are often absent in forensic science work product; 
and,
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• while the community perception appears to be that forensic fraud is rare, the 
absence of community “openness” has severely hampered in-depth study of error, 
bias, and fraud committed by forensic science practitioners. 
Ultimately, however, the NAS Report avoids addressing the issue of forensic fraud by 
sidestepping to the issue of practitioner error. It suggests that unintentional error within 
the forensic science community is the more common and immediate concern. However it 
also concedes that there is currently no research to accurately demonstrate the rate or 
scope of either forensic fraud or forensic error (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009). This makes 
the need for actual research in both areas critical to the scientific health and credibility of 
the forensic sciences.
This is not to say that the subject of forensic fraud has been entirely ignored in the 
professional literature, but rather that it has been limited with respect to available data 
and those who are able and willing to voice critical opinions.
Ideographic Research: Loosely Referenced Case Studies
The vast majority of research published in relation to the subject of forensic fraud has 
been ideographic in nature. That is to say it consists primarily of peer-reviewed articles 
and textbooks that touch anecdotally on specific high profile cases resulting from 
individual examiner misconduct. Such cases are generally adduced in order to highlight a 
relevant issue, or demonstrate a significant condition or failing within the forensic science 
community. Commonly cited cases include (alphabetically)41:
Jacqueline Blake, DNA Analyst 
Jacqueline Blake was a forensic examiner for the FBI Crime Laboratory’s DNA Analysis 
Unit; she held a Bachelor’s of Science Degree in Biology. As explained in Murphy (2007) 
Ms. Blake (p.733): “pled guilty to falsifying reports of “negative controls”--the data used 
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41 Data included and excluded from the present study are described as such.
to demonstrate that no contamination has taken place during testing.”  Her acts of fraud at 
the FBI Crime Lab spanned five years, leading up to her resignation in 2002, and 
involved at least 103 cases (Botluk, 2007; Cooley, 2004; DiFonzo, 2005; Giannelli, 2007; 
Murphy, 2007; OIG, 2004; and Pyrek, 2007). 
This law enforcement employed forensic examiner, having committed her acts of fraud 
within the timeframe parameters set for this study (2000-2010), was included in the final 
data set. See Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results for details regarding 
inclusion criteria and data collected.
Ralph Erdmann, Coroner 
Ralph Erdmann was a coroner from Texas who, in 1992, pleaded no contest to falsifying 
at least six autopsies in Dickens, Hockley and Lubbock counties for the prosecution. He 
falsified results regarding forensic examinations and testing that were never performed 
(aka dry-labbing), and gave related false testimony in court proceedings to facilitate 
criminal convictions. He was subsequently convicted, received 10 years probation, and 
moved to Washington State. There, Mr. Erdmann violated his probation by keeping a 
“cache of firearms” and was returned to serve out his time in Texas (Underwood, 1997).  
Mr. Erdmann was reportedly well known among his contemporaries for tailoring autopsy 
results to fit law enforcement needs and theories (Cooley, 2007a; Giannelli, 1997; and 
Giannelli and McMunigal, 2007).
This law enforcement employed forensic examiner, having committed his acts of fraud 
outside of the timeframe parameters set for this study (2000-2010), was properly 
excluded from the final data set. See Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results 
for details regarding inclusion criteria and data collected.
Joyce Gilchrist, Forensic Scientist
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Joyce Gilchrist was a forensic scientist for the Oklahoma City Police Department crime 
laboratory. Her reputation for pro-police and pro-prosecution bias was well known by 
supervisors, co-workers, and professional organizations early in her career, which began 
in the 1980s (Giannelli and McMunigal, 2007)42. This included withholding exculpatory 
findings from the defense, testifying beyond the accepted limits of science, falsely 
reporting findings, and contaminating evidence to prevent testing (Cooley, 2007a). 
However, her scientific misconduct went unchecked and by many counts was even 
rewarded within the local prosecutorial system that she served (Giannelli, 2007). As 
reported in Raeder (2007), Ms. Gilchrist was (p.1421) “an African-American forensic 
chemist, known as "Black Magic" for her ability to sway juries with evidence only she 
could see.” 
Things came to a head, however, after the 2001 DNA exoneration of Jeffrey Pierce. He 
was convicted of rape in 1986, based almost entirely on the work and testimony of Ms. 
Gilchrist. As explained in IP (2009; p.29):
…the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation conducted a review of cases assigned to Gilchrist 
from 1980 to 1997. Of the 1,600 cases reviewed, they identified nearly 200 that warranted further 
review. A 2001 FBI review of her work also found errors in five of the eight cases randomly 
reviewed. Gilchrist testified in 11 cases in which the defendant has already been executed. She has 
contributed to at least three other wrongful convictions overturned through DNA testing. Gilchrist 
was terminated in 2001 after 21 years with the lab.
Subsequent to this case review, Ms. Gilchrist’s fraud and misconduct have resulted in 
multiple overturned verdicts, retrials, and millions of dollars in settlement payments to 
the wrongfully convicted (Cooper, 2009; Greiner, 2005).
This law enforcement employed forensic examiner, having committed her acts of fraud or 
having had them revealed within the timeframe parameters set for this study (2000-2010), 
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42 A member of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, multiple complaints were filed against Joyce 
Gilchrist over the years, none of which resulted in sanctions or expulsion.
was included in the final data set. See Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency 
Results for details regarding inclusion criteria and data collected.
David Harding, Latent Print Examiner
A New York State Trooper and fingerprint supervisor with the Troop C Forensic Unit, 
David Harding confessed to planting fingerprint evidence in numerous cases in order to 
secure convictions during the application process for a job with the Central Intelligence 
Agency. He also implicated his partner, Trooper Robert Lishansky, and admitted to 
burning physical evidence to protect fellow officers from consequences in a wrongful 
shooting investigation (Moenssens, 1993). As reported in Young (1996; p.466): “New 
York State Trooper David Harding, after pleading guilty to perjury charges, justified his 
acts of fabricating evidence, using fabricated evidence to obtain confessions, and 
testifying falsely about evidence at trial by saying that he had acted ‘because of a stern 
belief the defendant was a danger to society.’” See also Chamberlain v. Mantello (1997); 
Cooley (2004); and Risinger, Saks, Rosenthal, and Thompson (2002).
This law enforcement employed forensic examiner, having committed his acts of fraud 
outside of the timeframe parameters set for this study (2000-2010), was properly 
excluded from the final data set. See Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results 
for details regarding inclusion criteria and data collected.
Arnold Melnikoff, Laboratory Director
Arnold Melnikoff was employed by the Department of Justice Crime Laboratory in 
Montana from 1970-1989, where he eventually became the director. During that time, his 
testimony helped secure the conviction of Jimmy Ray Bromgard for the rape of an 8-
year-old girl (Cooley and Oberfield, 2008). As explained in Olsen (2002): “During 
Bromgard's 1987 trial, Melnikoff claimed hairs found in the girl's bedclothes were 
virtually indistinguishable from those of the defendant -- though experts agree such 
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evidence is not that precise.” This level of certainty with respect to hair comparison 
testimony was standard for Mr. Melnikoff.
In 1989, Mr. Melnikoff was hired by Barry Logan to work at the Washington State Patrol 
Crime Lab; he worked there as a forensic chemist performing drug tests, among other 
duties (Olsen, 2003). However, his work in Montana came under fire as the cases worked 
their way through the appellate system, resulting in multiple lawsuits from wrongfully 
convicted defendants (Cooley, 2004; Cooley and Oberfield, 2008). This included the 
Bromgard case. In 2002, DNA evidence exonerated Mr. Bromgard after 15 years in 
prison (Olsen, 2003). Consequently, reviews of his casework in Montana and Washington 
State were conducted. As reported in Gerianos (2003):
The State Patrol reviewed 100 cases completed by Melnikoff from 1999 to 2002 and found that his 
work on drug analysis did not meet professional standards.
"The review of the cases did not necessarily reflect any mistakes that would have changed the 
basic conclusions drawn from the analysis," according to a patrol report obtained through a state 
public records act request. "It is just that often the work product was weak or unsupported by 
sufficient data to reach clear conclusions."
Mr. Melnikoff, a charter member of The American Society of Crime Lab Directors 
(ASCLD), also admitted to previously fabricating statistics to bolster his hair comparison 
testimony (Olsen, 2003). Ultimately, based on a review of his “incompetent” and 
“sloppy” work in their lab system, and his prior false testimony, the Washington State 
Patrol determined that Arnold Melnikoff should be terminated (Gerianos, 2003). His 
appeal for termination was denied in 2005.
This law enforcement employed forensic examiner, having committed his acts of fraud 
outside of the timeframe parameters set for this study (2000-2010), was properly 
excluded from the final data set. See Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results 
for details regarding inclusion criteria and data collected.
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Fred Zain, Forensic Chemist
Fred Zain was a forensic chemist for the West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory 
from 1980 to 1989, after which he resigned and took a job as chief of evidence for the 
Bexar County Medical Examiner in Texas (Chan, 1994). As reported in McMunigal 
(2007; p.437): “An investigation of Fred Zain, the former head serologist at the West 
Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory… showed that between 1979 and 1989, he 
falsified test results in as many as 134 cases, almost always in favor of the prosecution.” 
At least 10 defendants had their convictions overturned as a consequence. Among the 
most widely publicized cases of forensic fraud, Mr. Zain’s pro-prosecution bias and 
tendency to dry-lab favorable results is referenced repeatedly in the literature (Castelle, 
1993; Connors, Lundregan, Miller, and McEwen, 1996; Cooley, 2004; Edwards and 
Gotsonis, 2009; Giannelli, 2007; Risinger, Saks, Rosenthal, and Thompson, 2002; and 
Starrs, 1993).
This law enforcement employed forensic examiner, having committed his acts of fraud 
outside of the timeframe parameters set for this study (2000-2010), was properly 
excluded from the final data set. See Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results 
for details regarding inclusion criteria and data collected.
The literature referencing these case studies is authored primarily by legal scholars 
aligned with the criminal defense bar. These commentators seek, ostensibly, to evaluate 
forensic science and its role in the justice system; they are, after all, in a unique and 
altogether unenviable position to experience the direct impact of forensic fraud43. Their 
collective view of the profession and its practitioners is dim to say the least. First, legal 
156
43 Despite the scientific literacy of a select few, it must be conceded that the vast majority of attorneys have 
a very limited understanding of forensic science; have no real understanding of how to cross-examine a 
forensic scientist effectively with respect to establishing the limitations of their methods and conclusions; 
and often demonstrate limited interest in learning either. This holds true regardless of their courtroom 
alignment.
scholars tend to view the truly objective forensic examiner as an exception; they contend 
that many if not most are “guns for hire”, selling opinions to the highest bidder (Barkacs, 
Browne and Williamson, 2002). Second, they tend to view the problem of laboratory 
fraud as endemic (Castelle, 1999). Third, given the parade of high profile DNA 
exonerations involving fraudulent examiners, hidden evidence, and misleading 
interpretations, they have come to accept that forensic fraud cannot always be averted or 
“unmasked” by the limited due process afforded at trial (Imwinkelried, 2003). This leads 
them to the inescapable conclusion that the vast majority of forensic fraud passes 
undetected through the courtroom, and that any public estimates of its frequency are low 
(Castelle, 1999).
Monographs: Case Studies With a Theme
Separate from literature that references well known cases of forensic fraud with a few 
lines in order to craft a much larger position, there are other works that focus on its 
occurrence as an important symptom of the overall infirmity of forensic science practice. 
While providing in-depth reviews spanning multiple case examples, these research efforts 
do not attempt statistical analysis and inference. Rather, they are anthologies with a 
theme, telling a story associated with a particular case, type of evidence, practice, or 
institution44. Significant examples from the past two decades include:
Mountebanks
First published in 1982, the Forensic Science Handbook, by the renowned forensic 
scientist Dr. Richard Saferstein, has generally included chapters reviewing cases of 
forensic fraud. These tend to emphasize the responsibility of forensic science to court 
proceedings through the exploration of examiner ethics and misconduct. The Handbook 
is currently in its second edition and exists as a three volume series. Chapter 1, written by 
James Starrs, Professor of Law and Forensic Sciences at The George Washington 
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44 It is worth noting that there are a number of Australian monographs written for this same purpose, 
reviewing flawed or biased forensic science and the resulting miscarriages of justice (e.g., Crowley and 
Wilson, 2007; Moles, 2004; Sangha, Roach, and Moles, 2010; and Wilson, 1992) 
University, is titled “Mountebanks Among Forensic Scientists,” (Starrs, 2004). Chapter 2, 
written by Charles Midkiff, formerly of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
(BATF) National Laboratory Center, and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Justice, 
Law, and Society at American University, is titled “More Montebanks” (Midkiff, 2004). 
A “mountebank” is a charlatan or a fake; a word derived from an Italian saying that 
means “climb the bench” (suggesting a desire to get on a platform and attract an 
audience).
Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science
Connors, Lundregan, Miller, and McEwen (1996) was among the first modern efforts to 
report on the subject of wrongful convictions revealed by forensic science, providing an 
early review of 28 cases that were overturned using DNA evidence. It included a number 
of cases that involved fraud and misconduct committed by forensic scientists working for 
the police and prosecution. This watershed report, titled Convicted by Juries, Exonerated 
by Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial 
(Connors, et al, 1996), revealed that (pp.xvi-xvii): 
A second important issue is the number of cases in which there was misconduct on the part of the 
prosecution’s scientific experts. For example, the forensic serologist who testified against Gary 
Dotson failed to disclose that, because the alleged victim was also a type B secretor, the fraction of 
the male population that could have contributed the semen found on the vaginal swabs exceeded 
60 percent, making the serological evidence in the case probative of very little. In this instance, the 
prosecution’s expert witness failed to volunteer potentially exculpatory information but did not 
actually lie under oath.
As further detailed in Giannelli (2007; pp.186-187):
Gary Dotson was convicted of the rape of Cathleen Webb... Six years later she recanted, stating 
that she had fabricated the charge… Subsequent DNA tests excluded Dotson as the source of the 
crime-scene semen… At Dotson’s 1979 trial, Timothy Dixon [a forensic scientists employed by 
the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement] testified that seminal material found in Webb’s 
panties matched Dotson’s blood type… He failed to disclose, however, that Webb’s own vaginal 
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discharges, not necessarily semen, could have caused the stains… Years later when a Washington 
Post reporter asked Dixon why he had not spoken up. He replied: “I guess I wasn’t asked.”
The Gary Dotson exoneration underscores the games that some forensic examiners for 
prosecution will play in order to keep and maintain the agendas of their employers – by 
refusing to acknowledge that omitting information and leaving a false impression with 
reports or testimony is in itself a deceptive practice45. 
Of note, an additional three cases reviewed in Connors, et al (1996) involved overt 
forensic fraud committed by the aforementioned Fred Zain, ensuring his continued place 
in the literature that would follow46.
Tainting Evidence: The FBI Crime Lab
In 1995, the FBI Crime Laboratory suffered the first of numerous scandals that would 
plague it until the present day, resulting from allegations by one of its own: Dr. Fred 
Whitehurst – a 20 year FBI veteran with a PhD in Chemistry. A whistleblower, Dr. 
Whitehurst reported that FBI evidence examiners were being pressured to cut corners and 
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45 It is worth mentioning that the current research effort revealed a number of cases where this kind of 
fraudulent examiner behavior was evident. Most notably, this included the North Carolina State Bureau of 
Investigation’s Crime Lab, where an audit of the lab “determined that the practice of not reporting results of 
more sophisticated blood tests was sanctioned by some analysts. In 1997, it became written policy. That 
policy remained in effect as recently as 2003,” (Locke, Neff, and Curliss, 2010). As further reported in 
Locke, Neff, and Curliss (2010):
In serology, police use rudimentary presumptive tests at crime scenes to determine where blood might be. 
Those tests are fallible, prone to giving false positives. So analysts depend on more sophisticated, 
confirmatory tests to determine whether a substance is, in fact, blood.
Before 1997, the serology unit operated without report-writing guidelines. Analysts set their own criteria until 
1997; that policy sanctioned the practice of not reporting negative or inconclusive results of confirmatory 
tests
This crime lab scandal involved evidence and findings withheld in over 230 case, false and biased 
testimony, and resulted in the closure of the lab’s bloodstain unit. It also resulted in the termination of two 
fraudulent examiners: Duane Deaver and Gerald Thomas. Data from both individuals were collected and 
included in the present study.  
46 This report served as an important precursor to the book Actual Innocence by Scheck, Neufeld, and 
Dwyer (2000), which details the stories of 10 men wrongfully convicted and then exonerated by DNA with 
the help of the Innocence Project in New York.
skew test results in favor of prosecutorial efforts. As explained in Peterson and Leggett 
(2007; pp.646-647):
…in 1995, Dr. Frederic Whitehurst, a scientist employed in the FBI laboratory, leveled charges of 
sloppy work, flawed report writing, and perjured court testimony affecting the explosives, 
chemistry-toxicology, and materials analysis units of the laboratory. Under the supervision of 
Michael R. Bromwich, the United States Justice Department's Inspector General, and with the 
assistance of an external blue ribbon panel, an extensive eighteen-month investigation ensued, 
which uncovered very serious problems. The investigation did not substantiate most of 
Whitehurst's allegations but did find numerous instances of “testimonial errors, substandard 
analytical work, and deficient practices.” The Inspector General's final report, issued in 1997, 
made numerous recommendations aimed at maintaining the independence of scientists in the 
crime laboratory and at protecting them from the influence of field investigators while conducting 
laboratory examinations, writing reports, and delivering testimony. 
Dr. Whitehurst subsequently sued the FBI as a whistleblower, eventually reaching a $1.46 
million dollar settlement for wrongful termination. 
The scandal made public by Dr. Whitehurst, and the Inspector General’s investigation 
that followed, preceded the publication of Tainting Evidence: Inside the Scandals at the 
FBI Crime Lab (Kelly and Wearne, 1998). This detailed effort levied a scathing 
indictment of FBI Crime Laboratory culture and ongoing misconduct. It included a litany 
of specific failings by FBI agents and laboratory personnel in their casework related to 
high profile investigations such as the Unabomber, Ruby Ridge, the first World Trade 
Center bombing in 1993, and the O.J. Simpson trial.
Law Reviews: Chronicles from the Defense Bar
Since the late 1990s, which included the first FBI Crime Laboratory scandal and the 
advent of DNA exonerations already mentioned, there have been a spate of law review 
articles focusing on scientific ethics and the fraud committed by forensic examiners 
employed within publicly funded crime labs. As discussed previously, these law reviews 
are primarily the work of the criminal defense bar. They are crafted using details from 
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crime lab scandals occurring across the country in an effort to expose the partiality of 
forensic scientists working for the police, and the subsequent potential fallibility of what 
is often presented as irrefutable physical evidence of guilt at trial. A list of devoted legal 
scholars and their major publications focusing primarily on forensic fraud and 
misconduct includes (in chronological order by author): 
• “The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent 
Crime Laboratories,” (Giannelli, 1997); "False Credentials," (Giannelli, 2001); 
“Fabricated Reports,” (Giannelli, 2002); and “Prosecutors, Ethics, And Expert 
Witnesses,” (Giannelli and McMunigal, 2007);
• “Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obligations of Attorneys,” (Saks, 2001) and 
“Ethics in Forensic Science: Professional Standards for the Practice of 
Criminalistics,” (Saks, 2003);
• “Reforming the Forensic Community to Avert the Ultimate Injustice,” (Cooley, 
2004) and “Forensic Science and Capital Punishment Reform: An “Intellectually 
Honest” Assessment” (Cooley, 2007b);
• “The Crimes Of Crime Labs” (DiFonzo, 2005) and “Devil In A White Coat: The 
Temptation of Forensic Evidence in the Age of CSI” (DiFonzo and Stern, 2007);
• “More than zero: Accounting for error in latent fingerprint identification” (Cole, 
2005) and “The Prevalence and Potential Causes of Wrongful Conviction By 
Fingerprint Evidence” (Cole, 2006);
• “Beyond Bad Apples: Analyzing the Role of Forensic Science in Wrongful 
Convictions,” (Thompson, 2009).
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These law review articles, and others like them, essentially seek to chronicle and 
broadcast the fraud, misconduct, and error related to forensic examiners and any resulting 
crime lab scandals that might be relevant to litigation. They also contextualize what has 
been publicly revealed about forensic fraud for the purposes of better understanding, and 
negotiating, the role that forensic scientists play in court. Ironically, they often include 
suggested reforms that would serve to make the forensic sciences more scientific (e.g., 
more valid, reliable and impartial methodology; scientific education; and laboratory 
independence from law enforcement) – an effort that has been generally absent from the 
forensic science community itself (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009). 
Forensic Science Under Siege
As an antidote to the critiques from the defense bar, and their coverage of ongoing 
forensic laboratory scandals and related instances of forensic fraud, a journalist named 
Kelly Pyrek wrote a book titled Forensic Science Under Siege (Pyrek, 2007). Ms. Pyrek 
researched the criticisms levied against the forensic sciences by interviewing various high 
profile forensic science practitioners47, the majority of whom were “stakeholders” (e.g., 
crime lab directors and senior members of organizations invested in the current forensic 
system). As provided in the Preface, the “siege” mentioned in the title is part of a battle 
over ownership, leadership, and the precise mandates of reliable forensic science practice 
(pp.xiii-xiv):
…engaged in battle most frequently are social scientists and legal scholars vs. forensic 
practitioners in a tussle over, if you will, ownership rights: Who owns forensic science, who has 
the right to dictate to it, and who will ultimately assume leadership over a field with immense 
power and strategic access to all three levels of U.S. government—legislative, judicial, and 
executive. The feud is triggered by allegations of errors, fraud, and malfeasance on the part of 
forensic service providers that undermine criminal justice, and fueled by disagreements over a 
diverse plank of issues ranging from the very definition of science and its purpose, to the 
admissibility of forensic evidence in a court of law, to the effects of a significant paradigm shift 
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47 This researcher was interviewed by Ms. Pyrek for her book, and was quoted accurately in numerous 
sections.
some commentators say is occurring at the nexus of law and science—the place where forensic 
science lives.
One very important argument that we will explore is the allegation by critics that forensic science 
is deficient in scientific methodology and rigor—with the extremists asserting that it is utterly 
lacking in science altogether—and the response from forensic practitioners, stunned by the 
charges, that forensic science was born from and is steeped in the traditional sciences.
The conclusion of this work is that forensic science is practiced by well meaning 
examiners in need of more funding; that the few laboratory errors reported are expected 
and manageable; that the rare occurrence of forensic fraud is the result of a small number 
of “rogues” and “cowboys”; and that the forensic science community is better served 
when built up than torn down in the media. 
It bears mentioning that two years after the publication of Pyrek (2007), the NAS Report 
on the forensic sciences concluded that there was an absence of scientific education, 
methodology, and research in the majority of the forensic sciences; that many forensic 
science stakeholders are too attached to the current broken system to fix it; that many 
forensic scientists are resistant to criticisms and reforms; and that actual rates of forensic 
fraud and error are unknown for lack of any research efforts from within the community – 
suggesting the need for a major overhaul of the forensic sciences (Edwards and Gotsonis, 
2009). 
Nomothetic Research: Group Studies
There have been few group studies examining questions related to the reliability and 
validity of scientific expert testimony, and only one specific to the nature and frequency 
of forensic fraud. Moreover, the existing research has not come from those associated 
with the stakeholders of forensic science. This is likely due to the liability issues 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter, in combination with the absence of an overall 
scientific research culture in the forensic sciences (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; 
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Mnookin, Cole, Dror, Fisher, Houck, Inman, Kaye, Koehler, Langenburg, Risinger, 
Rudin, Siegel, and Stoney, 2011).
Empirical research addressing the issue of forensic fraud has come, largely, from legal 
scholars associated with The Innocence Project48. This should not be much of a surprise, 
owing to the following: the advent of DNA exonerations identified the issue of forensic 
fraud and misconduct as a significant contributor to wrongful criminal convictions 
(Connors, Lundregan, Miller, and McEwen, 1996); the Innocence Project has a vested 
interest in exposing forensic fraud and misconduct in order overturn wrongful 
convictions; and the Innocence Project has amassed a large database of case evidence and 
expert transcripts related to criminal defendants exonerated by DNA, ripe for study (300 
exonerated defendants, as of the writing of this dissertation). 
Saks and Koehler (2005)
In a study of 86 DNA exoneration cases provided by The Innocence Project, Saks and 
Koehler (2005) reported the following frequency data: forensic testing errors in 63%; 
police misconduct in 44%; prosecutorial misconduct in 28%; and false or misleading 
testimony by forensic experts in 27%. They also reported surprise regarding the findings 
related to forensic testing, explaining that (p.893):
It was not surprising to learn that erroneous convictions sometimes occur, and that new science 
and technology can help detect and correct those mistakes. Nor was it surprising to learn… that 
erroneous eyewitness identifications are the most common contributing factor to wrongful 
convictions. What was unexpected is that erroneous forensic science expert testimony is the 
second most common contributing factor to wrongful convictions, found in 63% of those cases. 
These data likely understate the relative contribution of forensic science expert testimony to 
erroneous convictions. Whereas lawyers, police, and lay witnesses participate in virtually every 
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48 As provided in the “Mission Statement” on the Innocence Project’s website at 
www.innocenceproject.org: “The Innocence Project was founded in 1992 by Barry C. Scheck and Peter J. 
Neufeld at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University to assist prisoners who could be 
proven innocent through DNA testing. To date, 300 people in the United States have been exonerated by 
DNA testing, including 17 who served time on death row.”
criminal case, forensic science experts participate in a smaller subset of cases—about 10 to 20% of 
criminal cases during the era when these DNA exonerations were originally tried.
This data suggests, according to the authors of the study, that forensic scientists are the 
courtroom witnesses most likely to present “misleading or fraudulent testimony” (p.893).
Gross, et al (2005)
In a broader study of 340 exonerations between 1989 and 2003, 196 of which did not 
involve DNA evidence, Gross, Jacoby, Matheson, Montgomery, and Patil (2005) found 
the following: “In 5 [1.5%] of the exonerations that we have studied there are reports of 
perjury by police officers. In an additional 24 [7%] we have similar information on 
perjury by forensic scientists testifying for the government” (p.19). This study relied only  
in part on cases from The Innocence Project, explaining that (p.2): “Most of the 
exonerations we include in this database are listed on one or more the web sites that are 
maintained by three organizations: The Death Penalty Information Center… the 
Innocence Project at Cardozo Law School… and the Center on Wrongful Convictions at 
Northwestern University Law School.” While this is significantly fewer than the 
frequency of forensic fraud and error identified in Saks and Koehler (2005), the authors 
concede that there findings underestimate the problem due to the fact that (p.19): 
“Detecting a deliberate lie is harder; there may be no simple way to tell if a statement was 
false, and if so whether the falsehood was intentional.” Moreover, the authors did not 
have access to complete case materials and transcripts, making their findings regarding 
fraud and error incidental to the purpose of the study – which was to get an initial 
estimate of the nature and occurrence of wrongful convictions in the United States.
Garrett and Nuefeld (2009)
In the first published study of scientific testimony by prosecution experts in cases where 
the defendant was eventually exonerated, Garrett and Nuefeld (2009) reviewed the 
transcripts from 137 trials. They found that (pp.1-2):
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…in the bulk of these trials of innocent defendants—82 cases or 60%—forensic analysts called by 
the prosecution provided invalid testimony at trial—that is, testimony with conclusions misstating 
empirical data or wholly unsupported by empirical data. This was not the testimony of a mere 
handful of analysts: this set of trials included invalid testimony by 72 forensic analysts called by 
the prosecution and employed by 52 laboratories, practices, or hospitals from 25 states. 
Unfortunately, the adversarial process largely failed to police this invalid testimony. Defense 
counsel rarely cross-examined analysts concerning invalid testimony and rarely obtained experts 
of their own. In the few cases in which invalid forensic science was challenged, judges seldom 
provided relief.
Examining trial testimony did not reveal the entire picture, however. The authors 
discovered, upon evaluating “post-conviction review, investigations, or civil 
discovery” (p.14), that 13 (10%) of the 137 cases also involved withholding of 
exculpatory evidence. This included 3 cases that did not involve invalid testimony. 
Consequently, 85 (63%) of the 137 cases under review involved either invalid scientific 
testimony or the withholding of exculpatory evidence.
The nature of invalid forensic science testimony reported in Garrett and Nuefeld (2009) 
included:
• Non-probative evidence presented as probative
• Exculpatory evidence discounted
• Inaccurate frequency or statistic presented
• Statistic provided without empirical support
• Non-numerical statements provided without empirical support
• Conclusion that evidence originated from defendant without empirical support
With respect to the types of forensic examinations that involved invalid testimony in the 
137 cases reviewed (with ten cases involving more than one type of forensic 
examination), Garrett and Nuefeld (2009) reported the following frequency data:
• Serology: 100 cases reviewed; 57 cases involved invalid testimony
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• Hair comparison: 65 cases reviewed; 25 cases involved invalid testimony
• Bite mark comparison: 6 cases reviewed; 4 cases involved invalid testimony
• DNA testing: 11 cases reviewed; 3 cases involved invalid testimony
• Fingerprint comparison: 13 cases reviewed; 1 cases involved invalid testimony
• Shoe print comparison: 3 cases reviewed; 1 cases involved invalid testimony
• Voice comparison: 1 cases reviewed; 1 cases involved invalid testimony
• Soil comparison: 6 cases reviewed; 0 cases involved invalid testimony
While not delving into the issue of intent such that accusations of fraud might be levied 
beyond examiner ignorance and incompetence, this study: 1) identifies invalid scientific 
testimony and the withholding of exculpatory evidence, as significant factors in wrongful 
convictions; and 2) identifies those specific forensic science examinations and testimony 
that have caused the most harm to innocent defendants. 
Turvey (2003)
There has been only one previously published study specific to assessing instances of 
forensic fraud. It was a descriptive review of limited frequency data related to 42 forensic 
examiners that had been determined to have committed one or more acts of forensic 
fraud. These examiners were divided into three types: simulators, dissemblers, and 
pseudo-experts (Turvey, 2003). This study was broad in its scope: it included forensic 
examiners from many different forensic disciplines, from multiple countries, and from as 
far back as the 1981.
Simulators, the largest group, were forensic examiners that physically manipulated 
physical evidence or forensic examinations; this involved fabrication or destruction of 
findings. This group was comprised of 17 (41%) forensic examiners: 13 (31%) examiners 
were involved in dry-labbing results and 4 (10%) examiners had been involved in 
planting evidence. Simulators involved in dry-labbing, by evidence type, were reported as 
follows (Turvey, 2003):
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• Autopsy results: 3
• Drug tests: 3
• Serological tests: 2
• DNA tests: 2
• Fingerprints comparisons: 2
• Psychological assessments: 1
Simulators involved in planting evidence, by evidence type, were reported as follows 
(Turvey, 2003):
• Fingerprints: 2
• Biological material: 2
Dissemblers were forensic examiners who exaggerated, embellished, lied about, or 
otherwise misrepresented their actual findings. This group was comprised of 15 forensic 
examiners (36% of all cases). Dissemblers, by evidence type, were reported as follows 
(Turvey, 2003):
• Serological evidence: 4
• Arson / Explosive evidence: 3
• DNA evidence: 3
• Hair and Fiber comparison: 2
• Footwear comparison: 1
• Lead Bullet analysis: 1
• Social science research: 1
Pseudoexperts were forensic examiners who fabricated or misrepresented expert 
credentials. This group was comprised of 13 forensic examiners (31% of all cases). The 
most commonly falsified expert credentials were college diplomas, found in 8 (19%) 
cases. Pseudoexperts, by credential type, were reported as follows (Turvey, 2003):
• College education: 8
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• Professional certifications: 4
• Work experience: 4
• Professional affiliations: 3
A significant finding of this study was that the majority of forensic examiners committing 
fraud did so while employed in government agencies such as police departments (14%) 
and police crime labs (57%). When considering those forensic examiners working 
privately (26%), 3 worked almost exclusively for law enforcement and the prosecution. 
In other words, in 34 (81%) of 42 total cases, forensic fraud was committed on behalf of 
the prosecution, and most often by law enforcement employed crime laboratory personnel 
(Turvey, 2003).
While limited in descriptive depth (e.g. no impact data, limited employer data, and 
limited examiner data), and overly broad with respect to the sampling of different kinds 
of forensic examiners, these preliminary findings provided assistance with shaping the 
framework and dimensions of the current dissertation49.
Summary
There is an overall dearth of professional literature related to forensic fraud. The majority  
of existing research is found primarily in the form of ideographic case studies and 
monographs authored by those from the criminal defense bar. This is a consequence of 
the absence of a research culture within the forensic sciences created in part by the 
punitive disincentives for reporting, gathering and publishing data regarding fraud that 
exist for public employees. 
Larger scale empirical research associated with forensic fraud has traditionally been 
indirect, arising from the examination of forensic science testimony in relation to 
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49 It should be acknowledged that 23 of 42 cases in Turvey (2003) fell within the parameters of the current 
study. Consequently, further data were gathered for these 23 cases for inclusion with other cases identified 
for the dissertation.
wrongful convictions. In these studies (authored primarily by legal scholars with access 
to court transcripts), expert perjury, invalid scientific testimony, and the withholding of 
exculpatory evidence have been identified as significant contributing factors to proven 
miscarriages of justice. They also identify specific types of forensic examination and 
related areas of testimony that have caused the most harm to innocent defendants.
Turvey (2003) provided preliminary descriptive frequency data regarding a limited 
international sample of fraudulent examiners from multiple forensic disciplines over 
roughly a 30-year period (n=42), and also suggested a typology. However, the current 
study aims to provide a more reliable and focused analysis of forensic fraud and its 
significant correlates – examining data related to forensic fraud at a level that has not 
been explored previously. This will include, in subsequent chapters, descriptive frequency 
data for cases included in the final sample (n=100), correlation matrices, and multiple 
hierarchical regression analysis.
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Chapter 8 
Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results
“The legal community now concedes, with varying degrees of
urgency, that our system produces erroneous convictions 
based on discredited forensics.”
Pamela R. Metzer (Metzger, 2006; p.491) 
Associate Prof. of Law, Tulane University
This chapter describes the methods used to identify and gather data for the present study, 
along with initial frequency results. First, data sources are discussed with respect to 
availability and reliability. Second, the parameters of this dissertation are set forth, 
establishing the criteria used for including and excluding cases of fraud. Some case 
examples are provided. Finally, the variables collected and examined for the study are 
defined, and frequency results from the final data set are presented. These frequency 
results, being useful as limited preliminary assessments, provide the basis for more 
complex and reliable correlation analysis, and related discussion, in subsequent 
chapters50.
Sources of Data
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there is an overall absence of research-oriented 
culture within the forensic sciences (Mnookin, Cole, Dror, Fisher, Houck, Inman, Kaye, 
Koehler, Langenburg, Risinger, Rudin, Siegel, and Stoney, 2011). This may have been 
created, in part, by the punitive disincentives for reporting, gathering and publishing data 
regarding fraud that exist for public employees; and in part by the desire to limit liability 
among forensic science stakeholders. These circumstances combine to make identifying, 
parsing, and gathering forensic fraud data a significant challenge. 
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50 Methods of data analysis and findings will be presented and discussed in Chapter 9: Multivariate 
Analysis: Results and Discussion. 
Ultimately, however, the following data sources were identified and searched for 
information and viable data:
Media Accounts
Newspaper databases were routinely searched to identify cases of potential forensic fraud 
using combinations of the terms “crime lab”, “fraud”, “forensic”, “expert”, “perjury”, 
“scientist”, “technician”, “resigned”, “suspended”, “scandal”, “terminated”, “fired”, 
“charlatan”, and “phony” (e.g., Factiva, Westlaw, and Google news). However, media 
accounts were not considered reliable sources of final data. Rather, they were used to 
direct this researcher towards related court records, official agency records and press 
releases, audit reports, and peer-reviewed literature. 
Discovery Material/ Author’s Case Files
As part of this researcher’s work as a forensic scientist since 1996, a large amount of 
discovery material has been accumulated from a variety of agencies which documents the 
length and breadth of forensic fraud committed by various forensic examiners. Those 
cases having entered the justice system, that discovery material is now part of the public 
record. This includes internal disciplinary memoranda, forensic examination reports, 
sworn testimony, expert resumes, court transcripts, internal audit reports, and interviews 
conducted by members of various government agencies.
Court Records
This researcher has gathered court records, filings, testimony, and decisions from sources 
in the public domain, including media outlets, appellate court decisions from Westlaw, 
and government affiliated websites (indicated in the References section).
Agency Records
This researcher has gathered public records available directly from law enforcement 
agencies, government crime laboratories, and media outlets which include press releases, 
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subpoenas, indictments, arrest warrants, interdepartmental memoranda, and incident 
reports.
Audit Reports
Some of the police agencies and government crime laboratories involved in this study 
were subject to internal or independent audits revealing forensic fraud, the results of 
which have been made public (e.g., departmental websites, independent auditor websites, 
or media websites).
Peer Reviewed Literature
A number of cases of forensic fraud have been researched by others and published in the 
professional literature, as cited in the previous chapter.
Save media accounts, the data sources used for the dissertation were deemed sufficiently 
reliable for the present study to the extent that law enforcement agents, government 
agencies and the courts have also relied upon them to make decisions regarding employee 
misconduct, penalties, and institutional liability. 
It should be noted that the nature of these data sources limits the study to those cases in 
the public domain. For liability purposes this is desirable, as privacy is always a concern. 
However, it did confine the sample size. This is addressed in the next section. 
Parameters for the Current Data Set
The present study focuses on the identification of cases involving forensic fraud in United 
States. The goal was to render a data set that would provide a sufficient sample size, and 
a sufficiently narrow group of like forensic examiners, in order to enable the meaningful 
application of results relevant to questions raised in the thesis. To that end, the following 
parameters were observed:
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Timeframe and Region
The fraud occurred, or was revealed, in the United States within the years 2000 – 2010. 
This criterion narrows the timeframe and region of the study to a relevant scope in the 
post-DNA era. Regional limitations were imposed to maintain the relevance of findings 
within similar justice systems; the results of an international study might not be reliably 
interpreted or applied within the conditions single nation’s legal framework. Temporal 
limitations were set to keep the study relevant to the post-DNA era, where convictions 
and exonerations may be argued to be more reliable given the forensic tools and evidence 
available.
In every case, the forensic examiner, their employer, and/or the justice system 
experienced some or all of the consequences related to the fraud within the years 2000 – 
2010. This means that the following scenarios are possible: fraud was committed and 
revealed during the years 2000 – 2010; fraud was committed prior to, and then revealed 
during, the years 2000 – 2010; or fraud was committed prior to and within the years 2000 
– 2010, during which time it was subsequently revealed. 
Physical Evidence
Forensic examiners committed fraud related to their collection, preservation, 
examination, interpretation, and/or testimony regarding physical evidence. This criterion 
excludes many different kinds of forensic examiners (e.g., forensic accountants, forensic 
criminologists, and forensic mental health professionals), and focuses on the classic 
forensic sciences associated with crime laboratory work (Turvey and Petherick, 2010). It 
also excludes cases where non-forensic criminal justice professionals were found to have 
been involved in physical evidence related fraud (e.g., attorneys, police officers, and 
correctional officers).
External Decree 
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Forensic fraud was determined by a judgment or decree external to this researcher. That is 
to say, this researcher had no part in evaluating or determining whether forensic fraud 
actually occurred. Cases included in the sample required a judgment or decree of fraud 
levied against the forensic examiner in the form of court rulings; employer 
determinations; and/or public statements and confessions from the forensic examiner.
Research efforts using these parameters uncovered 32 crime labs experiencing significant 
crises across the United States between the years 2000 and 201051. These same efforts 
also revealed 170 different forensic examiners alleged to have committed fraud in the 
course of their casework to varying degrees. Of these 170 examiners identified, 70 were 
excluded as they ultimately fell outside of research parameters. Exclusions are discussed 
in the next section.
The final sample size (n=100) comprises a representative number of those forensic 
examiners committing fraud within the parameters of the study that were made public52. 
In fact, it is reasonable to infer that these cases were identifiable because they were made 
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51 It is worth noting that eight additional major crime laboratories in the United States have experienced 
significant crises related to fraud, error, and other misconduct since the closure of data collection efforts in 
this study, all during 2011-2012. Most of these continue to experience ongoing fall-out: (1) The 
Connecticut State Police Crime Laboratory lost its ASCLD-LAB accreditation; (2) the El Paso Police 
Department Crime Laboratory lost its ASCLD-LAB accreditation and was shut down; (3) the Indiana 
Department of Toxicology was recreated and made a stand alone state agency; (4) the Nassau County Police 
Crime Laboratory was shut down; (5) the St. Louis Police Department Crime Laboratory is involved in a 
whistleblower lawsuit subsequent to firing a long time chemist for reporting the errors of co-workers; (6) 
the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory continues to suffer from ongoing management problems 
and internal allegations of racism, bias, sexual harassment, error, and fraud – most recently involving a 
handwriting expert, Allen Southmayd, who embezzled almost $70,000.00 to finance a gambling addiction 
(he was arrested and convicted for his crimes); (7) the Idaho State Police Crime Laboratory in Pocatello is 
currently embroiled in a scandal that involves forensic examiners hiding unauthorized drugs and drug 
evidence from auditors on multiple occasions – causing a review of almost 1,000 cases and the resignation 
of three forensic examiners; and finally, (8) the Department of Public Health drug lab in Jamaica Plain, 
Massachusetts was shut down due to a lack of supervision in the quality control section, where criminalist 
Annie Dookhan was found to have engaged in forensic fraud over a period of nine years, effecting more 
that 30,000 cases (as of this writing, and in direct relation to this scandal, criminalist Annie Dookhan has 
been fired, arrested, and criminally charged; Linda Han, the Director of Bureau of Lab Sciences has 
resigned; Julie Nassif, the Director of the Analytic Chemistry Division, was fired; and Department of 
Public Health Commissioner John Auerbach has resigned).
52 Data gathering efforts closed when 100 examiners had been identified as having committed forensic 
fraud, hence the round number. It should be noted that it would have been difficult to find very many more 
fraudulent that fit the parameters of the study, given the constraints on data collection already described. As 
mentioned, these efforts also identified 70 examiners that fell outside the current parameters.
public. An apt analogy would be to imagine that all cases of forensic fraud are like an 
unknown volume of water boiled in a pot over a fire – a pot that we are not allowed to 
open. When the pot boils over, we can observe a volume of water being released as either 
liquid or gas. What can be observed can also be sampled and measured using various 
instruments. The measure of the water remaining in the pot is unknown. When the pot 
boils over with respect to incidents of forensic fraud spilling into the public domain, we 
can observe and study those cases with some expectation that they are representative of 
what remains unseen. This reality limits implications of the present study to known cases, 
and forces us to acknowledge that the characteristics of unreported and undiscovered 
cases, which could be many, remain unknown. However, this limitation is true of any 
study involving any criminal behavior: only the known and reported cases can be 
sampled for examination. Consequently, this is not a legitimate argument for avoiding the 
study of crime, only a limitation.
Excluded Cases
In the very early stages of conception, this dissertation had broader parameters, including 
the study of forensic examiners engaged in fraud across every major forensic discipline 
(e.g., forensic accounting, criminal profiling, and forensic psychology). However, it was 
soon understood that such an approach is not appropriate given the narrow issues of 
concern in the thesis. This is in part because of the differing professional constraints 
across forensic disciplines, differing professional standards, and because some forensic 
disciplines would have been overrepresented53. Consequently, the parameters of this 
study were attenuated as described in the previous section.
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53 For example, unlike forensic scientists working with physical evidence, forensic mental health 
professionals (e.g., psychologists, psychiatrists, and counselors) are licensed and regulated by state boards 
in the jurisdictions where they work. Some individual states keep open public records regarding those 
professionals that have lost their licensure, often with detailed explanations as to why. In the case of 
forensic mental health professionals, a quick search of available state licensure databases reveals numerous 
cases of fraud related to billing (e.g., examinations or assessments that did not take place) and the 
fabrication of results related to non-existent forensic evaluations. The prevalence of this fraudulent activity 
combined with the ease of gathering data would have caused this group to be over-represented against other 
forensic examiners. 
Ultimately, data from 70 examiners alleged to have committed forensic fraud identified in 
the initial stages of research were excluded. This is because in-depth examination of 
reliable data sources revealed an exclusionary criterion regarding the examiner. None of 
these cases involved multiple exclusionary criteria. Exclusions break down as follows:
Pre-2000 & Post-2010 
25 forensic examiners committed forensic fraud that was discovered and disposed of 
prior to the year 2000. Therefore, these cases fall outside of the temporal parameters 
established for the present study.
International
25 forensic examiners committed forensic fraud in justice systems outside of the United 
States (e.g., England, Canada, Australia, Barbados, Israel, and India). Therefore, these 
cases fall outside of the regional parameters established for the present study.
Other forensic professionals
14 forensic examiners committed fraud while working in forensic professions unrelated 
to preservation, examination, interpretation, and/or testimony regarding physical 
evidence. This includes the following professions: forensic mental health (6); criminal 
profiling (5)54; forensic accounting (2); and forensic sociology (1). Therefore, these cases 
fall outside of the employment parameters established for the present study.
Unproved allegations
6 forensic examiners were alleged to have committed forensic fraud, but those allegations 
had not been sufficiently investigated or they did not hold up to official scrutiny. 
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54 The parameters of the present study required this researcher to exclude five law enforcement experts 
describing themselves generally as behavioral analysts (aka criminal profilers), three of which were 
employed by, or affiliated with, the FBI. Three of these five falsified their credentials in professional 
resumes and subsequent expert testimony; one of them falsely testified to examining evidence that he had 
not; one resigned public office amid allegations of wrongdoing; and none have been sanctioned by any 
authority, including those who are active members of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS). 
See: Drake v. Portuondo, (2006) and Turvey (2011) for discussion regarding most of these forensic 
examiners. 
Resolutions included: accused but still under investigation (2); tried in court and 
acquitted (1); accused and expelled from a professional organization, but later reinstated 
and allowed to resign (1); arrested with the charges later dropped (1); and admission to 
error but not fraud, without follow-up investigation (1). Under the circumstances 
described, these cases fall outside of the “decree” parameter established for the present 
study.
The following case examples are representative of those that were excluded from the 
present study:
Howard B. Ollick, Forensic Toxicologist
Independent Forensic Examiner
Howard B. Ollick offered his services as a forensic toxicologist in private 
practice. However, it was eventually revealed by opposing counsel (a prosecutor) 
that his resume contained false and misleading information – including a fake 
PhD. According to Fitzgerald (1998a):
[Prosecutor Tony] Loe noticed a discrepancy between two of Ollick's resumes. In one, 
Ollick wrote he had a bachelor of science degree from the school of education at Ohio 
State University; in the other, it was a bachelor of arts from the school of business 
administration at Ohio State.
…Ollick also claimed he had earned a doctorate in organic chemistry from FAU in 1973, 
but the university does not offer that degree. In fact, FAU's registrar found no record of 
his attending the university or receiving a degree there.
In reality, Mr. Ollick was not an expert in forensic toxicology, but rather he was a 
laboratory technician licensed by the Florida Department of Health. Mr. Ollick 
was tried and found guilty of forging his credentials and falsifying his education. 
He was sentenced to prison for 3 years (Fitzgerald, 1998b).
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This case involved a forensic examiner falsifying his credentials in relation to 
both evidence examination and expert testimony regarding the interpretation of 
physical evidence. However, his acts of fraud were committed, revealed, and dealt 
with prior to 2000, placing them outside the scope of the present study. 
Consequently, Mr. Ollick’s years of credential fraud across hundreds of cases was 
excluded from the present data set.
 Diploma Fraud
Washington State Patrol
In March of 2008, Dixie E. Randock, 59, Steven K. Randock Sr., 67, and their 
daughter, Heidi K. Lorhan, 39 of Spokane, Washington pleaded guilty to 
conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud. They admitted to jointly creating a 
string of at least 127 fictional educational institutions out of their home. Over a 
period of ten years they sold more than 8000 bogus credentials to “students” all 
over the world from any one of their diploma mills with names such as “Saint 
Regis University” and “Robertstown University”. As detailed in Morlin (2008):
At least 300 of the buyers worked for the federal government, including in positions in 
the Justice Department, the State Department, various military branches and even the 
White House, it has been disclosed in previous court hearings.
The only publicly announced criminal prosecution of a purchaser involves a former 
deputy U.S. marshal supervisor who worked in Spokane and bought a degree from Saint 
Regis. He pleaded guilty to lying on a promotion application and awaits sentencing.
The discoveries in this case lead to an audit of the rank and file in the Washington 
State Patrol  (WSP), to check for fraud with respect to claims of academic 
achievement in higher education. Like many law enforcement agencies, the WSP 
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offers promotions and pay raises based in part on educational accomplishments. 
As a result of the audit, nine WSP officers were placed on leave under accusations 
of fraud for having purchased falsified diplomas in order to get increased pay and 
inevitably enhance courtroom testimony (Sullivan, 2008)55. Ultimately, none of 
those officers were charged with crimes or terminated – unlike the U.S. Marshal 
described above.
This incident involved multiple instances of credential fraud by multiple law 
enforcement officers during the timeframe set for the present study. However, 
these officers were not assigned primarily as forensic personnel and the fraud did 
not involve or impact physical evidence examination. Consequently, these cases 
were excluded from the present data set.
Miguel Rivera, Latent Print Examiner
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
Scientific Investigation Division, Latent Print Unit (LPU)
During 2007-2008, the LAPD’s LPU was involved in a fingerprint 
misidentification scandal resulting in multiple overturned cases, the termination of 
one examiner, the suspension of three others, and the replacement of two 
supervisors  (Rubin and Winton, 2008; Winton, 2009)56. The subsequent 
investigation of the LPU by the LAPD’s Audit Division revealed that “Erroneous 
identifications pose and immediate and extensive risk, liability, and exposure to 
the department”; “Quality assurance processes are insufficient and require 
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55 Diploma mills commonly target government employees, especially those in law enforcement, offering 
classroom credit for life experience. It is well known within the law enforcement community that 
presenting this kind of college diploma as evidence of having completed a higher education requirement is 
tantamount to fraud. However, the practice is so widespread within the higher ranks that it often goes 
uninvestigated or unpunished. 
56 The LAPD’s Latent Print Unit employs almost 80 civilian examiners (Rubin and Winton, 2008).
immediate improvement”; and that “Morale and the professionalism of the LPU 
and LPU staff need improvement to support and effective working 
environment” (LAPD, 2008; p.5-7). Further inquiry revealed “that errors were 
partly the result of the unit's being marred by inadequate training, antiquated 
facilities, poor supervision, careless handling of evidence and other 
shortfalls” (Winton, 2009). Though the LAPD was clearly responsible for 
recklessly creating an environment where the mandates of good science were 
largely ignored, there was no clear evidence of examiner fraud – only systemic 
incompetence, ineptitude, and apathy.
In 2009, Miguel Rivera, one of the LAPD’s highest-ranking latent print 
examiners, and a Unit supervisor, was charged with sexual assault (Rubin and 
Winton, 2009). This case involved criminal activity by a forensic examiner during 
the timeframe established for the present research. However, his crimes were not 
known to be related to his work as a latent print examiner, and were not known to 
involve acts that fit the definition of forensic fraud. 
Consequently, given the absence of specific instances of forensic fraud  in either 
of these related scandals (only ignorance, incompetence, and criminality), the data 
from these cases were properly excluded from the present study.
Larry Stewart, Forensic Scientist
Secret Service Forensic Services Laboratory
In 2004, Martha Stewart was put on trial for conspiracy, obstruction and making 
false statements regarding the illegal sale of some of stocks. She was convicted of 
multiple counts. Larry Stewart (no relation to Martha), a forensic scientist with 
the Secret Service Forensic Services Laboratory, and a witness for the prosecution 
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against Martha Stewart, was accused of multiple counts of perjury related to his 
expert testimony regarding ink analysis that had been performed (Smilon, Hadad, 
and Gaffney, 2004). He was put on trial and ultimately acquitted of those charges 
(McClam, 2004).
This case involved a forensic examiner accused of giving false testimony related 
to his examination of physical evidence, and put on trial for perjury, during the 
time interval of interest in the present study. However, a federal jury acquitted him 
at trial; the criminal allegations against him were ultimately unproved. 
Consequently, and out of an abundance of caution, this forensic examiner was 
excluded from the present data set.
Kevin Reed, Firearms & Tool Marks Examiner
Detroit Police Department, Forensic Services Laboratory
Police officer Kevin Reed was the coauthor of “a firearms evidence report in the 
case that ultimately led to the closure of the department's crime lab” (Schmitt, 
2009). An employee of the crime laboratory, Mr. Reed gave conflicting testimony 
regarding tests that were supposed to have been run on multiple shell casings 
before a conclusion could be reached as to their origin. As reported in Schmitt 
(2009):
At one point, Reed said he helped work on a June 6, 2007, report by his colleague Officer 
Tenisha Bridgewater. The report found that all the casings came from the same weapon in 
the May 27, 2007, killings of Detroiters DeAngelo Savage, 33, and Tommy Haney, 38. 
That was later found inaccurate.
An audit of the Detroit Police Department crime laboratory by the Michigan State 
Police found that 10% of the firearms examinations contained “significant 
errors” (MSP, 2008; p.3), as well as 42% rate of non-compliance with laboratory 
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practice standards (far below the 100% compliance requirement). It also 
determined that the cost of a 10% lab error rate was not only unacceptable, but 
that it had a serious impact on the justice system (p.3):
In total, this equates to approximately 10% of the completed firearms cases having 
significant errors. On average, the DPD firearms unit analyzes 1,800 cases per year. If 
this 10% error rate holds, the negative impact on the judicial system would be substantial, 
with a strong likelihood of wrongful convictions and a valid concern about numerous 
appeals.
High-ranking officers agreed that the Detroit Police Department crime laboratory 
suffered from “numerous errors made by multiple examiners”, and that the errors 
found at the lab were “indicative of a systemic problem” (Patton, 2008). 
Consequently, the Detroit Police Department closed its entire crime lab and had it 
condemned. 
While employees and supervisors from the shuttered lab claimed that physical 
evidence had been properly secured and shipped elsewhere for analysis or storage, 
the reality was different. An investigative effort by local journalists revealed 
(Neavling, Ashenfelter, and Damron, 2011): “Thousands of rounds of live 
ammunition, sealed evidence kits and case files -- some containing Social 
Security numbers of rape and assault victims -- lay amid rubble in a crime lab 
abandoned by Detroit police two years ago.” Eventually, the Detroit Police 
conceded that this was true and reportedly went to work remedying the situation.
This case involved at least one forensic examiner that gave inconsistent testimony  
in a multiple murder trail. However, it is unclear from the record whether that 
testimony was a result of incompetence or intentional deception. As forensic fraud 
was not established with certainty, and there is no evidence of sanction or 
termination, this forensic examiner was excluded from the present data set.
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The present study also excludes cases where non-forensic evidence related law 
enforcement personnel were found to have in engaged in fraud related to the physical 
evidence. Typical cases encountered by this researcher included police officers or jail 
officers stealing cash/drugs, tampering with physical evidence, and planting physical 
evidence57. These cases did not involve forensic examiners, and therefore did not meet 
the initial threshold for potential viability. They were also not counted as part of the 
original 170 potentially viable cases identified. 
The only police officers included in the present dataset were those employed by or 
affiliated with a law enforcement crime laboratory, and those whose primary duties were 
related to the collection, preservation, and testing of forensic evidence. This includes 
evidence technicians and crime scene investigators. These professionals, with varying 
levels of scientific education, hold a broad range of forensic responsibilities related to the 
processing and presumptive field-testing of physical evidence. In many cases, they are 
called to testify in court and offer what can only be described as expert scientific 
testimony regarding how physical evidence is collected, preserved, and examined. This is 
often given as a prelude to opinion testimony regarding of the results of presumptive field 
tests for drugs or biological evidence.
Variables and Frequency Results
Variables were extracted from the final sample (n=100) and assigned to one of four 
categories: employee, employer, evidence, and impact.
Employee Variables
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57 In recent years, there has been a steady stream of major law enforcement scandals involving conspiracies 
by multiple members of different police units to “flake”, or plant, drug evidence on innocent suspects for 
financial incentives, including departments in Brooklyn (Yaniv, 2011); Dallas (Emily, 2009); Oakland, 
(Lee, 2009); and St. Louis (Patrick, 2009).
Employee variables are comprised of traits specific to the forensic examiner. This 
includes examiner education, general job description, supervisory status, history of fraud, 
history of criminality, history of addiction, and their general approach to fraud. 
Examiner education was divided into four weighted categories, from those with zero 
higher education to those with a graduate level science background (MS or PhD). 
Frequency results for this variable are as follows: ED058: n=36; ED159: n=12; ED260: 
n=26; and ED361: n=26. See Chart 8.1 – “Examiner Science Education”.
The largest individual education category is comprised of those forensic examiners with 
no formal higher education of any kind (ED0; 36%). However, if we combine forensic 
examiners holding an undergraduate education in the sciences (ED2; 26%) with those 
holding a graduate level education in the sciences (ED3; 26%), this becomes the majority 
group by a narrow margin (n=52, or 52%). More significant, however, is that if we 
compare all forensic examiners holding no formal higher education in the sciences (ED0 
+ ED1 = 48%) with all forensic examiners that do (ED2 + ED3 = 52%), the 
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58 Zero college education.
59 Undergraduate education, non-science.
60 Undergraduate education, science oriented.
61 Graduate level education, science oriented.
representation all but evens out. This begins to suggest that higher education in the 
sciences, by itself, may not be a significant variable in relation to forensic fraud in 
general62. 
Forensic examiners were assigned to only one of five general job descriptions: laboratory 
criminalist (JLAB); technician (JTEC); law enforcement examiner (JLEX); medicolegal 
examiner (JMED); and digital evidence examiner (JDIG). Then they were also classified 
regarding their supervisory status (JSUP), with the notion that supervisors might have 
more access, privacy and therefore opportunities to commit fraud. Frequency results for 
job description variables are as follows: JLAB63: n=53; JMED64: n=23; JTEC65: n=15; 
JLEX66: n=7; JDIG67: n=2; and JSUP68: n=56. See Chart 8.2 – “Examiner Job 
Description” for detail excluding the JSUP variable.
The largest individual category by job description is comprised of those forensic 
examiners who work in a crime laboratory of some kind (J-LAB; 53%). This is followed 
distantly by those forensic examiners who work in the medicolegal professions (J-MED; 
23%). Those forensic examiners working directly for law enforcement agencies and not 
affiliated with a crime laboratory (J-TEC and J-LEX) could be combined to make a single 
group. However, they would still rank the same with respect to overall frequency. The 
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62 For discussion, see Chapter 9: Multivariate Analysis: Results and Discussion.
63 Laboratory criminalists.
64 Forensic pathologists, coroners, forensic nurses, and medicolegal death investigators.
65 Police technicians with evidence collection, preservation, testing, and reporting duties (e.g., crime scene 
technicians and evidence technicians).
66 Police officers or employees, unaffiliated with a crime lab or crime scene unit, who have come to be 
relied upon as experts in evidence examination and/or interpretation (e.g., officers with arson or drug 
sniffing canines, narcotics officers, and some police bloodstain experts).
67 Experts in the interpretation of digital evidence, including computer hard drives and any related digital 
files.
68 Examiners acting in a supervisory capacity, either as a Unit Manager or Laboratory Manager of some 
kind.
smallest category, by a wide margin, is comprised of those examiners who work with 
digital evidence (J-DIG: 2%). 
While sheer frequency suggests that being a supervisor may not be a significant variable, 
by itself, in relation to forensic fraud (JSUP; 53%), it is difficult to speculate regarding 
the potential meaning of the other job description variables. They could be a function of 
the ratio of full-time crime laboratory personnel to other full time positions found among 
other employers. They could also be a function of cultural accountability, suggesting that 
forensic fraud is more easily identified in crime laboratories because of the scientific 
nature of the work, procedural transparency, and a higher frequency of audits. As 
discussed in prior chapters, law enforcement culture is more closed, secretive, and 
punitive towards those who speak out, demanding loyalty over honesty. Whichever the 
case may be, correlation with evidence, employer, and outcome variables is required 
before the significance of any of these variables can even be guessed at69.
Before assessing examiner history, it was established whether the forensic fraud in 
question represented an isolated incident or whether it was part of an ongoing pattern of 
fraudulent behavior. Only 18 examiners were found to be involved in isolated incidents of 
fraud. That is to say, 82% of the forensic fraud in this study was determined to be part of 
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69 For discussion, see Chapter 9: Multivariate Analysis: Results and Discussion.
an ongoing pattern of fraud by the examiner, often involving multiple examiners, prior to 
its discovery. This is a significant finding given that, as discussed in previous chapters, 
forensic fraud is routinely an isolated event that can be blamed on “bad apples”. This will 
be discussed further in Chapter 10: Conclusions, in the context of other related findings.
Forensic examiners were assessed for a known a history of addiction (ADDx), a history 
of fraud (FRDx), a history of other criminal convictions (CRMx). Frequency results for 
examiner history variables are as follows: ADDx: n=23; FRDx: n=21; and CRMx: n=17. 
Some examiners fell into more than one category. See Chart 8.3 – “Examiner History”.
The frequency with which these variables occur, separately and in concert, suggest that 
they may be significant in relation to forensic fraud – and may also hint at direct 
preventative measures70.
Adapted from, and consistent with, typologies provided in Babbage (1830), NAS (2002), 
ORI (2009b), and Turvey (2003), forensic examiners were cross-categorized as having 
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70 For discussion, see Chapter 9: Multivariate Analysis: Results and Discussion.
used one or more of three general approaches to committing fraud, referred to as: 
Simulators71, Dissemblers72, and Pseudoexperts73.
Simulators are those examiners who physically manipulate physical evidence or related 
forensic testing. This means that they physically fabricate, tamper with, or destroy 
evidence. As the name suggests, they are trying to create the appearance that something 
happened when it didn’t, or create the appearance that nothing happened at all when in 
fact it did. This approach to fraud also describes those examiners engaging in evidence 
suppression by concealing its existence (e.g., hide it in a desk drawer, hide it on the 
evidence shelf, remove it from the evidence log).
Dissemblers are those examiners who exaggerate, embellish, lie about, or otherwise 
misrepresent findings. They are not tampering with the evidence, they are simply not 
telling the truth about it. Dissemblers exist on a continuum from those who lie outright 
about the significance of examination results to those who intentionally present a biased 
or incomplete view. 
Pseudoexperts are those examiners who fabricate or misrepresent their credentials. They 
are also referred to as fakes, phonies, charlatans, and mountebanks. Pseudoexperts exist 
on a continuum of severity as well, from those with valid credentials who misrepresent a 
credential or an affiliation, to those with no valid credentials at all.
Frequency results for examiner fraud type variables are as follows: Simulators (SIM): 
n=90; Dissemblers (DIS): n=57; and Pseudoexperts (PSE): n=27. See Chart 8.4 – 
“Examiner Approach to Fraud”.
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71  Also referred to as forging (Babbage, 1830) or fabrication (ORI, 2009b).
72 Also referred to as trimming and cooking (Babbage, 183), or falsification (ORI, 2009b).
73 Also referred to as falsifying credentials (ORI, 2009b)
The frequency of these variables evidence that simulators are the most common (90%), 
evidencing that this is the most frequently used approach by fraudulent forensic 
examiners. Pseudoexperts are the least common, yet still proportionately high  (27%), 
evidencing that this approach is found in more than a quarter of all cases of forensic 
fraud. Given this frequency distribution, it is clear that these variables may be significant 
in relation to forensic fraud when correlated with other evidence, employer, and impact 
variables. Correlation with employee, employer, and impact variables is necessary before 
more reliable interpretations can be made 74.
Employer Variables
Employer variables are comprised of traits specific to the agencies and institutions where 
the fraudulent examiners in this study worked. This includes employer independence 
from law enforcement, lab accreditation, and the involvement of an audit. 
Employers were divided into four weighted categories in relation to their independence 
from law enforcement: crime labs within law enforcement agencies (ELAW); public 
crime labs within government agencies (EPUB); private crime labs (EPLI); and self-
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74 For discussion, see Chapter 9: Multivariate Analysis: Results and Discussion.
employed examiners (EIE). Frequency results for these variables are as follows: ELAW: 
76; EPUB: 5; EPLI: 9; and EIE: 8. See Chart 8.5 – “Employers”.
The frequency of these variables evidence that crime labs within law enforcement 
agencies represent the largest of all employer groups (ELAW: 78%). As most crime labs 
are publicly funded (either as part of law enforcement or some other government agency), 
this might not be entirely unexpected. However, the low frequency of other publicly 
funded crime labs initially correlated with fraud in the present sample (5%) suggests that 
crime labs operating within law enforcement agencies might be associated with a 
particular type of fraud. This could in turn suggest that employer independence from law 
enforcement may have a significant relationship to forensic fraud, when correlated with 
other evidence, employer, and impact variables 75. 
Employers were evaluated with respect to whether they were accredited. The primary 
accrediting agency associated with forensic science laboratories is the American Society 
of Crime Lab Directors (ASCLD). Of the employers in the present study, 45% (n=45) 
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75 For discussion, see Chapter 9: Multivariate Analysis: Results and Discussion.
were accredited by ASCLD. No employers were accredited by any other agency. This 
somewhat even frequency distribution suggests that accreditation may not have a 
significant relationship to forensic fraud – however this preliminary inference ultimately 
proves inaccurate in light of multivariate hierarchical regression results76.
Employers were finally evaluated with respect to whether they uncovered the fraudulent 
examiner during an internal investigation or audit. Of the employers in the present study, 
54% (n=54)) discovered the fraudulent examiner during an internal investigation or 
audit. This relatively even frequency distribution suggests that the potential for internal 
investigations and audits may not have a significant relationship to forensic fraud – 
however, again, this preliminary inference ultimately proves inaccurate in light of 
multivariate hierarchical regression results 77.
Evidence Variables
Evidence variables are comprised the different kinds of physical evidence that forensic 
examiners committed fraud in relation to. These evidence types included DNA 
(DNAEV); biological evidence other than DNA (BIOEV); money (CASHEV); chain of 
custody (CHNEV); drug weights or amounts (DRG1EV); drug test results (DRG2EV); 
education, training, and experience (EDEXEV); fingerprint evidence (FNGEV); and 
firearms and ballistics evidence (BALEV). In some cases, forensic examiners committed 
fraud in relation to more than one evidence type. Frequency results for these variables are 
as follows: CHNEV: n=59; EDEXEV: n=30; BIOEV: n=28; DRG1EV: n=24; DRG2EV: 
n=17; DNAEV: n=9; CASHEV: n=8; BALEV: n=5; and FNGEV: n=4. See Chart 8.6 – 
“Frequency of Fraud by Evidence Type”.
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76 For discussion, see Chapter 9: Multivariate Analysis: Results and Discussion.
77 For discussion, see Chapter 9: Multivariate Analysis: Results and Discussion.
The frequencies of these variables demonstrate that chain of custody is the most common 
form of evidence affected by fraudulent examiners (CHNEV; 59%). This was followed a 
distant second by forensic examiners that lied about their credentials (30%). Firearms/
ballistics evidence (BALEV; 5%) and fingerprint evidence (FNGEV; 4%) were the least 
likely to be associated with forensic fraud.
The frequency of these variables evidence are consistent with chain of custody being 
necessarily associated with at least one other form of evidence, causing it to be more 
recurrent than others. The other forms of evidence are generally distributed in such a 
fashion as to suggest that some may also have a somewhat significant relationship to 
forensic fraud. Correlation with employee, employer, and impact variables is necessary 
before more reliable interpretations can be made78.
Impact Variables
Impact variables are comprised of consequences to employees, employers, and to cases 
that have entered in the justice system.
Traits associated with the severity of consequences to forensic examiners were divided 
into weighted categories for analysis. These included, in order of increasing severity, 
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78 For discussion, see Chapter 9: Multivariate Analysis: Results and Discussion.
examiners that were promoted (PROM); retained without consequence or change (RET); 
transferred to a different department (TRAN); encouraged to resign (RES); terminated 
(TERM); held civilly liable in a lawsuit (CIVL); convicted of a crime (CONV); and those 
who committed suicide (SUIC). Frequency results for these variables are as follows: 
PROM: n=1; RET: n=37; TRAN: n=6; RES: n=32; TERM: n=38; CIVL: n=15; CONV: 
n=48; and SUIC: n=2. See Chart 8.7 – “Examiner Consequences”. Note that some 
examiners suffered multiple consequences (e.g., retained and held civilly liable; resigned 
and held civilly liable; resigned and convicted; and terminated and convicted).
The frequencies of these variables begin to suggest that being convicted of a crime, as 
well as having committed forensic fraud is not, by itself, a significantly correlated factor: 
it is just about as likely to occur as not (CONV; 48%). Others variables evidence varying 
levels of significance. Correlation with employee, employer, and evidence variables is 
necessary before more reliable interpretations can be made79.
Employer consequences were assessed by considering the number of cases each was 
required to review (REV) and the number of labs ultimately shut down subsequent to the 
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79 For discussion, see Chapter 9: Multivariate Analysis: Results and Discussion.
discovery of fraud (SHUT - in a few cases, the closure was temporary). Consequences to 
the justice system overall were assessed by additionally considering the number of cases 
that have been overturned to date as a direct consequence of the fraud (OVER). 
Frequency results for these variables are as follows: REV: 42,042; OVER: 5,443; and 
SHUT: 9.
The frequency of these variables evidence a significant impact with respect to expenses 
necessarily related to reviewing cases and hiring/training new employees incurred by 
employers; and a significant impact on the financial cost and credibility to the justice 
system related to cases that must be overturned and perhaps even retried. As the actual 
expense incurred for each case reviewed, overturned, and retried varies widely across 
agencies and jurisdictions, along with the variable costs related to lab closures and 
outsourcing evidence examination, it is not possible to reliably estimate the total impact 
revealed in this study in actual dollars. This is to say nothing of the financial costs related 
to civilly litigating wrongful convictions and the liability that is generally incurred as a 
result – which can result in civil judgments that average around half a million dollars per 
case or more (Bernhard, 2004; not including legal fees and the average cost of $25,000.00 
per year to board a prisoner). This issue would require separate study, but it is safe to 
infer that the actual cost in dollars and credibility would be substantial. 
Summary
Research efforts described in this chapter revealed 170 different forensic examiners 
alleged to have committed fraud in the course of their casework to varying degrees. Of 
these 170 forensic examiners, data from 70 were excluded as they ultimately fell outside 
of research parameters. Variables were extracted from the final sample (n=100), and 
assigned to one of four categories: employee, employer, evidence, and impact. The 
frequencies for some of these variables suggest a potentially significant relationship with 
forensic fraud, while others show little potential significance. 
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Ultimately, these descriptive frequencies provide a shallow first look at the relationships 
that might exist in the present data. They have utility in that they offer preliminary 
inferences about where to look for more significant results. In order to more completely 
and reliably determine the statistical significance of these variables in relation to each 
other, evidence, employer, and impact variables will be correlated using multivariate 
regression analysis in the next chapter.
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Chapter 9 
Multivariate Analysis: Results and Discussion
 “Statistics are like a bikini. What they reveal is suggestive, 
but what they conceal is vital.” 
Aaron Levenstein (1961-1981) 
Prof. Emeritus of Business at Baruch College
This chapter presents the results of multivariate analysis performed on frequency data 
discussed in the previous chapter. As will be demonstrated, those frequency data were 
useful but preliminary. First, the statistical methodology used will be discussed in brief. 
Second, correlation matrices and hierarchical multiple regression analyses will be 
presented and discussed for each of the three dependent variable sets: approach to fraud, 
evidence type, and consequences. Finally, the limitations of these results will be 
considered, as well as immediate recommendations for additional related research. 
Statistical Methods
As mentioned in the previous chapter, variables were extracted from the final sample of 
fraudulent examiners (n=100) and assigned to one of four categories: employee, 
employer, evidence, and impact. For the analyses presented this chapter, the variables in 
these categories were appropriately separated with respect to cause and effect (Feinberg, 
2007). Independent variables (aka, causal or explanatory variables) in this study are those 
associated with examiners and their employers. Dependent variables (aka effect or 
response variables) are those associated with the examiner’s approach to fraud; the 
evidence associated with the approach fraud; and the impact of the fraud on the examiner, 
the employer, or the justice system. 
Independent variables will first be examined using correlation matrices, requiring one 
matrix for each of the three dependent variable sets (approach to fraud, evidence, and 
impact). A correlation matrix provides the statistical correlations between all pairs of data 
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sets. This is the usual first stage for data analysis involving multiple variables. It is 
intended to reveal both anticipated and unanticipated relationships of a statistically 
significant nature. 
Because this research involves multiple independent variables, it was decided that a 
multivariate analysis was the next appropriate step. After consideration was given to the 
data, the final sample size, and the goals of the research, a hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses was used80. Hierarchical multiple regression estimates the statistical 
relationship between a set of independent variables and individual or grouped dependent 
variables (Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken, 2003) 81. By definition, any findings reported 
to have “statistical significance” are unlikely to have occurred by chance – meaning that 
differences are likely the result of test variables causally interacting with each other 
(Aiken and West, 1991). This allows for more reliably informed theorization regarding 
the nature of that interaction, some of which is offered here and is then followed up on in 
Chapter 10: Conclusions.
Correlation Matrices
A correlation matrix provides the statistical correlations between all pairs of data sets – 
summarizing all possible relationships (Grimm and Yarnold, 1995). As explained earlier, 
this reveals both anticipated and unanticipated relationships of a statistically significant 
nature. When the correlation is between the variable and itself, the values are in 
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80 In the early stages of this dissertation, another form of multivariate analysis was considered, referred to 
as Smallest Space Analysis (SSA). However, it was eventually understood that SSA requires researchers to 
make initial assumptions about the distance between variables in order to present them graphically. 
Subsequently, the data from SSA graphs are interpreted based on the distance between variables that are 
presented. In essence, SSA allows the researcher to assume the nature of the distance-relationships that the 
researcher is purporting to reveal, and then to present them as though they are something that has been 
generated via statistical analysis. Therefore, while useful for presenting presumed but untested theoretical 
relationships, SSA does not provide for the discovery of unknown statistical relationships (see generally 
Bloombaum, 1970, Guttman and Greenbaum, 1998, and Kumar and Ryan, 2009). Given that the 
examination of the data in the present study is an exploratory effort, and that a-priori assumptions about the 
relationships between variables must be made when employing SSA, it was decided that presenting data via 
SSA would be premature, if not misleading.
81 While this methodology is not particularly creative, nor should it be, it offers the best hope of revealing 
and exploring the statistical relationships between the variables of known forensic fraud cases.
agreement creating a diagonal consisting of 1s. Correlation matrices are presented in this 
section as follows: Table 9.1 – “Employer and Examiner Variables Correlated with 
Approach to Fraud”; Table 9.2 – “Employer and Examiner Variables Correlated with 
Evidence Type”; and Table 9.3 – “Employer and Examiner Variables Correlated with 
Impact”.
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As indicated in the three correlation matrices provided (Tables 9.1 – 9.3), there are 
multiple employer and examiner variables that are significantly correlated with a number 
of approach, evidence type, and impact variables at the 0.01** and 0.05* level. The 
presence of significant correlations indicates that these variables affect each other in a 
manner that is noteworthy, requiring a more in-depth investigation and discussion82. As 
this is presented in the next section, detailed discussion here would be premature.
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis and Discussion
Hierarchical multiple regression is used to estimate the relationship between a set of 
independent variables and individual or grouped dependent variables (Cohen, Cohen, 
West and Aiken, 2003). It involves a sequence of simultaneously conducted analyses, as 
explained in Grimm and Yarnold (1995; p.52):
The first analysis in the series contains one or more predictors. The next analysis adds one or more 
new predictors to those used in the first analysis. The next analysis adds new predictors to those 
used in the second analysis, and so on. The change in R2 between consecutive analyses in this 
series represents the proportion of variance in the criterion that is shared exclusively with the 
newly added variables. Thus, hierarchical analysis is one way of calculating semipartial 
correlations… 
Hierarchical multiple regression indicates whether a set of independent variables explains 
a percentage of the variance in a dependent variable at a significant level. It can also 
indicate the corresponding predictive importance of independent variables.
Hierarchical multiple regressions are presented in this section as follows: Table 9.4 – 
“Hierarchical multiple regressions of Employer, Job Description and Examiner Variables 
on Approaches to Fraud”; Table 9.5 – “Hierarchical multiple regressions of Employer, 
Job Description and Examiner Variables on Impact of Fraud”; and Table 9.6 – 
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82 Original frequency data were extracted from the final sample of fraudulent examiners (n=100). However,  
10 additional cases were omitted from regression analysis in this chapter due to extreme values on the 
“Cases Reviewed” variable – some in the thousands. These outliers skewed the distribution to such a degree 
that the assumption of normality necessary for regression analysis could not be met. 
“Hierarchical multiple regressions of Employer, Job Description and Examiner Variables 
on Evidence Affected”. Some discussion of results is presented here, and then followed up 
on in Chapter 10: Conclusions.
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of Examiner Approaches to Fraud
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis demonstrates that, in the present sample, sets 
of employer characteristics, examiner characteristics, and situational factors explained a 
statistically significant portion of the variance in examiner approach to fraud (see Table 
9.4). Each statistically significant result is presented and discussed below83:
Dissemblers
Employer characteristics (R2 = .15**), Job Description characteristics (ΔR2 = .17**), and 
Examiner characteristics (ΔR2 = .02**) all accounted for a statistically significant portion 
of the variance found in Dissemblers, F(12,76) = 3.24,  p<.01. Put another way, the 
Employer, Job Description, and Examiner characteristics in the present study resulted in a 
total R2 of .34**, accounting for 34% of all variance found among Dissemblers.
In Step 1 (Employer characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Dissemblers based on Laboratory Accreditation (sr =.38**); significantly more 
Dissemblers were correlated with accredited forensic laboratories. This finding suggests 
that if a forensic laboratory is accredited, fraudulent examiners are significantly more 
likely to exaggerate, embellish, lie about, or otherwise misrepresent findings than to 
falsify credentials or dry-lab their results. 
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83 Though there is undeniable tedium in the repetition of pro forma discussion points throughout this 
chapter, this format is necessary for brevity, clarity, and transparency. This will allow others to more 
capably evaluate these findings for empirical integrity. 
Table 9.4 - Hierarchical Multiple Regressions of Employer, Job Description, and 
Examiner Variables on Approaches to Fraud
   Dissemblers
β (sr)
Pseudoexperts
β (sr)
Simulators
β (sr)
STEP 1 - EMPLOYER
Employer Independence  .10 (.09)  .07 (.06) -.23 (-.21)*
Accredited Lab  .42 (.38)** -.03 (-.03)  .01 (.01)
Internal Audit -.10 (-.09) -.31 (-.28)**  .49 (.44)**
R2 .15** .10** .39**
STEP 2 - JOB DESCRIPTION .15** .10**  .39**
JLAB  .34 (.09) -.74 (-.20)*  .46 (.12)
JTEC -.24 (-.09) -.58 (-.21)*  .29 (.10)
JLEX  .07 (.04) -.07 (-.04) -.04 (-.02)
JMED -.09 (-.03) -.52 (-.17)  .20 (.06)
ΔR2 .17** .10** .
06** 
.06**
STEP 3 - EXAMINER
Isolated Incident -.09 (-.08) -.27 (-.22)* -.03 (-.03)
Scientific Education     .12 (.09) -.23 (-.19)* -.04 (-.03)
History of Addiction -.04 (-.03) -.31 (-.25)**  .17 (.14)
Criminal History  .09 (.07) -.13 (-.10)  .12 (.10)
History of Fraud -.09 (-.08)  .03 (.03)  .07 (.06)
ΔR2 .02** .16** .08**
  Total ΔR2 .34** .36** .53**
Note: N=90. *p<.05, **p<.01, ΔR2 represents the change in the amount of variance in the dependent 
variable accounted for the set of predictors at each step of the regression. Total R2s are not identical to the 
sum of R2 and the changes in R2 due to rounding.
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One way to interpret this finding is to infer that the structure and accountability necessary  
to achieve laboratory accreditation may be effective at preventing the unqualified 
(Pseudoexperts) from gaining employment at accredited labs, and at ensuring that 
physical evidence gets examined without direct tampering from Simulators. In other 
words, that there are some positive and constructive results of laboratory accreditation. 
This is a reasonable interpretation. 
However, this finding also demonstrates that laboratory accreditation does not eliminate 
forensic fraud. In fact, it may be used to infer that laboratory accreditation actually 
encourages forensic examiners to commit a particular kind of fraud – to lie about the 
results of their examinations for fear of committing documented error or failing their 
proficiencies.  As will be discussed later in this chapter, this interpretation is supported by 
findings demonstrating that laboratory accreditation is significantly related to increased 
falsification of only one kind of evidence: DNA.
In Step 2 (Job Description characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Dissemblers based on a combined ΔR2 of .17**, accounting for 17% of all variance found 
among Dissemblers. While the combined ΔR2 is significant, examination of individual 
variables (JLAB, JTEC, JLEX, and JMED) is not revealing. Consequently, Step 2 
variables represent what may be referred to as a pool of variance. That is to say, these 
variables are important as a group in relation to Dissemblers, but it is likely that there is 
insufficient sample size to magnify and reveal which are significant factors on their own. 
Further study is needed to determine which Job Description characteristics are 
significantly correlated with Dissemblers. 
In Step 3 (Examiner characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Dissemblers based on a combined ΔR2 of .02**, accounting for 2% of all variance found 
among Dissemblers. While the combined ΔR2 is significant, examination of individual 
variables (Isolated Incident, Science Education, History of Addiction, Criminal History, 
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and History of Fraud) is not revealing. Consequently, Step 3 variables represent a pool of 
variance. That is to say, these variables are important as a group in relation to 
Dissemblers, but it is likely that there is insufficient sample size to magnify and reveal 
which are significant factors on their own. Further study is needed to determine which 
Examiner characteristics are significantly correlated with Dissemblers.
Pseudoexperts
Employer characteristics (R2 = .10**), Job Description characteristics (ΔR2 = .10**), and 
Examiner characteristics (ΔR2 = .16**) all accounted for a statistically significant portion 
of the variance found in Pseudoexperts, F(12,76) = 4.15,  p<.01. Put another way, the 
Employer, Job Description, and Examiner characteristics in the present study resulted in a 
total R2 of .36**, accounting for 36% of all variance found among Pseudoexperts.
In Step 1 (Employer characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Pseudoexperts based on Internal Audits (sr  = -.28**); in the present sample, significantly  
fewer Pseudoexperts are revealed in association with Internal Audits. This finding may 
suggest that internal audits are not effective at revealing those who falsify their 
credentials – that audits are more often focused on reviewing cases and protocols, and not  
hiring practices or examiner resumes. Alternatively, it may suggest that the kinds of 
forensic laboratories imposing internal audits are less likely to hire examiners with phony 
qualifications in the first place. 
In Step 2 (Job Description characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Pseudoexperts employed as laboratory criminalists (JLAB, sr  = -.20*) and technicians 
(JTEC; sr  = -.21*); in the present sample, those examiners employed as laboratory 
criminalists or technicians are significantly less likely to falsify their credentials. With 
respect to JLAB examiners, this may reflect the reality that laboratory positions require a 
demonstration of knowledge, skill, and ability that are not easily faked; these examiners 
are hired primarily based on the presentation verification of scientific credentials in 
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biology or chemistry. With respect to JTEC examiners, this may reflect the reality that 
police technicians are generally not expected to be educated in the sciences, and 
subsequently rely primarily on training and experience acquired on the job when writing 
reports and giving testimony.  
In Step 3 (Examiner characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Pseudoexperts with respect to Isolated Incidents (sr  = -.22*), Scientific Education (sr  = 
-.19*), and a History of Addiction (sr  = -.25**). In the present sample, Pseudoexperts are 
significantly more likely to engage in prolonged fraud involving multiple instances of 
falsification; they are significantly less likely to have a scientific education; and they are 
significantly less likely to have a history of addiction. Pseudoexperts are significantly 
more likely to have engaged in prolonged fraud involving multiple instances of credential 
falsification due to the time it generally takes to uncover their activity84; also, they tend to 
commit fraud more frequently: each time they apply for a job, a promotion, or testify 
under oath (either by commission or omission). Pseudoexperts are significantly less likely 
to have a scientific education as this tends to be the very type of credential that they are 
falsifying. Though it is not immediately apparent why Pseudoexperts are significantly 
less likely to have a history of addiction, it may have something to do with avoiding 
additional deviant behavior that draws unwanted attention or scrutiny (this is offered as 
one possibility only; further study is necessary to develop a more complete set of possible 
explanations)85.
Simulators
Employer characteristics (R2 = .39**), Job Description characteristics (ΔR2 = .06**), and 
Examiner characteristics (ΔR2 = .08**) all accounted for a statistically significant portion 
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84 Pseudoexperts examined in the present study were generally uncovered by opposing counsel at trial, and 
not by their employers. This reflects a lack of resume checking and verification by some employers. It also 
necessarily results in a subset of fraudsters that will have committed credential fraud multiple times prior to 
discovery.
85 See also Step 3 (Examiner characteristics), under Education and Experience later in this chapter, for a 
discussion of related results.
of the variance found in Simulators, F(12,76) = 7.36,  p<.01. Put another way, the 
Employer, Job Description, and Examiner characteristics in the present study resulted in a 
total R2 of .53**, accounting for 53% of all variance found among Simulators.
In Step 1 (Employer characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Simulators in relation to Employer Independence from law enforcement (sr  = -.21*) and 
Internal Audits (sr  = .44**). In the present sample, Simulators represent the most 
frequent approach to committing forensic fraud (90%)86. Simulators are also significantly  
less likely to be found in association with non-law enforcement employers, and 
significantly more likely to be discovered in association with Internal Audits. 
Simulators are significantly less likely to be found in association with non-law 
enforcement employers. Given that law enforcement employers comprise 78% of our 
sample, this might cause some to argue that law enforcement is over represented, which 
would in turn result in a higher correlation with forensic fraud. However, no other 
approach to fraud is significantly correlated with this variable. This suggests that the 
finding is a not necessarily a function of employer over-representation in the sample. It 
also supports the argument that increased employer independence from law enforcement 
significantly reduces the frequency of Simulators. Conversely, it supports the argument 
that law enforcement affiliation is significantly associated with an increased frequency of 
Simulators. 
Simulators are also significantly more likely to be discovered in association with internal 
audits. It could be argued that this may be a feature of over-representation in the sample 
(SIM=90%).  However, given that internal audits are not significantly associated with 
Dissemblers either way (DIS=57%), this interpretation seems less likely. Rather, it 
appears consistent with the argument that internal audits are most effective at revealing 
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86 As with all approaches to fraud discussed in this section, it must be remembered that these are not 
exclusive categories. Fraudulent examiners often employ multiple approaches.
when physical evidence has been fabricated, tampered with, or destroyed by forensic 
examiners – as discussed previously.  
In Step 2 (Job Description characteristics) statistically significant results are observed for 
Simulators based on a combined ΔR2 of .06**, accounting for 6% of all variance found 
among Simulators. While the combined ΔR2 is significant, examination of individual 
variables (JLAB, JTEC, JLEX, and JMED) is not revealing. Consequently, Step 2 
variables represent what may be referred to as a pool of variance. That is to say, these 
variables are important as a group in relation to Simulators, but it is likely that there is 
insufficient sample size to magnify and reveal which are significant on their own. This is 
consistent with a similar observation made with regard to Dissemblers at Step 2. Further 
study is needed to determine which Job Description characteristics are significantly 
correlated with simulators.
In Step 3 (Examiner characteristics), significant results are observed for Simulators based 
on a combined ΔR2 of .08**, accounting for 8% of all variance found among Simulators. 
While the combined ΔR2 is significant, examination of individual variables (Isolated 
Incident, Science Education, History of Addiction, Criminal History, and History of 
Fraud) is not revealing. Consequently, Step 3 variables represent a pool of variance. That 
is to say, these variables are important as a group in relation to Simulators, but it is likely 
that there is insufficient sample size to magnify and reveal which are significant on their 
own. Further study is needed to determine which Examiner characteristics are 
significantly correlated with Simulators.
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of Fraud Impact
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis demonstrates that some of the sets of 
employer characteristics, examiner characteristics, and situational factors explained a 
significant portion of the variance in the impact of fraud on examiners, employers, and 
209
the justice system (see Table 9.5). Each statistically significant result is presented and 
discussed below:
Severity of Consequences 
Employer characteristics (R2 = .07*), Job Description characteristics (ΔR2 = .06*), and 
Examiner characteristics (ΔR2 = .17**) all accounted for a statistically significant portion 
of the variance found in the Severity of Consequences, F(12,76) = 3.07,  p<.01. Put 
another way, the Employer, Job Description, and Examiner characteristics in the present 
study resulted in a total R2 of .30**, accounting for 30% of all variance found with 
respect to the Severity of Consequences.
In Step 1 (Employer characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Severity of Consequences and Accredited Labs (sr = -.32**); in the present sample, more 
severe consequences to the forensic examiner were associated with non- accredited labs. 
This finding suggests that accredited labs respond to examiner fraud with less severe 
consequences. This may be the result of the accreditation process itself, which requires 
laboratory protocols and guidelines for examiner conduct be clearly preserved in written 
form; that agency responses to misconduct be carefully tiered; and that extreme 
consequences, like termination and criminal charges, be considered last. In unaccredited 
agencies, there exists greater discretion on the part of supervisors to levy sanctions that 
can result in more severe internal and external consequences. Alternatively, accredited 
forensic laboratories may be less likely to impose severe consequences on fraudulent 
examiners for fear of increasing the impact of fraud on supervisor and agency 
reputations, incurring audits, and ultimately harming accreditation.
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Table 9.5 - Hierarchical Multiple Regressions of Employer, Job Description, and 
Examiner Variables on Impact of Fraud
Severity of
Consequences
β (sr)
Cases
Reviewed
β (sr)
Cases
Overturned
β (sr)
Labs
Shut
β (sr)
STEP 1 - EMPLOYER
Employer Independence -.08 (-.07)  .18 (.10) -.02 (-.02)  .08 (.07)
Accredited Lab -.34 (-.32)**  .19 (.17)  .05 (.05)  .21 (.20)
Internal Audit  .14 (.13)  .27 (.24)*  .14 (.12) -.07 (-.07)
R2 .07* .11* .03 .04
STEP 2 - JOB DESCRIPTION
JLAB -.58 (-.16)  .51 (.14)  .03 (.01)  .53 (.14)
JTEC -.17 (-.06)  .08 (.03  .09 (.03)  .13 (.05)
JLEX -.26 (-.13)  .04 (.02) -.01 (-.01)  .05 (.02)
JMED -.35 (-.11)  .03 (.01) -.03 (-.01)  .08 (.03)
ΔR2 .06* .10** .01 .09
STEP 3 - EXAMINER
Isolated Incident -.19 (-.16) -.15 (-.12)  .02 (.02) -.15 (-.12)
Science Education    -.14 (-.11) -.16 (-.12)  .02 (.02) -.15 (-.12)
History of Addiction  .17 (.13)  .09 (.07)  .38 (.31)** -.01 (-.01)
Criminal History  .11 (.08)  .04 (.03)  .00 (.00)  .06 (-.04)
History of Fraud  .08 (.07) -.12 (-.10) -.09 (-.08)  .03 (.02)
ΔR2  .17** .06* .12 .06
   Total ΔR2 .30** .27** ns ns
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ΔR2 represents the change in the amount of variance in the dependent variable 
accounted for the set of predictors at each step of the regression. Total R2s are not identical to the sum of R2 
and the changes in R2 due to rounding. ns = findings not significant.
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In Step 2 (Job Description characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Severity of Consequences based on a combined ΔR2 of .06**, accounting for 6% of all 
variance found related to Severity of Consequences. While the combined ΔR2 is 
significant, examination of individual variables (JLAB, JTEC, JLEX, and JMED) is not 
revealing. Consequently, Step 2 variables represent what may be referred to as a pool of 
variance. That is to say, these variables are important as a group in relation to the severity  
of examiner consequences, but it is likely that there is insufficient sample size to magnify 
and reveal which are significant on their own. Further study is needed to determine which 
Job Description characteristics are significantly correlated with increased or decreased 
Severity of Consequences. 
In Step 3 (Examiner characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Severity of Consequences based on a combined ΔR2 of .17**, accounting for 17% of all 
variance found within this variable set. While the combined ΔR2 is significant, 
examination of individual variables (Isolated Incident, Science Education, History of 
Addiction, Criminal History, and History of Fraud) is not revealing. Consequently, Step 3 
variables represent a pool of variance. That is to say, these variables are important as a 
group in relation to the severity of examiner consequences, but it is likely that there is 
insufficient sample size to magnify and reveal which are significant on their own. Further 
study is needed to determine which Examiner characteristics are significantly correlated 
with increased or decreased Severity of Consequences.
Cases Reviewed
Employer characteristics (R2 = .11*), Job Description characteristics (ΔR2 = .10**), and 
Examiner characteristics (ΔR2 = .06*) all accounted for a statistically significant portion 
of the variance found in the number of Cases Reviewed, F(12,76) = 2.34,  p<.01. Put 
another way, the Employer, Job Description, and Examiner characteristics in the present 
study resulted in a total R2 of .27**, accounting for 27% of all variance found with 
respect to the number of Cases Reviewed.
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In Step 1 (Employer characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Cases Reviewed and Internal Audits (sr =.24**); significantly more cases were reviewed 
by employers that were also conducting internal audits. This finding is expected; given 
that it is the nature of an internal audit to reveal cases that have been, or are in need of, 
review. Those employers not conducting audits are therefore far less likely to identify 
cases that are in need of review for lack of a directed effort.
In Step 2 (Job Description characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Cases Reviewed based on a combined ΔR2 of .10**, accounting for 10% of all variance 
found within this variable. While the combined ΔR2 is significant, examination of 
individual variables (JLAB, JTEC, JLEX, and JMED) is not revealing. Consequently, 
Step 2 variables represent what may be referred to as a pool of variance. That is to say, 
these variables are important as a group in relation to the number of cases reviewed, but it 
is likely that there is insufficient sample size to magnify and reveal which are significant 
on their own. Further study is needed to determine which Job Description characteristics 
are significantly correlated with an increased or decreased number of Cases Reviewed. 
This is consistent with a similar observation made with regard to Severity of 
Consequences at Step 2.
In Step 3 (Examiner characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Cases Reviewed based on a combined ΔR2 of .06*, accounting for 6% of all variance 
found within this variable. While the combined ΔR2 is significant, examination of 
individual variables (Isolated Incident, Science Education, History of Addiction, Criminal 
History, and History of Fraud) is not revealing. Consequently, Step 3 variables represent a 
pool of variance. That is to say, these variables are important as a group in relation to the 
number of cases reviewed, but it is likely that there is insufficient sample size to magnify 
and reveal which are significant on their own. Further study is needed to determine which 
Examiner characteristics are significantly correlated with an increased or decreased 
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number of Cases Reviewed. This is consistent with a similar observation made with 
regard to Severity of Consequences at Step 3.
Cases Overturned
Employer characteristics (R2 = .03), Job Description characteristics (ΔR2 = .01), and 
Examiner characteristics (ΔR2 = .12) did not account for a statistically significant portion 
of the variance found in the number of Cases Overturned, F(12,76) = 1.18, ns. This was 
not entirely unexpected, given that the decision to overturn a case (e.g., dropping criminal 
charges and vacating convictions) is a legal matter, or a judicial response, generally 
external to the authority of the employer or the examiner. 
While the overall model did not account for statistically significant variance with respect 
to the number of cases overturned, History of Addiction (sr =.31**) did (See Table 9.5, 
Step 2). In other words, examiners with a history of addiction were significantly 
correlated with an increased number of overturned cases. This is likely a result of the fact 
that examiners with a history of addiction are also related to a significantly higher 
frequency of cases involving altered drug weights and amounts (DRG1, see Table 9.6). 
Examiners discovered committing acts of fraud, in combination with a history of 
addiction, are more likely to lose overall credibility with the court. Subsequently, 
prosecuting attorneys and judges would be more likely to support overturning cases 
where the findings of such examiners played a role.
Labs Shut
Employer characteristics (R2 = .04), Job Description characteristics (ΔR2 = .09), and 
Examiner characteristics (ΔR2 = .106) did not account for a statistically significant 
portion of the variance found in the number of Labs Shut (aka, laboratory 
closures), F(12,76) = 1.44, ns. This was not entirely unexpected, given that the decision 
to shut down a forensic laboratory, whether temporarily or permanently, is generally 
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external to the authority of those actually working for, or directly supervising, the lab87. 
In some instances, this decision was made by a Chief of Police regarding an internal 
forensic division; in others it was made by an organization such as ASCLD-LAB, which 
suspended or revoked laboratory accreditation resulting in a de facto closure until 
accreditation could be reinstated.
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of Evidence Affected
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis demonstrates that some of the sets of 
employer characteristics, examiner characteristics, and situational factors explained a 
statistically significant portion of the variance in the type of evidence affected by forensic 
fraud (see Table 9.6). Each statistically significant result is presented and discussed 
below:
DNA
Employer characteristics (R2 = .08*) accounted for a statistically significant portion of the 
variance found in the DNA evidence, F(12,76) = 3.39, p<.05. Put another way, the 
Employer characteristics in the present study resulted in a total R2 of .08**, accounting 
for 8% of all variance found with respect to the DNA evidence.
In Step 1 (Employer characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
DNA evidence and Accredited Labs (sr = .26*); accredited forensic laboratories in the 
current sample were more likely to suffer from forensic fraud that involves DNA 
evidence. Consistent with previously discussed findings regarding accreditation being 
significantly associated with Dissemblers, this result may reflect the certainty and finality 
of DNA evidence and its analysis, all of which must be carefully documented. The 
majority of fraud related to DNA involves dry-labbing, concealing error, or cutting 
corners out of laziness or to maintain individual examiner proficiencies – not to help 
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87 In the present sample, the number of laboratory managers coming forth to declare that their own labs 
were so badly managed or so rife with error that they must be closed was zero. And while laboratory 
employees do have the ability to be whistleblowers, they are not in charge of how seriously their allegations 
are taken, or how thoroughly their allegations are investigated.
acquit or convict a particular suspect. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, these results 
may, in concert, be used to support the argument that laboratory accreditation may 
encourage dissembling (aka falsification) of DNA evidence.
Table 9.6: Hierarchical Multiple Regressions of Employer, Job Description, and 
Examiner Variables on Evidence Affected 
DNA
EV
β (sr)
Money
EV
β (sr)
Chain
EV
β (sr)
EDEX
EV
β (sr)
Drug1
EV
β (sr)
Drug2
EV
β (sr)
Bio
EV
β (sr)
STEP 1 - EMPLOYER
Employer 
Independence
-.03 (-.02) -.13 (-.11) -.15 (-.13) .05 (.04) -.23 (-.20) .08 (.07) .06 (.06)
Accredited 
Lab
.28 (.26)* -.41 (-.38)** -.04 (-.04) -.01 (-.01) -.21 (.19) .14 (.13) .13 (.12)
Internal Audit .09 (.08) -.36 (-.32)** .46 (.42) -.44 (-.39)** .26 (.23)* .14 (.13) -.22 (-.20)
R2 .08* .23** .28** .22** .14** .04 .06
STEP 2 - JOB DESCRIPTION
JLAB .10 (.03) -.18 (-.05) .34 (.09) -.67 (-.18) -.21 (-.06) .51 (.14) .52 (.14)
JTEC -.12 (-.04) .01 (.00) .35 (.13) -.52 (-.19)* .32 (.12) .10 (.04) .25 (.09)
JLEX -.04 (-.02) -.10 (-.05) .01 (.00) -.17 (-.09) -.09 (-.05) .02 (.01) .38 (.20)
JMED -.07 (-.02) .11 (.04) .22 (.07) -.38 (-.12) .11 (.03) .03 (.01) .38 (.12)
ΔR2 .03 .05** .05** .06** .16** .10 .06
STEP 3 - EXAMINER
Isolated
Incident
-.05 (-.04) .21 (.17) .03 (.03) -.21 (-.17) -.01 (-.01) -.19 (-.16) -.11 (-.09)
Science
Education
.08 (.06) -.15 (-.12) .00 (.00) -.20 (-.16) .15 (.12) .17 (.14) .12 (.10)
History of
Addiction
-.17 (-.13) -.05 (-.04) .21 (.17) -.24 (-.19)* .61 (.50)** -.06 (-.05) -.24 (-.20)
Criminal
History
.04 (.03) .17 (.13) .12 (.09) -.17 (-.14) .10 (.08) .17 (.13) -.06 (-.05)
History of
Fraud
-.12 (.10) .05 (.04) .05 (.04) .04 (.03) -.02 (-.02) .02 (.01) .01 (.01)
ΔR2 .04 .07** .08** .12** .38** .06 .08
    Total ΔR2 .08* .35** .41** .40** .68** ns ns
Note: *p<.05, p<.01, ΔR2 represents the change in the amount of variance in the dependent variable 
accounted for the set of predictors at each step of the regression. Total R2s are not identical to the sum of R2 
and the changes in R2 due to rounding. ns = findings not significant.
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This is further consistent with no significant variations observed for DNA relative to Job 
Description characteristics (Step 2) and Examiner characteristics (Step 3), suggesting that 
DNA-related fraud is more likely a function of workplace culture. Accredited labs require 
close monitoring of examiner proficiencies, and it is possible that fear of error may 
compel more DNA examiners to commit fraud than others in order to push through high 
volumes of casework and/or maintain their individual certifications and proficiencies 
(this is offered as one possibility only; further study is necessary to develop a more 
complete set of possible explanations).
Money
Employer characteristics (R2 = .23**), Job Description characteristics (ΔR2 = .05**), and 
Examiner characteristics (ΔR2 = .07**) accounted for a statistically significant portion of 
the variance observed in relation to Money related fraud, F(12,76) = 3.28,  p<.01.
In Step 1 (Employer characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Money Evidence in relation to Laboratory Accreditation (sr  = -.38**) and Internal Audits 
(sr  = -.32**). Accredited laboratories experience significantly less forensic fraud related 
to money evidence, and internal audits reveal significantly less forensic fraud related to 
money evidence. These two findings may be related, as laboratory audits are more likely 
to be conducted by laboratories seeking or maintaining accreditation. As an aggregate, 
these findings may suggest that accredited labs (and by extension those that might 
actually audit the evidence) experience less money-related fraud (e.g., theft of money 
from evidence and subsequent misreporting) because of clearer protocols and higher 
examiner accountability. 
In Step 2 (Job Description), statistically significant results are observed for Money 
evidence based on a combined ΔR2 of .05**, accounting for 5% of all variance found 
within this variable. While the combined ΔR2 is significant, examination of individual 
variables (JLAB, JTEC, JLEX, and JMED) is not revealing. Consequently, Step 2 
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variables represent what may be referred to as a pool of variance. That is to say, these 
variables are important as a group in relation to the number of cases reviewed, but it is 
likely that there is insufficient sample size to magnify and reveal which are significant on 
their own. Further study is needed to determine which Job Description characteristics are 
significantly correlated with Money evidence.
In Step 3 (Examiner characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Money evidence based on a combined ΔR2 of .07**, accounting for 7% of all variance 
found within this variable. While the combined ΔR2 is significant, examination of 
individual variables (Isolated Incident, Science Education, History of Addiction, Criminal 
History, and History of Fraud) is not revealing. Consequently, Step 3 variables represent a 
pool of variance. That is to say, these variables are important as a group in relation to 
money related fraud, but it is likely that there is insufficient sample size to magnify and 
reveal which are significant on their own. Further study is needed to determine which 
Examiner characteristics are significantly correlated with Money evidence.
Chain of Custody
Fraud related to Chain of Custody evidence holds statistically significant promise as a 
dependant variable, but revealed little in the current study. Employer characteristics 
(R2 = .28**), Job Description characteristics (ΔR2 = .05**), and Examiner characteristics 
(ΔR2 = .08**) accounted for a significant portion of the variance observed in relation to 
Chain of Custody related fraud, F(12,76) = 3.28,  p<.01.
In Step 1 (Employer characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Chain of Custody evidence based on a combined ΔR2 of .28**, accounting for 28% of all 
variance found within this variable. In Step 2 (Job Description), significant results are 
observed for Chain of Custody evidence based on a combined ΔR2 of .05**, accounting 
for 5% of all variance found within this variable. In Step 3 (Examiner characteristics), 
significant results are observed for Chain of Custody evidence based on a combined ΔR2 
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of .08**, accounting for 8% of all variance found within this variable. Consequently, the 
combined variables in each Step (1-3) represent three separate pools of significant 
variance. However, it is likely that there is insufficient sample size to magnify and reveal 
which are the significant variables within each Step’s pool. Further study is needed to 
determine which Employer, Job Description, and Examiner characteristics are 
significantly correlated with Chain of Custody evidence.
Education and Experience
Employer characteristics (R2 = .22**), Job Description characteristics (ΔR2 = .06**), and 
Examiner characteristics (ΔR2 = .12**) accounted for a statistically significant portion of 
the variance observed in relation to false presentation of Education and 
Experience, F(12,76) = 4.23,  p<.01.
In Step 1 (Employer characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for false 
presentation of Education and Experience in relation to Internal Audits (EDEX EV, sr  = 
-.39**). That is to say, those labs conducting internal audits tend to reveal significantly 
less fraud related to examiner education and experience. This was not unexpected, as 
internal audits are generally focused on specific complaints or concerns with respect to 
casework and protocols, not necessarily examiner qualifications. Credential fraud is 
generally revealed through cross-examination or research by opposing counsel; it is 
largely a surprise to an employer that has not done its own due diligence, and not as a 
function of an internal audit or investigation. This is consistent with previously discussed 
findings related to Pseudoexperts shown in Table 9.4. 
In Step 2 (Job Description), statistically significant results are observed for false 
presentation of Education and Experience in relation to forensic technicians (e.g., 
evidence technicians and crime scene investigators; JTEC, sr  = -.19**). That is to say, 
forensic technicians are significantly less likely to falsify their credentials than those 
serving in other capacities. This is likely related to Step 2 characteristics for 
219
Pseudoexperts (see Table 9.4), reflecting the reality that police technicians are generally 
not expected to be educated in the sciences, and subsequently rely primarily on training 
and experience acquired on the job when writing reports and giving testimony. As a 
consequence, they do not generally experience cultural or work-related pressure to falsify 
or inflate their credentials.
In Step 3 (Examiner characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for false 
presentation of Education and Experience in relation to an examiner History of Addiction 
(sr = -19*). Those engaged in credential fraud are significantly less likely to have a 
history of addiction. This is likely related to Step 3 characteristics for Pseudoexperts (see 
Table 9.4), reflecting the reality those engaging in credential fraud do not tend to engage 
in activity that might draw unwanted attention or cause a review of their work.
Drug1 Evidence
Employer characteristics (R2 = .14**), Job Description characteristics (ΔR2 = .16**), and 
Examiner characteristics (ΔR2 = .38**) accounted for a statistically significant portion of 
the variance observed in relation to false presentation of Drug1 evidence (i.e., falsifying 
drug weights or amounts), F(12,76) = 13.60,  p<.01.
In Step 1 (Employer characteristics), statistically significant results are observed for 
Drug1 evidence in relation to Internal Audits (sr  = .23). That is to say, those employers 
conducting internal audits were significantly more likely to reveal Drug1 related fraud. 
This was expected, as an audit generally involves a physical inventory and retesting of 
evidence; this requires weighing and counting what exists (and finding out what is 
missing). Moreover, it is fairly difficult to physically replace drug evidence without 
committing even more acts of fraud.
In Step 2 (Job Description), statistically significant results are observed for Drug1 
evidence based on a combined ΔR2 of .16**, accounting for 16% of all variance found 
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within this variable. While the combined ΔR2 is significant, examination of individual 
variables (JLAB, JTEC, JLEX, and JMED) is not revealing. Consequently, Step 2 
variables represent what may be referred to as a pool of variance. That is to say, these 
variables are important as a group in relation to Drug1 evidence, but it is likely that there 
is insufficient sample size to magnify and reveal which are significant on their own. 
Further study is needed to determine which Job Description characteristics are 
significantly correlated with Drug1 evidence.
In Step 3 (Examiner characteristics), significant results are observed Drug1 evidence in 
relation to an examiner History of Addiction (sr = 50**). That is to say, those examiners 
engaged in Drug1 fraud were significantly more likely to have a history of addiction. This 
was not unexpected, as the examiners engaged in Drug1 fraud were generally stealing 
drugs from the lab to manage an addiction – though a few were selling them.
Drug2 Evidence
Employer characteristics (R2 = .04), Job Description characteristics (ΔR2 = .10), and 
Examiner characteristics (ΔR2 = .06) did not account for a statistically significant portion 
of the variance observed in relation to false presentation of Drug2 evidence (i.e., 
falsifying drug test results), F(12,76) = 1.61, ns. Given that fraud related to Drug2 
evidence occurs in 17% of all cases in the present sample (n=100), this may suggest that 
Drug2 related fraud exists as a cultural or systemic problem within forensic science 
community, distributed evenly regardless of employer, job description, or employee 
related variables.
Biological Evidence
Employer characteristics (R2 = .06), Job Description characteristics (ΔR2 = .06), and 
Examiner characteristics (ΔR2 = .08) did not account for a statistically significant portion 
of the variance observed in relation to false presentation of non-DNA oriented Biological 
evidence (BioEV; e.g., hair evidence and serological tests), F(12,76) = 1.52, ns. Given 
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that fraud related to non-DNA oriented Biological evidence occurs in 28% of all cases in 
the sample (n=100), this may suggest that BioEv related fraud exists as a cultural or 
systemic problem within forensic science community, distributed evenly regardless of 
employer, job description, or employee related variables.
Immediate Recommendations for Related Research 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses presented in Tables 9.4 – 9.6 revealed 
numerous “pools of variation”, each suggesting immediate recommendations for 
additional related research to determine the nature of potentially significant relationships 
between specific variables examined in the present study88. 
1) In Table 9.4, Job Description characteristics (JLAB, JTEC, JLEX, and JMED) 
combine to account for 17% of all variance among Dissemblers. This evidences 
that one or more are significantly correlated with that particular approach to fraud. 
Further study is required to reveal which. 
2) In Table 9.4, Examiner characteristics (Isolated Incident, Science Education, 
History of Addiction, Criminal History, and History of Fraud) combine to account 
for 2% of all variance found among Dissemblers. This evidences that one or more 
are significantly correlated with that particular approach to fraud. Further study is 
required to reveal which.
3) In Table 9.4, Job Description characteristics (JLAB, JTEC, JLEX, and JMED) 
combine to account for 6% of all variance found among Simulators. This 
evidences that one or more are significantly correlated with that particular 
approach to fraud. Further study is required to reveal which.
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88 Future research suggested by the findings of this study in general are presented in Chapter 10 –
Conclusions.
4) In Table 9.5, Job Description characteristics (JLAB, JTEC, JLEX, and JMED) 
combine to account for 6% of all variance found related to Severity of 
Consequences to the examiner. This evidences that one or more are significantly 
correlated with that particular approach to fraud. Further study is required to 
reveal which.
5) In Table 9.5, Examiner characteristics (Isolated Incident, Science Education, 
History of Addiction, Criminal History, and History of Fraud) combine to account 
for 17% of all variance found related to Severity of Consequences to the 
examiner. This evidences that one or more are significantly correlated with that 
particular approach to fraud. Further study is required to reveal which.
6) In Table 9.5, Job Description characteristics (JLAB, JTEC, JLEX, and JMED) 
combine to account for 10% of all variance found related to Cases Reviewed. This 
evidences that one or more are significantly correlated with that particular 
approach to fraud. Further study is required to reveal which.
7) In Table 9.5, Examiner characteristics (Isolated Incident, Science Education, 
History of Addiction, Criminal History, and History of Fraud) combine to account 
for 6% of all variance found related to Cases Reviewed. This evidences that one 
or more are significantly correlated with that particular approach to fraud. Further 
study is required to reveal which.
8) In Table 9.6, Job Description characteristics (JLAB, JTEC, JLEX, and JMED) 
combine to account for 5% of all variance found related to Money. This evidences 
that one or more are significantly correlated with that particular approach to fraud. 
Further study is required to reveal which.
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9) In Table 9.6, Examiner characteristics (Isolated Incident, Science Education, 
History of Addiction, Criminal History, and History of Fraud) combine to account 
for 7% of all variance found related to Money. This evidences that one or more 
are significantly correlated with that particular approach to fraud. Further study is 
required to reveal which.
10)  In Table 9.6, Employer characteristics (Employer Independence, Accredited Lab, 
and Independent Audit) combine to account for 28% of all variance related to 
Chain of Custody evidence. This evidences that one or more are significantly 
correlated with that particular approach to fraud. Further study is required to 
reveal which.
11) In Table 9.6, Job Description characteristics (JLAB, JTEC, JLEX, and JMED) 
combine to account for 5% of all variance related to Chain of Custody evidence. 
This evidences that one or more are significantly correlated with that particular 
approach to fraud. Further study is required to reveal which.
12)  In Table 9.6, Examiner characteristics (Isolated Incident, Science Education, 
History of Addiction, Criminal History, and History of Fraud) combine to account 
for 8% of all variance related to Chain of Custody evidence. This evidences that 
one or more are significantly correlated with that particular approach to fraud. 
Further study is required to reveal which.
13) In Table 9.6, Job Description characteristics (JLAB, JTEC, JLEX, and JMED) 
combine to account for 16% of all variance related to Drug1 evidence. This 
evidences that one or more are significantly correlated with that particular 
approach to fraud. Further study is required to reveal which.
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Again these research recommendations are those explicitly suggested by the current data, 
in order to gain a greater understanding of the relationships that the current data suggest.
Limitations
The present study is not without important limitations. First, the sample size, while the 
best available representation of known cases of forensic fraud, was small enough to 
conceal the relevance of some significant variables within, referred to as “pools of 
variation” (as already mentioned)89. While several major variables significantly affecting 
forensic fraud were revealed, specific lesser variables will remain hidden until further 
research can be performed with a larger or more focused sample size. Second, while 
statistically significant correlations have been identified between certain examiner, 
employer, evidence, and impact related variables that allow for prediction and even 
potential manipulation, these cannot necessarily be interpreted causally. Further study is 
necessary to develop a more complete set of causal possibilities for the results at hand.
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89 See Chapter 8: Data, Parameters, and Frequency Results, for a discussion regarding the limitations of 
using known data in crime related research.
Chapter 10 
Conclusions
"One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, 
opinion, intention, or law for the purpose of inducing 
another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, 
is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss 
caused him by his unjustifiable reliance 
upon the misrepresentation."
American Law Institute (1965), Vol. 2, p. 55
Forensic fraud is no small problem in for the justice system, as has been demonstrated by 
the research compiled and presented in this thesis. Beyond the conviction of innocent 
defendants, which has been tabulated in part by the published research conducted through 
the Innocence Project, it can destroy careers and create immense financial liability for 
law enforcement agencies, individual examiners, and the municipalities that employ 
them. It also creates incalculable expense for the justice system in general, as mentioned 
in the previous chapter. Forensic fraud is therefore not something to be disregarded, 
minimized, or otherwise ignored. It is a serious problem that requires the close attention 
of any professional community intersecting with the forensic sciences.
To that end, the purpose of this study was to develop a preliminary understanding of 
forensic fraud by examining whether and how cultural factors, workplace conditions, and 
examiner traits interact with each other to make specific types of fraud more or less 
likely. In this final chapter, results presented in previous chapters will be discussed and 
conclusions rendered in consideration of relevant criminological theory. First, the 
significant findings of major importance in the present study will be summarized and 
related to the theses set forth in Chapter 1. Second, reforms suggested in the forensic 
literature prior to the current study will be reviewed and evaluated – including those from 
the NAS Report. Third, specific forensic reforms suggested by the results of the present 
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study will be offered. Finally, future research into the phenomenon of forensic fraud will 
be recommended.
Significant & Relevant Findings: A Summary
In the current study, we began with two central thesis statements. First, that forensic fraud 
tends to be the result of cultural, pathological and systemic causes rather than the narrow 
motives of single individuals, as the circumstances surrounding are allowed to develop 
and persist by those in the immediate forensic environment. Second, that although private 
(e.g. defense) forensic practitioners are routinely characterized as biased or mercenary, 
those working on behalf of the state (e.g., the police and the prosecution) are responsible 
for a substantial amount, if not the majority, of known cases of forensic fraud. The 
research compiled and presented in this study offers both theoretical and empirical 
support for these statements.
Theoretical Support
To demonstrate the validity of these hypotheses, theoretical support was sought from the 
related professional literature. 
In Chapter 2, it was established that occupational fraud is viewed predominately through 
the lens of Fraud Triangle Theory, asserting that it is the result of situational motivation, 
opportunity and rationalization – often tied the individual perception of unfairness or an 
affiliation with a deviant employee sub-group. Some researchers have begun to use Fraud 
Diamond Theory, which adds the element of individual capability. Generally, however, 
the management of employee fraud is considered the responsibility of the employer, who 
is best situated to control the workplace by reducing motivators, opportunities, and 
conditions that can lead to pro-fraud rationalizations. Furthermore, it was established that 
there are no reliable employee variables that are suitable for use as predictors of fraud in 
the workplace: anyone can commit fraud, and those that do cannot be reliably 
distinguished from anyone else. This removes support for focusing exclusively on 
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employee variables when looking for causes or correlations. Consequently, this literature 
provides initial theoretical support for the notion that any form of occupational fraud 
tends to be the result of cultural, pathological and systemic causes – including fraud 
committed by forensic examiners.
In Chapter 3, it was established that the majority of forensic examiners work for law 
enforcement or government agencies, and almost exclusively for the police and 
prosecution. These employment conditions require consideration of both law enforcement 
culture and the mandates of scientific integrity when researching environmental factors 
associated with forensic fraud – given the existence of competing cultural pressures, 
Differential Association Theory, and potential role strain. Consequently, this literature 
lays a foundation for theoretical support of the notion that forensic fraud tends to occur 
on behalf of law enforcement, and that it tends to be the result of cultural, pathological 
and systemic causes. 
In Chapter 4, it was established that law enforcement organizations provide employees 
with the training, opportunity and authority to commit acts of fraud on a variety of levels, 
which requires a high level of personal integrity to evade. It was further established that 
law enforcement culture is often defined by traits that afford the motivations and 
rationalizations for a deviant internal subculture, actively cultivating fraud within its 
ranks. At the same time, law enforcement culture also furnishes otherwise lawful 
members with the skills, incentives, motivations and rationalizations for ignoring, 
protecting, and even publicly defending their unlawful co-workers. These employment 
circumstances and cultural features, in conformity with Differential Association Theory, 
Social Learning Theory, and Role Strain, increase the likelihood that those in law 
enforcement will commit, tolerate, conceal, and even defend acts of overt fraud. Forensic 
examiners being largely employed by law enforcement agencies, this literature provides 
theoretical support for the notion that forensic fraud can be the result of cultural, 
pathological and systemic causes.
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In Chapter 5, it was established that scientific integrity requires honesty, use of the 
scientific method, skepticism, objectivity, transparency, and a host of other well 
established scientific norms. It also prohibits fabrication (aka forging or dry-labbing); 
falsification (aka cooking); suppression of unfavorable results (aka cherry-picking); 
plagiarism; ghost authorship (aka honorary or gift authorship); falsification of scientific 
credentials; and the reckless disregard for practice standards that ensure scientific 
integrity. However, it was established that scientific misconduct (i.e., fraud) remains both 
pervasive and extensive – mandating an employer’s obligation to create a workplace 
environment where scientific practice is encouraged and protected, and fraud is not 
tolerated. As previously explained, Differential Association Theory and Social Learning 
Theory help to explain how the capacity to commit fraud is transmitted within groups and 
remains pervasive. Consequently, this literature provides theoretical support for the 
notion that forensic fraud is primarily the result of cultural, pathological and systemic 
causes that are the responsibility of the employer to manage. 
In Chapter 6, it was established that scientific misconduct is primarily the result of 
institutional failures to uphold scientific values and nurture scientific culture; they are an 
institution’s responsibility to detect, investigate, and correct. More specifically, it was 
established that corrupt individuals cannot be hired, or retained, by any employer without 
some level of institutional negligence, apathy, tolerance, or even encouragement. It is 
therefore inappropriate, and even misleading, to blame forensic fraud solely on bad 
apples. It was also established that the mandates of scientific integrity are incompatible 
with law enforcement values and cultural pressures – making the employment or 
alignment of forensic examiners with law enforcement inappropriate. Though fraud exists 
in the scientific community without the influence of law enforcement culture, the 
imposition of that culture on the requirements of scientific integrity can only make things 
worse, and not better. 
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Empirical Support: Findings in the Current Sample
In Chapter 7, it was established that there is an overall dearth of professional literature 
related to forensic fraud, demonstrating the need for present research effort. However, 
preliminary empirical support for the notion that known instances of forensic fraud 
tend to originate from law enforcement aligned examiners, and that it tends to be the 
result of cultural, pathological and systemic causes, was suggested by the research 
associated with wrongful convictions, as well as a limited descriptive study of forensic 
fraud by Turvey (2003).
Based on the findings in the current sample of data related to fraudulent examiners, there 
is significant empirical support for the thesis statements in this dissertation, summarized 
below90. Additionally, it will be shown that the absence of significant findings for certain 
variables was also relevant.
Frequency Data
In Chapter 8, frequency data for the current study established the following:
Examiner History: 23% (n=23) of the forensic examiners in this study were determined to 
have a history of addiction; 21% (n=21) a history of fraud; and 17% (n=17) a history of 
other criminal convictions. These findings combine to indicate that a large percentage of 
forensic fraud was committed by forensic examiners that were not properly screened by 
employers during the hiring process. Arguably, this kind of history should be an 
employment disqualifier for anyone seeking a career in the criminal justice system 
(CCLRTF, 2009; see Chapter 3 for discussion). That so many forensic examiners in the 
present sample were negligently hired and then retained, despite histories of addiction 
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90 Findings of statistical significance unrelated to the theses of this dissertation are reported in Chapters 8 
and 9, but not discussed here.
and criminal convictions, suggests a lack of due diligence by employers91. Consequently, 
these findings generally point towards the existence of unchecked systemic factors in 
employment culture.
Pseudoexperts: 27% (n=27) of forensic examiners in this study were lying about some or 
all of their education, training, and experience, and subsequently classified as 
Pseudoexperts. That so many forensic examiners in the present sample were negligently 
hired and retained while providing this kind of false information on their resumes, or in 
expert testimony, suggests a further lack of due diligence by employers with respect to 
tracking either. Consequently, these findings generally point towards the existence of 
unchecked systemic factors in employment culture.
Examiner Education: 52% (n=52) of forensic examiners in this study had an 
undergraduate or graduate level science education; and 48% (n=48) had a non-science 
education or no education. This finding suggests, and subsequent Hierarchical Multiple 
Regression Analyses agrees, that having a formal science education is unrelated to almost 
all of the approach, impact, or evidence related variables under examination92. That is to 
say, forensic examiners committing fraud were about as likely to have a formal scientific 
education as not, suggesting that the causes of forensic fraud are not related to current 
scientific education models one way or another. Consequently, this finding supports 
231
91 Far from being a mere value judgment regarding the employability of those with a criminal history or a 
history of addiction, the issue is one of trustworthiness and liability. Bank robbers should not be allowed to 
work at banks; drug addicts should not be allowed to work with drugs; and child molesters should be 
allowed to work with children. To allow otherwise is to invite transgression and liability. More to the point, 
those with a history lying, which is inextricable from criminal conduct and addiction, cannot be trusted to 
give sworn expert testimony in court under oath. Those that are allowed to do so are viewed with disdain by 
any trier of fact. The importance upholding this criterion is often lost on those working outside of or only 
indirectly with the justice system, who may be unaccustomed to having to give their word under penalty of 
perjury. It is, never the less, a matter that the court takes very seriously.
92 With the anticipated exception of increased Scientific Education being significantly correlated with fewer 
Pseudoexperts, as this is the type of credential that the majority of Pseudoexperts are lying about possessing 
– see Chapter 9 for discussion.
focusing on cultural or systemic causes and remedies under the current conditions93.
However, this is not to say that having a science education is completely unrelated to the 
problem of forensic fraud. In some cases, the data revealed examiners possessing no 
science education that committed errors and then attempted to cover them up with acts of 
fraud. The precise nature and frequency of this particular forensic fraud sub-type was not 
explored in the present research, suggesting the need for further study. In any case, this 
comes back to agencies hiring properly qualified scientists in the first place, and creating 
a scientific culture where deficiencies in education and training may be recognized and 
addressed as opposed to ignored.
Supervisory Status: 56% (n=56) of the forensic examiners in this study were determined 
to be working in a supervisory capacity. It was theorized that that supervisors might have 
more access, more privacy, and therefore more opportunities to commit fraud. This 
frequency suggests, and Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses agrees, that 
supervisory status is unrelated to any of the approach, impact, or evidence related 
variables under examination. Those committing forensic fraud were about as likely to be 
supervisors as not. Consequently, this finding generally points away from examiner 
related causes. 
Isolated Incidents: 82% (n=82) of the forensic examiners in this study were determined to 
be involved in an ongoing pattern of fraud, often involving multiple examiners, prior to 
discovery. This finding is an empirical refutation of Bad Apple Theory94 as a primary 
explanation for fraud within the present data. Consequently, this finding generally points 
towards the existence of unchecked systemic factors in employment culture.
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93 Given the variety of scientific educational backgrounds associated with the forensic sciences, and the 
varied hiring policies of different forensic employers, it is not possible to make meaningful 
recommendations regarding forensic science education based on the data gathered in the present study. 
Further study that accounts for this variability as it relates to the phenomenon of forensic fraud is therefore 
recommended.
94 See Chapter 6 for a discussion regarding the theoretical refutation of Bad Apple Theory.
Law Enforcement Labs: 78% (n=78) of the forensic examiners in this study were 
employed directly by law enforcement agencies. The corresponding low frequency of 
other publicly funded (aka government) crime labs initially correlated with fraud in the 
present sample (5%; n=5) begins to suggest that crime labs operating within law 
enforcement agencies might be associated with a particular type of fraud. In any case, this 
finding supports the theory that those working on behalf of the police and the prosecution 
(though not necessarily the government in general) are responsible for a substantial 
amount, if not the majority, of the known cases of forensic fraud.
Examiners Retained: 37% (n=37) of the fraudulent examiners in the present study were 
initially retained by their respective employers without severe consequences despite their 
misconduct; of these, the weightiest involved examiners being reassigned or temporarily 
suspended. This evidences employer negligence, and indifference to scientific integrity, 
as there is no reasonable justification for permanently retaining an examiner that has 
committed forensic fraud. Examiner fraud should result in automatic termination, as the 
examiner can no longer be trusted to give reliable evidence in court and their continued 
employment is a toxic example to other employees. Yet, consistent with law enforcement 
culture in general, there seems to be a tolerance for forensic examiner misconduct by 
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more than 1/3 of the employers in the present study95. Consequently, this finding 
generally points towards the existence of unchecked systemic factors in employment 
culture.
Impact: The actions of the 100 forensic examiners in the present study resulted in the at 
least the following consequences, conservatively: 42,042 cases reviewed for potential by 
forensic laboratory employers; 5,443 criminal cases dismissed or overturned; and 9 
forensic laboratories closed, either temporarily or permanently. In addition, 38% (n=38) 
of fraudulent examiners were terminated, and 32% (n=32) eventually resigned. These 
findings evidence a significant impact with respect to expenses necessarily related to 
reviewing cases and hiring/training new employees incurred by employers; a significant 
impact on the financial cost and credibility to the justice system related to cases that must 
be overturned and perhaps retried; a significant impact on forensic services as laboratory 
caseloads must be shifted due to suspensions, terminations and closures; and a significant 
impact on the financial cost to those individuals, agencies, and governments that incur 
civil liability 96. 
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95 See Chapter 4, the section titled “Internal Tolerance for Criminality”. Relevant to this concern, there is an 
ongoing scandal related to the forensic sciences at a national level involving the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms (B-ATF). Kenneth Melson was pressured to resign from the B-ATF in 2011, after 
serving only two years as its interim Director, for supervisory negligence regarding the infamous “Fast and 
Furious” operation (Serrano, 2011). The details of this affair, involving the illegal sale of guns by those 
working for U.S. law enforcement agencies such as the B-ATF and FBI to drug cartels operating in Mexico, 
are still being investigated and revealed as of the writing of this dissertation. However, it is known that one 
of those guns was an AK-47 used to kill Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry, whose family has recently filed a 
lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Justice and the B-ATF for 25 million dollars. Mr. Melson is a former 
prosecutor, remains a Distinguished Fellow and past President of the American Academy of Forensic 
Sciences (AAFS), and currently serves as a Board Member for the American Society of Crime Laboratory 
Directors-Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD-LAB). Despite being pressured to resign during an 
ongoing investigation by the U.S. Congress into confirmed criminal activity that he supervised and 
sanctioned, Mr. Melson was subsequently appointed as Senior Advisor to the Assistant Attorney General for 
the Office of Legal Policy (OLP), to specialize in forensic science policy issues at the Department of 
Justice. That Mr. Melson remains so prominent a fixture in the forensic science community under these 
circumstances further suggests a community tolerance for criminality and misconduct by those forensic 
science organizations involved (e.g., the AAFS and ASCLD-LAB). It also demonstrates the extent to which 
these organizations are inappropriately aligned with law enforcement agencies and prosecutors over actual 
scientists. 
96 As discussed in Chapter 8, the actual impact in dollars cannot be reliably calculated from the present 
data, and would require separate study.
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses
In Chapter 9, Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses revealed significant correlations 
between employer, job description, and employee variables related to examiner approach, 
the impact of fraud, and evidence affected97:
Employer Independence
Significant correlations regarding Employer Independence, relevant to the theses of this 
dissertation, are as follows (see also discussed provided in Chapter 9):
1. As mentioned, Simulators represent the most frequent approach to committing 
forensic fraud (90%; n=90).
2. Increased employer independence from law enforcement is associated with a 
significantly reduced frequency of Simulators. 
3. Conversely, increased law enforcement dependence (i.e., affiliation) is associated 
with a significantly increased frequency of Simulators.
4. Independence from law enforcement is not associated with a significant increase 
or reduction in the frequency of other approaches to fraud.
These findings provide explicit empirical support for the thesis that those working on 
behalf of the state, specifically the police and the prosecution, are responsible for a 
substantial amount, if not the majority, of known cases of forensic fraud. These findings 
also support the assertion that the culture of law enforcement has a significant and 
potentially corrupting affect on the forensic examiners that it employs.
Laboratory Accreditation
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97 Significant findings unrelated to the thesis statements put forth in this dissertation are not summarized 
here, but are presented and discussed in Chapter 9.
Significant correlations regarding Laboratory Accreditation, relevant to the theses of this 
dissertation, are as follows (see also discussion provided in Chapter 9):
1. If a forensic laboratory is accredited, fraudulent examiners are significantly more 
likely to exaggerate, embellish, lie about, or otherwise misrepresent results. 
2. Laboratory accreditation is significantly correlated to increased falsification of 
only one kind of physical evidence: DNA. 
3. Accredited laboratories are significantly less likely to impose severe 
consequences on fraudulent examiners. 
These findings provide explicit empirical support for the thesis that forensic fraud 
tends to be the result of cultural, pathological and systemic causes rather than the narrow 
motives of single individuals, as the circumstances surrounding it must be allowed to 
develop and persist by those in the immediate forensic environment. 
Internal Audits
Significant correlations regarding Internal Audits, relevant to theses of this dissertation, 
are as follows (see also discussion provided in Chapter 9):
1. Internal Audits are significantly correlated with an increase in the number of cases 
under review – as this is generally the purpose of an audit, this finding was 
expected.
2. Significantly more Simulators are revealed in association with Internal Audits, 
demonstrating their effectiveness with identifying this type of forensic fraud.
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3. Significantly fewer Pseudoexperts, and related Education and Experience fraud, 
are revealed in association with Internal Audits. This may reflect that audits are 
more often focused on reviewing cases and protocols, and not hiring practices or 
examiner resumes. Alternatively, this may suggest that the kinds of forensic 
laboratories imposing internal audits are less likely to hire examiners with phony 
qualifications in the first place. 
4. While Internal Audits are significantly correlated with identifying more Drug1 
evidence related fraud (e.g., weights and amounts), they are significantly 
correlated with identifying fewer cases of fraud related to Money and Biological 
(non-DNA) evidence.
These findings provide explicit empirical support for the thesis that forensic fraud 
tends to be the result of cultural, pathological and systemic causes rather than the narrow 
motives of single individuals, as the circumstances surrounding it must be allowed to 
develop and persist by those in the immediate forensic environment. 
History of Addiction
Significant correlations regarding Examiner History of Addiction, relevant to theses of 
this dissertation, are as follows (see also discussion provided in Chapter 9):
1. Examiners with a history of addiction were significantly correlated with Drug1 
evidence related to fraud (e.g., weights and amounts).
2. Examiners with a history of addiction were significantly correlated with an 
increased number of overturned cases.
A history of addiction is something that can be screened for by an employer both prior to 
and during examiner employment. Therefore, these findings provide explicit empirical 
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support for the thesis that forensic fraud tends to be the result of cultural, pathological 
and systemic causes rather than the narrow motives of single individuals, as the 
circumstances surrounding it must be allowed to develop and persist by those in the 
immediate forensic environment. 
Drug2 and Biological Evidence
There was a noteworthy absence of any significant correlations between the Independent 
variables in this study, and Drug2 and Biological (non-DNA, aka BioEV) evidence 
(detailed discussion provided in Chapter 9; see Table 9.6). This may suggest that Drug2 
and BioEV related fraud exist as cultural or systemic problems within forensic science 
community, distributed evenly regardless of employer, job description, or employee 
related variables. The failure to significantly correlate either of these types of evidence 
suggests empirical support for the thesis that forensic fraud tends to be the result of 
cultural, pathological and systemic causes rather than the narrow motives of single 
individuals 
Pre-NAS Report Reform in the Literature
In Chapter 7 – “Forensic Fraud: A Literature Review”, it was established that the majority  
of research relating to forensic fraud is found primarily in the form of ideographic case 
studies and monographs authored by those from the criminal defense bar. It was also 
found that the few larger empirical research efforts associated with forensic fraud have 
the same origins, indirectly resulting from the examination of forensic science testimony 
in relation to wrongful convictions. It should come as no surprise that this community has 
also suggested a number of corresponding reforms.
Leading up to the NAS Report (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; discussed in the next 
section), many criminal justice reformers have called upon the forensic science 
community to become more scientific – to behave honestly, fairly, and with humility 
towards the evidence. Their research has focused primarily on exposing the lack of 
238
empirical research in the forensic sciences, as well as problems associated with examiner 
bias, general scientific ignorance, and unintentional error, all of which contribute to 
incompetent and overconfident examiner interpretations (e.g., Cole, 2005 and 2006; Dror, 
Charlton, and Peron, 2006; Findley, 2008; Heller, 2006; Murphy, 2007; Peterson and 
Leggett, 2007; and Saks, Risinger, Rosenthal, and Thompson, 2003). Some criminal 
justice reformers, however, have been specific regarding concerns over the issue of 
abusing the forensic sciences, including the problem of examiner fraud (e.g., DiFonzo, 
2005; DiFonzo and Stern, 2007; Giannelli, 1997, 2007; Cooley, 2007a, 2007b; Cooley 
and Oberfield, 2007; and Thornton and Peterson, 2002). While consistently revealing the 
absence of scientific education, empirical research, or even a scientific culture in forensic 
science practice, these and related efforts have also chronicled the lack of forensic parity 
between the defense and the prosecution, while calling for due process from the courts. 
However, some criminal justice reformers have advocated the complete separation of 
forensic science practice from law enforcement oversight and control – arguing that 
science aligned with law enforcement cannot achieve the independence and impartiality 
that scientific practice requires (Chisum and Turvey, 2006; Cooley, 2007b; Giannelli, 
1997, 2007; Kirk and Bradford, 1965; Starrs 1993; and Ungvarsky, 2007). 
The NAS Report: Lack of Science and Error over Fraud
As mentioned in the first Chapter of this dissertation, the National Academy of Science 
Report on forensic science (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; aka, the NAS Report) presents 
the findings of a Congressionally funded system-wide investigation and review of 
forensic science disciplines and crime laboratory practice. It was initiated by the U.S. 
Congress in response to the endless publication of critical legal reviews regarding the bias 
and lack of science in forensic practice; the ongoing occurrence of highly publicized 
forensic frauds, blunders, and crime lab scandals nationwide; and the ever-increasing 
number of DNA exonerations sourced back to flawed or misleading forensic evidence 
documented by groups such as the Innocence Project. The NAS Report represents the 
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first major effort to investigate the forensic science community by actual scientists – and 
to recommend related reforms. 
However, the NAS Report ultimately avoids addressing the issue of forensic fraud 
directly. Instead, it focuses on the issues of scientific integrity and related forensic error. 
It does so by suggesting that developing scientific culture and managing unintentional 
error within the forensic science community are the more common and immediate 
concerns. However, it concedes that there is currently no research to accurately 
demonstrate the rate or scope of either forensic fraud or error. In that spirit, the NAS 
Report provides the following conclusions and suggested reforms:
1. The forensic science community is fragmented and broken, without a single voice 
or purpose; it cannot identify, let alone fix, its own problems. As explained in the 
NAS Report: “The forensic science enterprise lacks the necessary governance 
structure to pull itself up from its current weaknesses. Of the many professional 
societies that serve the enterprise, none is dominant, and none has clearly 
articulated the need for change or presented a vision for accomplishing 
it,” (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; p.16). Nor has the adversarial process been 
adequate to the task. Consequently, the NAS Report recommends that the Federal 
government step in to mandate and manage forensic science reforms – by forming 
a National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS).
2. Forensic science and law enforcement are culturally incompatible, with separate 
missions in the justice system. Therefore, publicly funded crime labs should be 
“independent of or autonomous within law enforcement agencies” (Edwards and 
Gotsonis, 2009; p.184). Specifically the NAS Report recommends that “To 
improve the scientific bases of forensic science examinations and to maximize 
independence from or autonomy within the law enforcement community, 
Congress should authorize and appropriate incentive funds to the National 
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Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) for allocation to state and local jurisdictions 
for the purpose of removing all public forensic laboratories and facilities from the 
administrative control of law enforcement agencies or prosecutors’ 
offices,” (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; p.24). This would result in separate 
administration and separate budgets – so that those working crime labs would 
experience less pressure or constraint from the will of those in law enforcement.
3. The majority of the forensic science community lacks standardized terminology 
and report writing requirements. This results in forensic reporting that is unclear 
and in many cases incomplete. Consequently, the NAS Report recommends that 
standardized terminology and reporting must be developed and mandated through 
the NIFS.
4. Many forensic examiners perform examinations and testify regarding subsequent 
findings with an inappropriately high degree of certainty. The NAS Report 
recommends, “research is needed to address issues of accuracy, reliability, and 
validity in the forensic science disciplines” (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; p.22). 
This because there is an absence of scientific research supporting the accuracy, 
reliability, and validity of many of the forensic sciences (excluding DNA).
5. The NAS Report recommends empirical research into the frequency and nature of 
examiner bias and error, in order to “develop standard operating procedures (that 
will lay the foundation for model protocols) to minimize, to the greatest extent 
reasonably possible, potential bias and sources of human error in forensic 
practice,” (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; p.24). This because there is an overall 
dearth of scientific research into examiner bias and error in forensic practice. 
6. The NAS Report recommends research into the development of  “tools for 
advancing measurement, validation, reliability, information sharing, and 
241
proficiency testing in forensic science and to establish protocols for forensic 
examinations, methods, and practices,” (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; pp.24-25). 
This because there is an overall dearth of scientific research into such tools, owing 
to an overall scientific ignorance that they are necessary in the first place.
7. The NAS Report recommends, “laboratory accreditation and individual 
certification of forensic science professionals should be mandatory, and all 
forensic science professionals should have access to a certification 
process,” (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; p.25). This because laboratory 
accreditation is currently voluntary, and the practice of forensic science does not 
generally require examiner certification. The NAS Report argues that 
accreditation and certification are necessary for levying scientific standards and 
providing professional accountability.
8. The NAS Report recommends that forensic laboratories develop and adopt quality 
assurance and control procedures. It explains that “quality control procedures 
should be designed to identify mistakes, fraud, and bias; confirm the continued 
validity and reliability of standard operating procedures and protocols; ensure that  
best practices are being followed; and correct procedures and protocols that are 
found to need improvement,” (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; p.26). This because 
current quality assurance and control procedures are inconsistently attended or 
entirely absent in the majority of forensic laboratories. This acknowledges that 
mistakes, bias, and fraud are not intentionally screened for, let alone identified 
and managed, in the majority of forensic laboratories. 
9. Currently, there is no uniform code of ethics across forensic science disciplines. 
The NAS Report recommends that the NIFS “should establish a national code of 
ethics for all forensic science disciplines and encourage individual societies to 
incorporate this national code as part of their professional code of ethics. 
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Additionally, NIFS should explore mechanisms of enforcement for those forensic 
scientists who commit serious ethical violations” (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; p.
26). These because existing professional codes of ethics are non-existent, 
inadequate, or selectively enforced within the majority of forensic science 
organizations.
10. In order to practice forensic science competently, the forensic examiners must 
first be educated and trained as scientists. As explained in the NAS Report 
(Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; pp.26-27):
Forensic science examiners need to understand the principles, practices, and contexts of 
scientific methodology, as well as the distinctive features of their specialty. Ideally, 
training should move beyond apprentice-like transmittal of practices to education based 
on scientifically valid principles. In addition to the practical experience and learning 
acquired during an internship, a trainee should acquire rigorous interdisciplinary 
education and training in the scientific areas that constitute the basis for the particular 
forensic discipline and instruction on how to document and report the analysis. A trainee 
also should have working knowledge of basic quantitative calculations, including 
statistics and probability, as needed for the applicable discipline.
This position asserts that the current model of learning on the job from others 
within the broken forensic system, often from those without scientific education 
or training, provides an inadequate foundation for the performance of forensic 
examinations. This position also acknowledges that forensic examinations are 
commonly performed by non-scientists (often wearing a badge), without 
attendance to scientific integrity, and then presented inappropriately in court with 
the aura of scientific legitimacy. 
11. The NAS Report recommends that graduate programs intersecting with the 
forensic sciences be developed and funded, to increase educational opportunities 
for aspiring forensic scientists, provide for continuing education opportunities, 
and nurture a research culture in the forensic science community. Currently, there 
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are many forensic science programs operating out of schools of criminal justice 
aligned with or taught by current and former law enforcement professionals. Such 
models are vocational rather than scholarly. In other words, these programs are 
designed to produce police officers, correctional officers, crime scene technicians, 
or bench criminalists for police crime labs. This is reflected by the types of 
instructors employed—too many are criminal justice practitioners, not objective 
scientists or academic scholars. In this environment, research is not supported, 
funded, or viewed as necessary within forensic science. The NAS report explains 
that (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; p. 230-231):
Many forensic degree programs are found at small colleges or universities with few 
graduate programs in science and where research resources are limited. The lack of 
research funding has discouraged universities in the United States from developing 
research-based forensic degree programs, which leads to limited opportunities to attract 
graduate students into such programs. Only a few universities offer Ph.D.-level education 
and research opportunities in forensic science, and these are chemistry or biology 
programs with a forensic science focus.
Most graduate programs in forensic science are master’s programs, where financial 
support for graduate study is limited. In addition, the lack of research funds means that 
universities are unlikely to develop research programs in forensic science. This lack of 
funding discourages top scientists from exploring the many scientific issues in the 
forensic science disciplines. This has become a vicious cycle during which the lack of 
funding keeps top scientists away and their unavailability discourages funding agencies 
from investing in forensic science research. Traditional funding agencies have never had 
a mission to support forensic science research.
This acknowledges the absence of strong scientific practitioners in the forensic 
sciences, and the need for establishing Ph.D. forensic science programs that 
would both attract them and simultaneously generate quality research. This 
educational model is something that just about every other scientific discipline 
benefits from. 
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12. The NAS Report recommends a complete overhaul of the Medicolegal Death 
Investigation System, from the development of consistent national educational 
requirements for forensic pathologists, to increased funding (e.g., money for 
modernization of facilities and equipment, accreditation efforts, and examiner 
certifications). Currently “requirements for practitioners vary from nothing more 
than age and residency requirements to certification by the American Board of 
Pathology in forensic pathology,” (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; p.28). This 
acknowledges a reality that most criminal justice practitioners are aware of but 
generally choose to ignore: that cause and manner of death determinations are 
often made by ignorant and unqualified personnel, without even the most basic 
understanding of science or forensic science. Yet these practitioners, by virtue of 
job title alone, are afforded the underserved attention and respect of the court.
13. The NAS Report recommends “a new broad-based effort to achieve nationwide 
fingerprint data interoperability,” (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; p.31). As an 
adjunct, it recommends funds for retraining current fingerprint examiners, and 
“training new fingerprint examiners to gain the desired benefits of true 
interoperability.” (p.32). This acknowledges the fact that the documentation and 
interpretation of fingerprint evidence is not sufficiently standardized; that 
fingerprint examiners are inadequately trained; and that fingerprint databases do 
not always communicate with each other effectively (if at all) as a result.
The recommendations of the NAS Report are broad in scope and characterized by 
generally negative observations regarding the current state of the forensic science 
community. They accurately recognize an unhealthy alignment with law enforcement; an 
absence of properly educated scientists; an absence of scientific research into 
methodology, bias, error and fraud; an absence of mechanisms for identifying error and 
fraud; and an absence of consistent practice standards, ethical guidelines, and 
accountability to manage those forensic examiners that would violate the mandates of 
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scientific integrity. Most important to the present research, the NAS Report does not deny 
the problem of forensic fraud. Rather, it is subsumed with recommendations regarding 
bias and error, which are considered of greater immediate concern in the current 
environment of forensic disrepair. 
In general, the NAS Report has enjoyed support in the professional literature that has 
responded, with multi-disciplinary agreement to focus on reducing bias, develop 
scientific education requirements and practice standards, and embrace a research culture 
in the forensic science community (Chisum and Turvey, 2011; Giannelli, 2010; Lentini, 
2009; Mnookin, Cole, Dror, Fisher, Houck, Inman, Kaye, Koehler, Langenburg, Risinger, 
Rudin, Siegel, and Stoney, 2011; and Saks, 2010). However, and despite this professional 
agreement, there is no evidence that the recommendations of the NAS Report are being 
embraced and applied to any significant degree. This is to say that there has been no 
development or funding of a NIFS from which the majority of the recommended reforms 
must flow; law enforcement remains in direct control of the majority of forensic science 
practitioners; and the vast majority of forensic examiners still lack a formal science 
education.
Forensic Reform Suggested by the Current Research
The questions for the present research are whether the recommendations of the NAS 
Report, and the related professional literature, are sufficient to address and manage the 
problem of forensic fraud, and whether there are further specific reforms suggested by the 
empirical findings in the present study.  
The NAS Report appears written in the belief that forensic science can benefit most from 
scientific research, standardization, laboratory accreditation, and examiner certification. It 
suggests that by teaching scientific values to practitioners, and providing them with clear 
scientific guidelines, that bias, fraud, and error can be reduced.  It seems, in essence, to 
suggest that the majority of those employing forensic examiners, as well as those 
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performing forensic examinations, have generally honest (though often uninformed and 
misguided) intentions. The present research offers no reason to doubt this.
However, making rules does not ensure that they will always be followed – only that it 
will be clear to all when they have been broken, and that the consequences can be 
prescribed in advance. Consequently, the recommendations of the NAS Report do not 
specifically address how forensic fraud, necessarily involving forensic examiners with the 
worst intentions, is best identified and managed. Though they do suggest that it can and 
should be.
Institutional Hiring and Retention Policies
The present research findings indicate that forensic fraud might be significantly curtailed 
by the development of more rigorous hiring and retention practices. This includes the 
following, which are not standard for many employers of forensic examiners:
Scientific education requirement: In comportment with the NAS Report, forensic 
examiners must have at least an undergraduate scientific education. This would assist 
with the employer’s obligation to screen for Pseudoexperts and promote a culture that 
embraces scientific integrity. It could also potentially help to reduce the kinds of 
scientific errors that some examiners feel the need to conceal with fraudulent behavior. 
Resume verification: Forensic employers must engage in a comprehensive vetting process 
prior to hiring any new personnel. This must include the verification of every aspect of 
the prospective employees resume, from acquiring official college transcripts and 
reviewing educational qualifications, to direct verification of any certifications and 
publications. Employee retention must also be dependent upon verification of any 
updates to employee resumes. The employer has a duty to keep and maintain 
documentation regarding the verification of each item on an employee’s resume, to 
enable production upon request as part of any timely discovery package before trial (aka, 
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Brady material, Brady package). Again, this would assist with the employer’s obligation 
to screen for Pseudoexperts and promote a culture that embraces scientific integrity.
Criminal background check: Prior to hiring any new personnel, applicants must be 
required to submit to a thorough criminal background investigation – in and out of state. 
This must be done to screen candidates for disqualifiers, such as those who are on parole, 
those who are convicted felons, and those with a history of disqualifying misdemeanors 
(e.g., theft, domestic violence conviction, drug related convictions, and fraud related 
convictions). This would assist with the employer’s obligation to screen for those with a 
history of criminality, and promote a culture that embraces scientific integrity.
Medical and Mental Health history: Prior to hiring any new personnel, applicants must 
be required to submit to a medical and mental health evaluation, to screen for those with a 
history of mental disturbance (and related medication), substance abuse, and addiction. 
This is common practice for many high security companies and law enforcement 
agencies. Once hired, it can be extremely difficult to terminate an employee with a 
previously unacknowledged mental health or substance abuse problem. For what should 
be obvious reasons, such individuals should not be trusted with the custody of physical 
evidence that can include controlled substances, nor should they be relied upon to 
perform forensic examinations and give expert testimony under oath. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, this is one of the most significant issues revealed in association with 
forensic fraud by the present study. This would assist with the employer’s obligation to 
screen for those with a history of addiction, and promote a culture that embraces 
scientific integrity.
Mandatory Drug Testing: Employers should adopt a zero tolerance policy with respect to 
substance abuse, and require all employees to refrain from illegal drug use as part of their 
employment contracts. As an adjunct, employers should require all forensic examiners to 
submit to random on the spot drug testing without pre-notification of any kind. Again, 
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this is one of the most significant issues revealed in association with forensic fraud by the 
present study. This would assist with the employer’s obligation to screen for those with 
addiction problems, and promote a culture that embraces scientific integrity.
Criminalizing expert resume fraud: Currently, it is not necessarily illegal for an expert to 
commit resume fraud (See Chapter 1, discussion regarding perjury). Nor does resume 
fraud necessarily result in the termination of an employee or their expulsion from a 
professional organization. Criminalizing expert resume fraud would create a powerful 
disincentive to provide false information on one’s expert resume. It would also furnish 
employers and professional organizations with a powerful tool for expelling those 
without professional integrity.
Reforms to Institutional Culture 
The present research findings indicate that forensic fraud might be significantly curtailed 
by the development of specific reforms within institutional cultural. This includes the 
following, which are not standard for many employers of forensic examiners: 
Forensic Autonomy: In comportment with the NAS Report, forensic science examinations 
must be separated from law enforcement alignment, administration and oversight. This 
given the cultural conflicts discussed previously, and that institutional independence from 
law enforcement is correlated with a significantly reduced frequency of Simulators.
Such an arrangement does not necessarily mean privatizing forensic science. It could 
simply mean passing legislation to separate all the existing government forensic 
laboratory systems from law enforcement budgets, oversight, and chains of command. 
Related policy and legislation should preclude anyone working for any law enforcement 
agency from serving in the capacity as a forensic examiner, or from supervising anyone 
that is a forensic examiner: such work should be the sole province of trained scientists, 
given the many conflicts of interest between law enforcement and scientific culture 
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already discussed.
This should be done despite the costs that will be associated, given the financial liabilities 
of forensic fraud that have already been established related to the cases in this study. With 
respect to additional government costs, this could necessitate the building and 
maintenance of separate and up to date facilities that are often mandated as part of 
accreditation requirements anyway. With respect to free market or chain of custody 
concerns, it should be noted that many government funded forensic laboratories already 
sub-contract to private companies for the examinations that they do not provide, or when 
there is a backlog (e.g., DNA analysis, toxicological analysis, and blood alcohol testing).
Transparency: In general comportment with the NAS Report, forensic examiners and 
employers must embrace the concept of complete scientific transparency with respect to 
all methods and findings. Ideally, this would include transparency with respect to any 
evidence in custody, examinations and related results, and any prior examiner testimony, 
resumes, certifications, and proficiencies – all of which employers have a responsibility 
to collect, store, and maintain to enable production upon request as part of any timely 
discovery package before trial. In short, federal legislation should be passed making all 
documents and communications generated by any forensic laboratory a public record – to 
end any lack of compliance with evidence discovery and admissibility rulings held by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland (1963) and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts 
(2009). This requirement would help reduce and reveal Pseudoexperts and Dissemblers.
Accreditation: The NAS Report recommends laboratory accreditation as one of several 
measures necessary to achieve and maintain scientific accountability. However, as 
discussed, laboratory accreditation is not significantly correlated with any decreases in 
forensic fraud. In fact, the opposite is observed in the present findings. Laboratory 
accreditation is significantly correlated with an increased frequency of Dissemblers and 
DNA related fraud, as well as being significantly correlated with decreased severity in 
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examiner consequences. Ultimately, the results of the present study can only be used to 
suggest that present laboratory accreditation efforts may actually do more harm than good 
when it comes to the specific problem of forensic fraud98. Given the cost that is 
associated with laboratory accreditation, and the cachet that it is used to imply, this 
finding raises questions about its overall efficacy.
Mandatory Comprehensive Independent Audits: In general comportment with the NAS 
Report, employers should submit themselves, and their employees, to comprehensive 
audits from independent external non-law enforcement organizations. As discussed, many 
audits are conducted in response to case specific complaints, and are therefore goal 
oriented as opposed to being all-inclusive. Specifically, they are associated with a 
significantly increased frequency of fraud cases related to drug weights and amounts. 
However, they tend to be associated with revealing significantly fewer Pseudoexperts, 
significantly fewer cases of money related fraud, and significantly fewer cases of 
biological evidence (non-DNA) related fraud. This means that the majority of forensic 
fraud is discovered by other mechanisms – such as complaints from co-workers or cross-
examination by opposing counsel. Comprehensive audits, involving the spontaneous 
independent review of forensic examination results, physical evidence inventories, 
examiner resumes and any related testimony could help identify both fraud and error 
earlier in the process, reducing any damaging effects. They would also help to better 
preserve institutional reputations relating to scientific integrity, allowing the justice 
system to correctly perceive that forensic fraud is being identified and managed due to 
institutional efforts, rather than as the result of legal review or whistleblowers.
Zero tolerance for fraud: Forensic employers, professional organizations, and employees 
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98 One could argue that laboratory accreditation is not intended to address the issue of forensic fraud, but 
rather it is intended to reduce examiner error and increase overall accountability within the forensic 
community, and this would be fair comment. However, there is no research to suggest that accredited 
forensic laboratories experience less error than unaccredited forensic laboratories. Consequently, any 
assertions about the effectiveness of accreditation with respect to reducing examiner error and increasing 
accountability are not based on anything that has been empirically verified.
have an obligation to adopt a zero tolerance policy with respect to forensic fraud. 
Currently, this is not the case: forensic employers often retain fraudulent examiners; 
ASCLD-LAB rarely revokes the accreditation of labs employing fraudulent examiners99; 
forensic science organizations such as the American Academy of Forensic Sciences 
(AAFS) infrequently expel fraudulent examiners100; and, mentioned in previous chapters, 
whistleblowers are often punished by employers when the law is meant to protect them. 
This collective unwillingness to act when action is required supports the findings of the 
NAS Report (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009), which found that some law enforcement 
agencies are (p.18): “too wedded to the current “fragmented” forensic science 
community, which is deficient in too many respects”; and that the forensic science 
community as disjointed, and (p.16): “lacks the necessary governance structure to pull 
itself up from its current weaknesses”. This general inaction creates an environment of 
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99ASCLD-LAB generally prefers not to suspend or revoke laboratory accreditation. This was explained by 
then Chair Don Wyckoff when defending the decision not to suspend the accreditation of the FBI crime lab 
subsequent to the Brandon Mayfield scandal, which admittedly involved a systemic problem with the way 
the fingerprint examinations were being performed at the time (Wycoff, 2005; p.39): 
The suspension of a laboratory’s accreditation, without complete review of facts, does little to support a 
laboratory that must immediately deal with QA issues and, in fact, shows that ASCLD/LAB really does not 
abide with its stated objective of trying to improve the quality of service to the criminal justice system. Had 
ASCLD/LAB’s first response been to suspend accreditation, the right to due process would have been 
violated.
…Because the ASCLD/LAB accreditation program is voluntary and our goal is to encourage every forensic 
laboratory to subject its operation to the scrutiny of accreditation, the process discussed above is routinely 
carried out in a confidential manner.
It is relevant to note that despite numerous such scandals over the past decade, the FBI crime lab has never 
had its ASCLD-LAB accreditation suspended or revoked. As Mr. Wyckoff explains, the mission of 
ASCLD-LAB is to “support a laboratory” through voluntary accreditation (presumably, the logic is that if 
labs fear losing accreditation, they are less likely to pay the costs associated with achieving and maintaining 
it). This is not to say that suspension or revocation never happens, but that it is rare when forensic fraud is 
concerned. Ultimately, this researcher finds it difficult to agree that the forensic science community is best 
served by the continued accreditation of forensic laboratories with systemic problems.
100 The present research effort identified only a single case involving a professional forensic science 
organization permanently censuring a forensic examiner for false or misleading testimony in the public 
domain within the established parameters – Dougherty v. Haag et al. (2008), involving the Association of 
Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners (AFTE). However, numerous cases were identified involving fraudulent 
examiners that remained members in good standing within their respective professional organizations, most 
commonly the AAFS. It is worth noting that the AAFS, in a 2004 memo from then President Ronald Singer,  
responding to an ethics complaint against a law enforcement bloodstain expert where no action was taken, 
has conceded, “under our current Bylaws, it is not unethical to be ignorant,” (Singer, 2004). The fallacies 
inherent in this position are discussed at length in Cooley (2011). Also, given that professional organization 
membership data was not available for many of the forensic examiners included in the study, this variable 
was not examined - though perhaps it should in the future. 
tolerance for fraud within the forensic science community. 
A series of related remedies are necessary to help begin to alleviate these deficiencies. 
First, forensic employers and professional organizations have an obligation to develop 
and maintain a public registry of forensic examiners that have resigned or been 
terminated in relation to fraudulent activity. This would include a clear description of 
institutional measures taken to review affected cases and prevent future fraud of a similar 
nature. Second, forensic laboratories should be prohibited from employing examiners 
with a criminal history, or a history a forensic fraud or other misconduct. Third, forensic 
organizations should adopt strict policies requiring the public expulsion of any member 
that has a criminal history, or a history a forensic fraud or other misconduct.
These remedies, providing for enhanced transparency and accountability, would go a long 
way in preventing fraudulent examiners from transferring to other jurisdictions – a 
problem identified in multiple cases within the present study. Primarily, however, they 
would help to restore and maintain confidence in affected agencies and organizations. 
While they may seem extreme to the uninitiated, they are actually common in the 
sciences with respect to the publications of the U.S. Office of Research Integrity already 
cited, and the various state databases that publicly catalog the revocation of certifications 
or credentials of licensed professionals (e.g., attorneys, school teachers and medical 
healthcare professionals).
Future Research 
The discussions regarding necessary forensic reforms in this chapter lead to a recognition 
that there are many areas where future research efforts should focus in order to help 
anticipate and limit the frequency of forensic fraud. These include:
1. More general research into the areas of bias, fraud, and error in relation to 
potentially mitigating employer and examiner variables – as suggested by the 
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NAS Report. Specific recommendations would include research into correlates of 
bias, fraud, and error related to Drug2 and Biological (non-DNA) evidence.
2. Examination of correlates between fraud, a higher degree of scientific education. 
Specifically, the data revealed examiners possessing no science education that 
committed errors and then attempted to cover them up with acts of fraud. The 
precise nature and frequency of this particular forensic fraud sub-type was not 
explored in the present research, suggesting the need for further study.
3. Examination of correlates between fraud, fraud types, and examiner affiliation 
with specific professional organizations and ethical codes (or their absence) – to 
assess efficacy and impact.
4. Examination of correlates between the presence or absence of specific resume 
variables not investigated by the present research (e.g., specific degree types, the 
absence of degree titles, the presence of media appearances, and the absence of 
training dates) and forensic fraud, in order to suggest red flags for use during the 
hiring process.
5. Examination of correlates between specific addictions, medications, or mental 
health variables not covered by the present research and forensic fraud, in order to 
better inform the employee vetting process.
6. Examination of correlates between specific forms of criminal activity, drug abuse 
and forensic fraud, in order to better inform preventative policies and auditing 
efforts.
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7. Examination of correlates between the specific traits of accredited and non-
accredited forensic laboratories not examined in the present study, to better 
understand how accreditation impacts different incarnations of forensic fraud.
8. Examination of correlates between the results of internal and external forensic 
laboratory audits, in order to better inform preventative policies and future 
auditing efforts.
Although these research recommendations may seem relatively unambitious, they reflect 
two important realities: first, they are the areas of research explicitly suggested by the 
current data, in order to gain a greater understanding of the relationships that the current 
data suggest; second, more ambitious research should not be undertaken until more basic 
and foundational research has been completed to the many address years of empirical 
neglect that have been demonstrated.
Consequently, these research recommendations, in combination with the specific 
recommendations for future research necessary to understand the findings of the present 
study discussed in the prior chapter, provide the forensic science community with 
significant direction and opportunity for examining the complex phenomenon of forensic 
fraud in the years to come. 
Conclusion
Forensic fraud is a major concern for the criminal justice system. It results in a significant 
cost from retesting evidence, overturned cases, dismissed cases, and civil actions for 
wrongful convictions. It can also simultaneously destroy the lives of innocent defendants, 
the careers the forensic examiners involved, and the credibility of their employers and co-
workers by association. This to say nothing of eroding public confidence in the justice 
system and those working within it.
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Prior to the publication of the NAS Report, a persistent group of criminal justice 
reformers consistently worked to reveal the absence of scientific education, research, or 
culture in forensic science practice. They also chronicled the lack of forensic parity 
between the defense and the prosecution, while calling for due process from the courts. 
Some of these even called for the separation of forensic science practice from law 
enforcement oversight.
In 2009, the publication of the NAS Report included the observations that the forensic 
science community suffered an unhealthy alignment with law enforcement; an absence of 
properly educated scientists; an absence of scientific research into methodology, bias, 
error and fraud; an absence of mechanisms for identifying error and fraud; and an 
absence of consistent practice standards, ethical guidelines, and accountability to manage 
those forensic examiners that would violate the mandates of scientific integrity. It also 
acknowledged the problem of bias, fraud, and error in forensic fraud – and the 
corresponding lack of sufficient empirical research to suggest informed management 
strategies.
In the wake of the NAS Report and its watershed findings, the current study is a first 
exploratory effort into the phenomenon of forensic fraud. Though preliminary, it has 
yielded results that suggest the immediate importance of specific reforms. It supports the 
assertion that forensic fraud tends to be the result of cultural, pathological and systemic 
causes rather than the narrow motives of single individuals, as the circumstances 
surrounding it must be allowed to develop and persist by those in the immediate forensic 
environment. It also supports the assertion that although private (e.g. defense) 
forensic practitioners are routinely characterized as biased or mercenary, those 
working on behalf of the state (e.g., the police and the prosecution) are responsible for a 
substantial amount, if not the majority, of known cases of forensic fraud. Additionally, it 
is fair to say that Routine Activities Theory, Differential Association Theory, and Role 
Strain Theory provided useful insights into cultural and other environmental influences 
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brought to bear on the forensic examiner.
Of further significance, this dissertation has also revealed specific areas of future research 
that would add to the current body of literature relevant to our understanding of how to 
anticipate and manage the occurrence of forensic fraud.
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